Adjustment of commercial banks' interest rates and the effectiveness of monetary policy: evidence from Anglophone West Africa by Bangura, Lamin
ADJUSTMENT OF COMMERCIAL BANKS’ INTEREST RATES AND THE 
EFFECTIVENESS OF MONETARY POLICY: EVIDENCE FROM ANGLOPHONE 
WEST AFRICA 
 
 
 
LAMIN BANGURA 
Student No: 609B0079 
 
 
 
 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS 
FOR THE DEGREE OF 
 MASTER OF COMMERCE (FINANCIAL MARKETS)  
 
 
DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS AND ECONOMIC HISTORY  
RHODES UNIVERSITY, GRAHAMSTOWN  
 
 
 
 
 
SUPERVISOR: PROFESSOR MESHACH J. AZIAKPONO 
2011 
 
ii 
 
ABSTRACT 
Most central banks use short-term interest rates as their main instrument of monetary policy. 
It is assumed that a change in policy rate will influence interest rates set by commercial 
banks, but this is not usually the case. Commercial banks adjust their interest rates in 
response to changes in policy rate with lags, which make their interest rates sticky. Stickiness 
in commercial banks interest rates have been seen as an obstacle to the smooth transmission 
of monetary policy decisions. Despite the importance of the transmission process, little 
attention has been given to a systematic measurement of the degree of response of 
commercial banks‟ interest rates to changes in monetary policy stance in the Anglophone 
West African countries, specifically within the West African Monetary Zone (WAMZ) 
economies. Against this backdrop, this study explores the interest rate adjustment dynamics 
using monthly interest rate series on discount rate, treasury bill rate, commercial banks‟ 
deposit and lending rates from 1989 to 2009 (for Gambia, Nigeria and Sierra Leone) and 
from 2000 to 2009 (for Ghana). Specifically, the study set out to examine how lending and 
deposit rates respond to changes in the official rates and to see whether there is a convergence 
among the rates over time. Also, to examine the relative adjustment of commercial bank 
lending rates to changes in the official rate when there is disequilibrium. The analyses were 
twofold: a full sample period and a rolling window analysis. Following Cottarelli and 
Kourelis (1994), the study employed cointegration technique and an asymmetric error 
correction model to obtain the short-run and long-run parameters from which the error 
correction coefficients, mean adjustment lags and asymmetric mean adjustment lags were 
estimated. 
The results for the entire sample period revealed that the long-run pass-through in Nigeria 
was 81% and 67% for lending rates and deposit rates respectively. In Ghana, it was 66% and 
69% for lending and deposit rates respectively. While in Sierra Leone, long-run pass-through 
was 62% and 72% for lending and deposit rates respectively. In Gambia, it was 50% and 40% 
for lending and deposit rates respectively. On the other hand, the short-run pass-through was 
found to be lower compared to the long-run pass-through: in Nigeria it was 66% and 47%; in 
Gambia, 26% and 29%; in Sierra Leone, 30% and 13%; and in Ghana, -6% and 35% for 
lending and deposit rates respectively in each country. The pass-through estimates for the 
rolling windows were mixed for short-run and long-run pass-through.  
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The mean adjustment lags suggest that the speed of adjustment of Lending rates for full 
sample period were two, two, seven and twelve months in Nigeria, Ghana, Sierra Leone and 
Gambia respectively. While for deposit rates they were five, six, seven and eighteen for 
Ghana, Nigeria, Gambia and Sierra Leone respectively. The average speeds of adjustment for 
the rolling windows were four and five months for lending and deposit rates respectively. 
Weak evidence of convergence was found in lending and deposit rates in the short-run and 
long-run pass-through among the countries. 
However, the results suggest that the magnitude and speed of the pass-through amongst the 
countries on average were high compared to emerging Asian countries. Significant 
asymmetric adjustments were found in the lending rates for Gambia and Sierra Leone, while 
in Gambia and Nigeria there were asymmetries in deposit rates. Based on the evidence 
provided, interest rate pass-through is high in Nigeria and Ghana compared to Gambia and 
Sierra Leone and this calls for the harmonization of financial policies on the part of the 
financial authorities in the WAMZ. Viewed solely from an interest rate pass-through, the lack 
of convergence among the countries suggests that WAMZ is far from ready for a monetary 
union. The relatively low pass-through in some of the countries suggests rigidity in the 
banking system which may be due to underdevelopment of the system. Thus efforts geared 
toward strengthening the banking system and the financial system as whole would further 
enhance the prospect of a monetary union among them. 
 
iv 
 
DECLARATION 
Except for the references, which are specifically indicated and acknowledged, this thesis is 
wholly my own work and has not been submitted to any other University or College for 
degree purposes.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
v 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
I am indebted to the almighty God for his grace and provision, and to my parents and family 
members for their support while doing this work. My sincere gratitude to Professor Meshach 
Jesse Aziakpono for his guidance, valuable comments, support, understanding, and for seeing 
me through this academic hurdle. I would also like to extend my appreciation to Alhaji 
Alusine Kamara and Mr. Albert Leigh for their financial support. My gratitude to Mrs. Remie 
V. Juana for her invaluable support and encouragement. I am very grateful to all the staff in 
the Economics Department at Rhodes University and my classmates. Thanks to my close 
friends Solomon, Brian and Gideon for a wonderful time in Grahamstown. Furthermore, I 
would like to express my deepest appreciation to Mr. and Mrs. Sylvester Meheux, Dr. Abdul 
B. Kamara, Dr. James Juana, Dr. Victor Bagla, Dr. Robert D. Korsu and my colleagues at 
Guaranty Trust Bank (SL) Limited for the support and encouragement they gave me through 
my studies. This thesis is dedicated to my mother and late father Regimental Sergeant Major 
(RSM) Bangura T.  
 
 
vi 
 
CONTENTS 
Abstract  ............................................................................................................................ ii 
Declaration  ........................................................................................................................... iv 
Acknowledgements .................................................................................................................... v 
List of tables  ........................................................................................................................ viii 
List of figures  ........................................................................................................................ viii 
List of appendices ..................................................................................................................... ix 
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................ 1 
1.1 Context of the Research.................................................................................................... 1 
1.2 Objectives of the Research ............................................................................................... 4 
1.3 Motivation for the Study .................................................................................................. 5 
1.4 The Method of the Study .................................................................................................. 6 
1.5 Organisation of the Study ................................................................................................. 7 
CHAPTER TWO: THEORETICAL ISSUES AND LITERATURE REVIEW ....................... 8 
2.1 Introduction ...................................................................................................................... 8 
2.2 Monetary Policy Transmission Mechanism and its Implications for Monetary Policy ... 8 
2.2.1 Monetary Policy Transmission Mechanisms in Developing Countries ........... 11 
2.2.2 The Interest Rate Channel of the Monetary Policy Transmission 
Mechanism ....................................................................................................... 14 
2.3 Interest Rate Pass-Through............................................................................................. 15 
2.3.1 Theories of Interest Rate Stickiness and Determinants of Interest Rate 
Pass-Through .................................................................................................... 16 
2.4 Empirical Review ........................................................................................................... 27 
2.4.1 Introduction ...................................................................................................... 27 
2.4.2 Developed Economies ...................................................................................... 28 
2.4.3 Emerging and Developing Economies ............................................................. 34 
2.5 Summary and Conclusion............................................................................................... 38 
CHAPTER THREE: OVERVIEW OF THE FINANCIAL SECTORS IN THE WAMZ ...... 40 
3.1 Introduction .................................................................................................................... 40 
3.2 Financial System in the WAMZ: Some Historical Evidence ......................................... 41 
vii 
 
3.3 Structure of the WAMZ Financial System ..................................................................... 42 
3.3.1 Size, Depth and Composition of the WAMZ Financial System ...................... 43 
3.4 Monetary Policy Framework in the WAMZ .................................................................. 56 
3.4.1 Monetary policy framework in Gambia ........................................................... 57 
3.4.2 Monetary policy framework in Ghana ............................................................. 58 
3.4.3 Monetary Policy Framework in Nigeria ........................................................... 58 
3.4.4 Monetary Policy Framework in Sierra Leone .................................................. 59 
3.5 Summary and Conclusion............................................................................................... 60 
CHAPTER FOUR: METHODOLOGY AND EMPIRICAL FRAMEWORK ....................... 61 
4.1 Introduction .................................................................................................................... 61 
4.2 Data and Methodology ................................................................................................... 61 
4.2.1 Data Definitions, Selection and Sources .......................................................... 61 
4.3 Estimation Techniques ................................................................................................... 65 
4.3.1 Tests for Cointegration ..................................................................................... 65 
4.3.2 Empirical Pass-Through Analysis .................................................................... 66 
4.3.3 Equilibrium Correction or Error Correction Model (ECM) ............................. 69 
4.3.4 Mean Adjustment Lag: Symmetric and Asymmetric Error Correction 
Framework ....................................................................................................... 71 
4.4 Summary and Conclusion............................................................................................... 73 
CHAPTER FIVE: EMPIRICAL RESULTS ........................................................................... 74 
5.1 Introduction .................................................................................................................... 74 
5.2 Unit Root Tests ............................................................................................................... 78 
5.2.1 Unit root analyses for the entire sample ........................................................... 78 
5.2.2 Unit root analyses for the rolling windows ...................................................... 79 
5.3 Cointegration Analyses .................................................................................................. 79 
5.3.1 Cointegration analyses for the entire sample  .................................................. 80 
5.3.2 Cointegration analyses for the rolling windows ............................................... 81 
5.4 Results from Interest Rate Pass-Through Analyses ....................................................... 82 
5.4.1 Short-Run Pass-Through Analyses .................................................................. 82 
5.4.2 Long-Run Pass-Through Analyses................................................................... 86 
5.5 Symmetric Mean and Asymmetric Adjustment in the ECM.......................................... 93 
5.5.1 Mean Adjustment Lags .................................................................................... 93 
viii 
 
5.5.2 Asymmetric Mean Adjustment Lags in the ECM ............................................ 98 
5.6 Summary and Conclusion............................................................................................. 104 
CHAPTER SIX: SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION ................................. 106 
6.1 Summary of Study and Findings .................................................................................. 106 
6.2 Policy Implications and Recommendations ................................................................. 111 
6.3 Areas for Further Research ........................................................................................... 113 
REFERENCES ...................................................................................................................... 114 
APPENDICES ....................................................................................................................... 126 
 
 
 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 3.1: Banks with Cross-Border Subsidiaries in WAMZ countries ........................... 44 
Table 3.2: Number Financial Institutions in the WAMZ .................................................. 47 
Table 4.1: Summary of data used for estimation (policy and retail interest rates) ............ 62 
Table 5.1: Descriptive Statistics of the Interest Rates Series ............................................ 74 
Table 5.2: Correlation Analysis between Policy and Retail Interest Rates. ...................... 77 
Table 5.3: Summary of interest rate pass-through analysis for the entire sample period . 80 
 
 
 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 3.1: Ratio of Liquid Liabilities to Gross Domestic Products .................................. 45 
Figure 3.2: Deposit Money Banks Assets to GDP.............................................................. 47 
Figure 3.3: Bank Deposit to Bank Credit ........................................................................... 49 
Figure 3.4: Interest Rate Spread in the WAMZ: 1990–2009 .............................................. 50 
Figure 3.5: The Degree of Bank Concentration in the WAMZ Countries. ........................ 51 
Figure 3.6: Ratio of Stock Market Capitalization to GDP in Ghana, Nigeria and South 
Africa ................................................................................................................ 54 
Figure 4.1: Interest Rate Behaviour : 1989–2009 ............................................................... 64 
Figure 5.1: Changes in Interest Rates over time ................................................................. 76 
Figure 5.2: Estimated Short-Run Pass-Through ................................................................. 83 
Figure 5.3: Short-Run Pass-Through – Lending Rates. ...................................................... 84 
ix 
 
Figure 5.4: Short-Run Pass-Through – Deposit Rates ........................................................ 85 
Figure 5.5: Estimated Long-Run Pass-Through ................................................................. 87 
Figure 5.6: Long-Run Pass-Through – Lending Rates ....................................................... 89 
Figure 5.7: Long-Run Pass-Through – Deposit Rates ........................................................ 90 
Figure 5.8: Short-Run and Long-Run Pass-Through for rolling windows ......................... 92 
Figure 5.9: Mean Adjustment Lag of the entire sample period – Lending and Deposit 
Rates ................................................................................................................. 94 
Figure 5.10: Mean Adjustment Lag of the rolling windows – Lending Rates ..................... 95 
Figure 5.11: Mean Adjustment Lag of the rolling windows – Deposit Rates ...................... 96 
Figure 5.12: Asymmetric Adjustment: Entire sample period for Lending Rates ................. 98 
Figure 5.13: Asymmetric Adjustment: Entire sample period for Deposit Rates .................. 99 
Figure 5.14: Asymmetric Adjustment: Rolling windows – Lending Rates ........................ 101 
Figure 5.15: Asymmetric Adjustment: Rolling windows – Deposit Rates......................... 103 
 
 
 
LIST OF APPENDICES 
Appendix A:  Summary of Empirical Pass-Through Studies ............................................... 126 
Appendix B:  Financial Systems Size and Development Indicators .................................... 131 
Appendix C:  Results of the Unit Root Tests. ....................................................................... 132 
Appendix D:  Summary of Interest Rate Pass-Through Analyses ........................................ 137 
Appendix E:  Summary of Asymmetric Error Correction Terms and Mean Adjustment 
Lags ................................................................................................................ 141 
 
 
 
1 
 
CHAPTER ONE: 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 CONTEXT OF THE RESEARCH 
The banking sector of the financial system in an economy plays an important role in 
transmitting the monetary policy stance of the central bank. A well-functioning banking 
sector will contribute to economic growth, welfare and smooth business cycles. Banks act as 
conduit through which monetary impulses from the central bank are transmitted to the rest of 
the economy. By implication, the activities of banks and their position as intermediaries make 
them relevant in the transmission process of monetary policy impulses of the central bank to 
the rest of the economy (Fuentes and Ahumada, 2003: 1). A key aspect of the monetary 
policy transmission process is the speed at which changes in policy interest rate is reflected in 
commercial banks‟ deposit and lending interest rates. The effectiveness of the central bank‟s 
monetary policy depends largely on how commercial banks adjust their range of lending and 
deposit interest rates to changes in the central bank‟s policy interest rate1. The magnitude and 
speed of these adjustments in lending and deposit rates determines whether these tools of 
monetary policy are effective or not.  
The relevance of the banking sector in the transmission of the central bank‟s monetary policy 
stance can be seen via two important channels: the traditional interest rate channel and the 
credit channel. According to Fuentes and Ahumada, (2003: 1), monetary policy is effective 
through the interest rate channel when the central bank‟s adjustments to short-term interest 
rate have an impact on the real interest rates charged by commercial banks to their customers 
and, ultimately, on investment and consumption in the economy. The interest rate channel 
becomes effective if commercial banks quickly transmit the changes in the monetary policy 
interest rate to their customers, otherwise, ineffective or interest rates are sticky. The 
effectiveness of the central bank‟s monetary policy is crucial for the stabilization of inflation 
and influencing of other economic activities in the economy, and this largely depends on how 
commercial banks‟ interest rates respond to shocks from the central bank‟s monetary policy 
rate. It is worth noting that if monetary policy is to be effective, changes in the monetary 
policy rate should be transmitted to other interest rates quickly, and the magnitude of the 
change should be large enough to influence investment, consumption and aggregate demand 
                                                          
1
 Note that the terms policy, official and policy-controlled rates are used interchangeably in this study. 
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in the economy (Aziakpono and Wilson, 2010: 3).  
A critical and most important issue in the monetary policy transmission mechanism is the 
„pass-through‟, which is defined as the degree and speed of adjustment with which a change 
in the monetary policy interest rate is passed on to commercial banks retail interest rates in 
the economy (Aydin, 2007: 1). If the interest rate pass-through (hereinafter IRPT) is equal to 
one, it implies that the interest rate channel is effective and the IRPT is complete. On the 
other hand, if the IRPT is less than one, it implies that the interest rate channel is ineffective 
and the IRPT is incomplete or sluggish. A high IRPT would suggest a developed, competitive 
and efficient financial system while a low IRPT suggest the opposite. Also, IRPT can either 
be long-term or short-term pass-through. In most cases, long-term and short-term IRPT in 
most advanced economies
2
 are often found to be complete. The stickiness of retail interest 
rates with respect to changes in policy interest rate has been seen as a serious impediment to 
the smooth transmission of monetary policy impulses to the rest of the economy. Therefore, it 
is important for central bankers and policymakers to have a comprehensive understanding of 
the nature of IRPT since it can have important implications not only for monetary policy, but 
to keep track of the level of competition and soundness of the financial system (Aydin, 2007: 
1; Aziakpono and Wilson, 2010: 3). 
Several explanations have been proposed in the literature concerning the variations in the 
magnitude and speed of IRPT across countries and over time. Among these are: the structure 
of the financial system (Cottarelli and Kourelis, 1994); monetary policy regime whether 
market-oriented or controlled (Gidlow, 1998; Egert et al., 2007) and the transparency of 
monetary policy (Kaketsis and Sarantis, 2006; Kleimeier and Sander, 2006; Gambacorta, 
2008; Liu et al., 2008); the degree of competition amongst financial intermediaries (Cottarelli 
and Kourelis, 1994); the stages of financial market development, concentration within the 
banking sector, and the degree financial market openness (Cottarelli and Kourelis, 1994; 
Borio and Fritz, 1995; Mojon, 2000; Weth, 2002); asymmetric information (Stiglitz and 
Weiss, 1981); menu cost (Rotemberg and Saloner, 1987; Hannan and Berger, 1991; Hofman 
and Mizen, 2004); switching cost (Fried and Howitt, 1980; Ausubel, 1991; Cottarelli, Ferri 
and Generale,1995; Angeloni et al., 1995; Berlin and Mester, 1997); adverse selection (Lowe 
and Rohling, 1992); risk sharing (Fried and Howitt, 1980; Lowe and Rohling, 1992); 
consumer irrationality (Fried and Howitt, 1980; Lowe and Rohling, 1992); implicit contract 
                                                          
2
 Cottarelli and Kourelis (1994) conducted a comprehensive study for 31 countries and provided evidence, 
though mixed, of complete long-term and incomplete short-term pass-through.  
3 
 
between banks and their customers as a result of a long standing relationship (Berger and 
Udell, 1992; Allen and Gale, 2004); and economic policy and regulation of the economy 
(Wang and Lee, 2009). 
Policymakers and economists have long realized the importance of the interest rate channel in 
transmitting the monetary policy stance of the central bank to the rest of the economy. De 
Bondt (2002: 6) noted that commercial banks‟ interest rates3 play a crucial role in the 
transmission of the central bank‟s monetary policy stance, especially the speed and the extent 
to which commercial banks adjust their interest rates to changes in official rates. A quicker 
and fuller IRPT of monetary policy interest rates to retail interest rates strengthens monetary 
policy transmission process. Economists such as Cottarelli and Kourelis (1994), Mojon 
(2000) and de Bondt (2005) have proposed arguments that retail interest rates are 
characterized by lower variance than policy controlled interest rates. In this line of thought, 
Bernanke and Gertler (1995) argued that banks are no neutral conveyors of monetary policy. 
Therefore, banks typically may not fully adjust their interest rates when policy interest rate 
changes. However, it is clear that commercial banks may react quickly or slowly to changes 
in policy interest rate. The preceding arguments are further strengthened by Aziakopono, 
Wilson and Manuel (2007: 2) who assert that if “the response of the retail interest rates is too 
small to be noticed or delayed or sluggish, monetary policy may not achieve its desired goal, 
irrespective of the size or magnitude of the change in the official rate”. 
The monetary policy transmission process has been the subject of theoretical and empirical 
research in industrial economies. Consequent on the findings of a comprehensive study by the 
Bank for International Settlement (BIS) in 1994, the debate on the issue of interest rate 
stickiness has sharpened, not only in developed economies but also in emerging and 
developing economies. A major challenge faced by policymakers and economists in 
developing countries is that the monetary policy transmission processes in the context of 
developing economies are not well-understood and are still uncertain. Several attempts have 
been made to unravel the monetary policy transmission process in developing countries but 
these studies focused on Asia and Latin America economies (Acheampong, 2005). As far as 
Sub-Saharan Africa is concerned, empirical studies examining the extent to which 
commercial banks‟ interest rates respond to changes in official rates remain few. The few 
known attempts that have been made in Africa include the works of Jankee (2004) - 
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 Note that commercial bank interest rates and retail interest rates are used interchangeably in this study.   
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Mauritius; Acheampong (2005) - Ghana; Aziakpono (2006) - SACU
4
 countries; Aziakpono, 
Kleimeier and Sander (2007) - SADC
5
 countries; Aziakpono, Wilson and Manuel (2007) - 
South Africa; Aziakpono and Wilson (2010) - South Africa; and Samba and Yan (2010) - 
CAEMC
6
). 
 
Consistent with the findings of Hannan and Berger (1991) and Neumark and Sharpe (1992), 
Jankee (2004) and Acheampong (2005) find asymmetries in deposit and lending rates 
adjustments in Mauritius and Ghana respectively. On the other hand, Aziakpono, Wilson and 
Manuel (2007); Aziakpono and Wilson (2010) and Samba and Yan (2010) find high speed of 
adjustment of retail interest rates to changes in the official rate in South Africa and the 
CAEMC region respectively.  It is clear that the speed and magnitude of interest rate 
adjustment in the context of emerging and developing African countries is unclear and 
requires further investigation. Also, it is evident that the available studies concentrated on 
Southern African economies and much is not known about the developing West African 
economies. To this end the study aims to unveil the dynamics of retail interest rate 
adjustments (interest rate pass-through) in four of the five Anglophone West African 
economies
7
 which make up the second West African Monetary Zone (hereinafter WAMZ). 
1.2 OBJECTIVES OF THE RESEARCH 
The main goal of the study is to analyse the dynamic adjustment of commercial banks‟ 
interest rates in response to changes in policy-controlled interest rate amongst four of the five 
Anglophone West African countries
8
. To achieve this, the following specific objectives are 
pursued: 
 To provide an overview of the financial systems and monetary policy frameworks and 
their implications for the monetary policy transmission mechanism in the WAMZ 
economies; 
 To examine how lending and deposit rates adjust to changes in the central bank‟s 
policy controlled interest rate and to see whether there is convergence in the pass-
                                                          
4
 SACU stands for Southern African Customs Union. 
5
 SADC stands for Southern African Development Community. 
6
 CAEMC stands for Central African Economic and Monetary Community. 
7
 The countries are Gambia, Ghana, Nigeria and Sierra Leone. 
8
 The Republic of Liberia was not included due the unavailability of data and collapsed of the financial system 
as result of prolong civil war which starts in the late 1980‟s.  
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through from policy-controlled interest rate to retail interest rates among the countries 
under investigation; 
 To examine the relative adjustment of commercial banks‟ interest rates to changes in 
official rates when they are either above or below their equilibrium levels; and 
 To recommend policies for monetary integration among member countries. 
1.3 MOTIVATION FOR THE STUDY 
West African economies have a history of economic grouping which dates back as far as 
1975 with the formation of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). 
Subsequent to this, the first West African Monetary Zone
9
 was established by the 
Francophone countries, with the exception of Guinea in 1994. In April 2000, the heads of 
states of Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone signed a declaration for the 
establishment of the second West African Monetary Zone with the aim of launching a single 
currency (ECO) in 2009, later postponed to 2015. Against this backdrop, the study focuses on 
WAMZ economies for a number of reasons: First, these countries have undergone series of 
World Bank sponsored financial liberalization programmes since the late 1980s and early 
1990s, and the outcomes of these liberalizations are perceived to be mixed. Second, the 
financial systems are dominated by rapidly growing banking sectors and sundry of non-bank 
financial institutions. Finally, the banking sectors have been in a state of almost continuous 
evolution since the late 1980s while the non-bank financial markets are growing. Even 
though previous PT studies
10
 have provided sufficient evidence that the financial structures of 
the economy are very crucial for the speed and magnitude of IRPT and the effectiveness of 
monetary policy in the economy, much is not known as far as the WAMZ economies are 
concerned.  
Researchers
11
 have argued that the interest rate channel of monetary policy transmission is 
ineffective in countries where the financial system is underdeveloped and dominated by 
commercial banks. This may lead one to ask: Is this argument true for the WAMZ economies 
in which the financial systems are underdeveloped and dominated by the banking sector? 
                                                          
9
 The first West African Monetary Zone was established in 1994 and it is called West African Economic and 
Monetary Union (WAEMU) and its members include: Benin, Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, 
Niger, Senegal and Togo. 
10
 Studies such as Cottarelli and Kourelis (1994); Sander and Kleimeier (2004) 
11
 See Montiel (1991);  
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Anecdotal evidence
12
 shows that the interest rate channel of monetary policy transmission 
may be relevant for developing countries such as those of the WAMZ but this is insufficient 
in explaining interest rate rigidities. Therefore, a comprehensive analysis is required to unveil 
the dynamics of IRPT in the WAMZ. Moreover, Mishkin (1996: 1) asserts that monetary 
policy affects the economy or macroeconomic variables through monetary transmission 
channels. For the monetary authorities to achieve the intended outcome of monetary policy 
strategy, they need to understand the relationship between operating instruments of monetary 
policy and their ultimate goals (for example, economic growth, price stability, interest rate 
stability, stability in financial markets and employment). Mishkin further suggests that the 
monetary authorities must have an accurate assessment of the timing and effects of their 
policies on the economy, thus requiring an understanding of the mechanism through which 
monetary policy affects the economy. 
There are a number of reasons that could lead one to believe that this study contributes to the 
existing literature. First, no study has been done on the dynamic adjustment of retail interest 
rates to changes in policy interest rates within the WAMZ. This is the first attempt made to 
unveil the dynamic adjustment and importance of IRPT for the WAMZ economies. Second, 
the use of more than one cointegration test to check for the existence of a stable equilibrium 
relationship among the interest rates series in the empirical analysis will help identify the 
short-run and long-run stickiness/rigidities and also the symmetric or asymmetric behaviour 
among the variables. An analysis of the PT process and its convergence over time among the 
WAMZ economies is therefore highly relevant at this time when the region is considering the 
launch of a single currency by 2015. 
1.4 THE METHOD OF THE STUDY 
The research objectives will be addressed using empirical analysis of monthly monetary 
policy rate (i.e., Discount or Treasury bill rates), commercial banks deposit and lending rates 
data from 1989 to 2009 (for Gambia, Nigeria and Sierra Leone) and from 2000 to 2009 for 
Ghana. The data for the various countries are sourced from the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) International Financial Statistics (IFS) with the exception of lending rate for Ghana, 
which was sourced from the download facility of the Central Bank of Ghana (BOG). 
To examine the dynamics of retail interest adjustment to a given change in the official rates in 
each of the four countries under investigation, the study will employ cointegration techniques 
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 See International Monetary Fund Country Report (2009) 
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and an asymmetric error correction model used by Cottarelli and Kourelis (1994) which have 
been followed by a number of authors, such as Toolsema et al. (2002); de Bondt (2002, 
2005); Sander and Kleimeir (2004); Kwapil and Schaler (2010) and Aziakpono and Wilson 
(2010), to study pass-through within and amongst countries. According to Aziakpono, Wilson 
and Manuel (2007: 8) “the benefit of this method derives from the fact that it can be used to 
test for differences in adjustment in interest rates when they are above or below their 
equilibrium levels. In addition, it can be used to determine how long it takes for retail interest 
rates to adjust to changes in the official interest rate”. An important point to note about the 
study is that four cointegration techniques are used to identify long-run relationship among 
the interest rates series. 
A detailed analysis of the relationship between policy rate and retail interest rates will be 
conducted using the rolling regression technique in an error correction framework. The point 
of the rolling regression technique is to measure the dynamic adjustment of interest rates over 
time. These results should provide long run and speed of adjustment parameters, which will 
indicate whether the monetary policy transmission has been stable over time in each of the 
countries under consideration. A comparison will then be made between the various 
parameters across the countries in the sample. This would help in identifying whether 
convergence has occurred or not. 
1.5 ORGANISATION OF THE STUDY 
The structure of the study takes the following form. Chapter two will review the theoretical 
and empirical literature on interest rates stickiness and IRPT in developed, emerging and 
developing countries. Chapter three will present an overview of the various countries‟ 
financial systems and monetary policies frameworks. Also, an analysis will be done on the 
recent trends and development of the financial markets to identify factors that may be crucial 
for IRPT in each country. The fourth chapter describes the methodology and empirical 
framework used to unveil the dynamic adjustment of commercial banks‟ interest rate in 
response a change in policy interest rate within the WAMZ. The variables, their sources and 
econometrics techniques will also be described. In what follows, chapter five presents and 
discusses the results of the analysis for the entire sample period and the rolling windows. 
Finally, chapter six provides the summary of the findings and discusses the policy 
implications. These include the limitations, recommendations and possible areas for future 
research work.  
8 
 
CHAPTER TWO: 
THEORETICAL ISSUES AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
The chapter examines the theoretical issues and empirical literature regarding the relationship 
between the central bank‟s official interest rate and the retail interest rates in developed, 
emerging market and developing economies. Some of the key issues discussed include the 
monetary policy transmission mechanism and its implication for monetary policy in Section 
2.2, followed by a description of monetary policy transmission process in context of 
developing countries and the interest rate channel of the monetary policy transmission 
mechanism. In Section 2.3, interest rate pass-through is described and the theories or 
determinants of interest rate pass-through are also discussed. The empirical review in Section 
2.4 looks at the current state of discussions on the interest rate pass-through literature with 
reference to developed, emerging/transition and developing economies. Section 2.5 
summarizes and concludes the chapter. 
2.2 MONETARY POLICY TRANSMISSION MECHANISM AND ITS 
IMPLICATIONS FOR MONETARY POLICY 
Most monetary policy decision starts with the monetary authorities adjusting the official 
interest rate. Official interest rate (price of funds) changes for a number of reasons, and one 
key reason for such changes might be to stabilize the economy when there is a shock. Short-
term official interest rates, which in some countries are set by the central bank and in others 
by the ministry of finance, are the main instrument of monetary policy. It is worth noting that 
central banks have the capacity to influence money market conditions by an upward or 
downward adjustment in the policy interest rate and this sets in motion other outcomes. 
Therefore, ceteris paribus, it is expected that other interest rates, like the interbank market 
rate and ultimately retail interest rates, follow suit and finally influence investment and 
consumption decisions in the economy. The process through which monetary policy is 
transmitted and ultimately affects inflation and aggregate output is called the monetary policy 
transmission mechanisms (MPTM). According to Samba and Yan (2010: 31) “monetary 
transmission mechanism describes the ways in which monetary policy impacts aggregate 
demand and prices by influencing the investment and consumption decisions of firms, 
households, and financial intermediaries”. 
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The monetary policy decisions of the central bank do not operate in isolation, they steer 
economic activities in the economy through monetary transmission channels (such as interest 
rate, bank lending, balance sheet, asset prices, exchange rate, and expectation channels). It is 
worth noting that, the effectiveness of any of these channels depends on the magnitude and 
speed at which these channels transmit monetary impulses and also depends on factors such 
as the economic regulation, legal, and financial structure of the economy. Thus, the success 
of a monetary policy strategy largely depends on a comprehensive understanding of how 
these channels work and the relationship between operating instruments of monetary policy 
and the ultimate goals
13
 (Buigut, 2009: 2). Therefore, Mishkin (1996: 1) suggests that it is 
imperative for the monetary authorities to have an accurate assessment of the timing and 
effects of their policies on the economy. Thus, this requires a comprehensive understanding 
of the mechanisms through which monetary policy affects the economy. 
Researchers
14
 have argued that the monetary policy transmission process is complex and 
involves a number of stages. Faure (2006: 9) summarized the process into six stages: First, a 
change in the central bank‟s lending rate is transmitted to the private bank-to-bank interbank 
market. Second, the private bank-to-bank interbank market transmits the change to other 
market interest rates. Third, changes in market interest rates are transmitted to asset prices, 
exchange rates and expectations. Fourth, these changes in asset prices, exchange rate and 
expectations are then transmitted to aggregate demand. Fifth, changes in aggregate demand 
are transmitted to money supply. Sixth, changes in money supply are finally transmitted to 
prices. It should be noted that the scope of this study is limited to the first and second stages 
of the transmission process which is relevant for the traditional interest rate channel. Further 
analysis on the transmission process is provided in Section 2.2.2 of this chapter.  
Economic theory suggests that monetary policy actions (changes in interest rates or money 
supply) should influence economic activities in the short or medium term. For instance, when 
the central bank changes its monetary policy stance (policy rate), it is expected that other 
variable interest rates (for example retail interest rates) should respond immediately to such 
changes for the policy instrument to be effective. However, this is not usually the case; retail 
interest rates do not necessarily change at once, nor one-to-one with official rates. The central 
question that might emerge is, Why is it that retail interest rate neither responds immediately 
nor one-to-one when policy interest rate changes? Although this question is answered in 
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detail in Section 2.3.1 of this chapter, Mahadeva and Sinclair (2005: 18) provide some insight 
thereto by asserting that the transmission mechanism of monetary policy depends upon how 
spending decisions of firms and households respond to the interest rates they face. 
Additionally, they state that unless there is strong competition, commercial banks are not 
interest rate takers in the deposit and loan markets, therefore, retail rates on loans and 
deposits are set by them. They suggest that changes in official interest rates are influenced by 
several factors such as: current levels or forecasts of inflation; current levels or forecasts of 
the output gap
15; market‟s expectations of future policy rates; and official interest rate 
changes abroad
16
. However, Bernanke and Gertler (1995: 27) suggest that the mechanism 
through which monetary policy actions are transmitted to the real economy is something of a 
„black box‟, and attempts to understand this mechanism have given rise to a large body of 
both theoretical and empirical literature. 
Empirical studies have shown that the transmission mechanisms of monetary policy are not 
only important for the conduct of monetary policy in developed countries but also in 
emerging and developing economies (Scholnick, 1996; Ramlogan, 2004; Baugnet et al., 
2007; and Samba and Yan, 2010). Highlighting the importance of the transmission 
mechanism and its implication in transitional and developing economies, Ramlogan (2004: 
435-436) suggests that in countries where financial markets are at early stages of 
development, the channels of transmission are important for the following reasons: 
 During the early stages of development of financial markets, the link between the 
financial and real sectors of the economy is likely to change hence it is important to 
determine which of the financial aggregates monetary policy impacts upon. 
 Furthermore, an understanding of the transmission mechanism assists policymakers in 
deciding which market disturbances warrant changes in monetary policy and which 
do not.  
 Finally, knowledge of the transmission mechanism may help promote higher 
investment and a faster pace of economic growth if it leads to a better choice of target 
variables. 
Therefore, the impact of monetary policy on the real economy depends on how changes in 
policy rates are transmitted to retail interest rates (Toolsema et al., 2002: 2). It may be that a 
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small change in the monetary policy stance in the form of a change in short-term interest rates 
could translate to large changes in output. This mechanism is referred to as the accelerator or 
amplification effect of monetary policy (Bernanke and Gertler, 1995; Hubbard, 1994). It is 
therefore important for the monetary authorities to better understand how monetary policy 
transmission mechanism works. Against this backdrop, the next section explores the interest 
rate channel of monetary policy in developing economies.  
2.2.1 Monetary Policy Transmission Mechanisms in Developing Countries 
The monetary transmission mechanisms in the context of developing countries have been the 
focus of recent debates in monetary policy literature. To invigorate the discussion on 
monetary policy transmission process in the context of a developing country,  the description 
of developing economies by Montiel (1991: 84) is restated thus, developing countries are 
characterized by: underdeveloped financial markets with a limited portfolio of financial 
assets available to the private sector; lack of organized securities markets; underdeveloped 
money markets in which the central bank conducts open market operations; interest rates that 
are controlled and fixed by applicable legal norms; and equity markets that are small or 
nonexistent. An obvious question to ask is: Does this assertion by Montiel (1991) still hold 
for developing economies, taking into consideration the level of globalization, economic 
growth, the series of World Bank supported financial liberalization programmes in the late 
1980s and early 1990s, and fast changing financial systems? Insights to the above question in 
terms of the WAMZ economies are reserved for chapter three of this study. 
However, Ghatak and Sanchez-Fung (2007: 127) provide some insights on how the 
transmission mechanism of monetary policy in developing countries should be analysed. 
They stress that transmission mechanism of monetary policy in developing countries has been 
based on measuring the impact of financial liberalization on credit availability. Early studies 
on monetary policy transmission have viewed transmission mechanism in developing 
countries from two perspectives: The McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) view; and the 
Structuralist view
17
 (Montiel, 1991: 85; Ghatak and Sanchez-Fung, 2007: 127). The 
McKinnon–Shaw approach assumes that liberalization of interest rates is crucial since it 
facilitates the movement of idle resources to more productive use. This approach argues that 
an increase in interest rates as a result of financial liberalization will increase output and 
decrease inflation in the short-run, which in turn, boosts savings, causing an increase in bank 
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loans to firms, thereby increasing investment and leading to an increase in real output. In 
contrast to this view, the structuralist approach places more emphasis on the effects of 
financial liberalization in the unorganized money market. The main point of argument in the 
latter approach is that financial liberalization policies may lead to an increase in the marginal 
cost of funds in the unorganized money market. Additionally, the structuralists argue that a 
monetary policy tightening will increase interest rates leading to a drop in the available funds 
in the unorganized money market (or informal loan markets), causing an increase in the 
marginal cost of funds, thereby lowering investment and decreasing real output (Ghatak and 
Sanchez-Fung, 2007: 128). The schematics below show the transmission mechanism of the 
McKinnon–Shaw and structuralist views as follows: 
 McKinnon–Shaw view: 
FL ⇒ i ↑ ⇒ s ↑ ⇒ BL ↑ ⇒ I ↑ ⇒ Y ↑ 
Where FL indicates financial liberalization leading to an increase in interest rates (i↑), which 
in turn increase financial savings (s↑), causing an increase in bank loans (BL↑), thereby 
increasing investments (I↑) and real output (Y↑).  
 Structuralist view: 
FL ⇒ i ↑ ⇒ ILM ↓ ⇒ MCF ↑ ⇒ I ↓ ⇒ Y ↓ 
Where FL indicates financial liberalization increase interest rates (i↑), leading to a fall in the 
informal loan market (or unorganized money market) (ILM↓), causing rise in the marginal 
cost of funds (MCF↑), thereby decreasing investments (I↓) and reducing real output (Y ↓). 
It is worth noting from the above classification that in the McKinnon–Shaw approach, the 
main channel of transmission is through the direct effect of the controlled interest rates on 
savings. While the structuralist approach emphasizes that interest rates should be market-
determined (Montiel, 1991: 86). 
In another scenario, by developing a model that takes into consideration the dynamics of 
financially repressed developing economies, Montiel (1991) explored how actions of central 
banks are transmitted to domestic aggregate demand (or rest of the economy). He modelled 
households, government and the central bank, and the financial system in a standard 
Mundell–Fleming framework that incorporates several important features of an 
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underdeveloped financial system
18
. From his study, he argued that changes in monetary 
policy affect the central bank‟s takings and the fiscal consequence of these changes represent 
a separate channel through which the effects of policy on demand are transmitted (Montiel, 
1991: 106). Additionally, he derived a general equilibrium for which he argued that its effects 
are derived from the consequences of policy changes for the economy‟s stock of foreign 
assets, the parallel market premium and expected rate of inflation. Moreover, these variables 
affect domestic demand and changes in their values that ultimately result to an additional 
channel through which monetary policy influences aggregate demand. 
Ramlogan (2004) using vector autoregression (VAR) analysis shows that the interest rate 
channel plays a relatively insignificant role in explaining output variability in each of the four 
Caribbean countries 
19
, while the credit and the exchange rate channels are more important in 
transmitting monetary impulses from the financial sector to the real sector. However, 
Ramlogan argued that, in countries with relatively underdeveloped money market, the money 
market ceases to be the principal conduit of monetary policy shocks. His findings are in line 
with Carpenter (1999) who developed an IS-LM model to examine monetary policy 
transmission mechanism in developing countries and are also consistent with the findings of 
Montiel (1991). 
Alternatively, Sander and Kleimeier (2006) document that the bank lending channel of the 
Common Monetary Area (CMA) is homogeneous, and the pass-through is often fast and 
complete, while deposit markets are more heterogeneous by showing differing degrees of 
interest rate stickiness and asymmetric adjustment in some countries. Additionally, 
Wijnbergen‟s (1982) results show that an expansionary monetary policy may often lead to 
stagflation in South Korea. Other recent researches have also found different results, 
complicating the understanding of monetary transmission in developing countries. For 
instance, Samba and Yan (2010) find evidence of complete short-term pass-through for 
lending rates in the CAEMC area. These studies will be discussed further under the empirical 
review in Section 2.4. Therefore, it is worth noting that the channels identified to be effective 
in developed economies, such as those in the Euro area and US may not be relevant for 
developing countries like those in the WAMZ (Montiel, 1991; Ramlogan, 2004; Buigut, 
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2009; and Ghatak and Sanchez-Fung, 2007). The next section examines the interest rate 
channel of monetary policy transmission mechanism. 
2.2.2 The Interest Rate Channel of the Monetary Policy Transmission Mechanism  
As noted earlier theoretical and empirical literature on monetary policy transmission has 
identified several channels (interest rate, bank lending, balance sheet, asset prices, exchange 
rate, and expectation channels) through which monetary policy stance of the central bank is 
transmitted to the rest of the economy. While theory offers a wide array of different channels 
of monetary policy transmission, this study only considers the interest rate channel. The 
traditional interest rate channel is considered to be the first link in the monetary policy 
transmission process, and it is the most important channel in the transmission mechanism 
owing to the fact that it cannot be isolated from the other channels of the monetary policy 
transmission mechanism (Baugnet et al., 2007: 2; Ozdemir, 2009: 8; Wang and Lee, 2009; 
Samba and Yan, 2010).      
The interest rate channel, otherwise referred to as the traditional interest rate channel, is the 
core link in the monetary transmission mechanism and has been a key tool in the Keynesian 
IS-LM framework, which indicates that a change in the monetary policy stance, for instance 
an expansionary monetary policy, may affect aggregate demand in the economy. This has 
been a key emphasis of the of the Keynesian monetary transmission mechanism in the IS-LM 
and AD/AS models. Mishkin (1996: 2) provides a schematic, which shows the effect of an 
expansionary monetary policy as follows: 
Expansionary monetary policy ⇒ ir ↓ ⇒ I ↑ ⇒ Y ↑ 
The above schematic implies that an expansionary policy leads to a fall in real interest rates 
(ir↓), which in turn lowers the cost of capital, causing a rise in investment spending (I↑), 
thereby leading to an increase in aggregate demand and a rise in output (Y↑).  
Mishkin (1996: 2) noted that a key characteristic of the interest rate transmission mechanism 
is its emphasis on real interest rate as opposed to nominal interest rates. Additionally, it is not 
the real short-term interest rate but the real long-term interest rate that has a significant 
impact on spending. The fact that real interest rates as opposed to other rates affects spending 
paves the way for another view of how monetary policy can stimulate the economy during 
deflationary periods (i.e., when nominal interest rate is at zero). Furthermore, Mishkin 
(1996:3-4) argues that the interest rate transmission can still be effective even when interest 
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rate is at zero. However, when nominal interest rate is at zero, a commitment to future 
expansionary monetary policy can raise the expected price level (P
e↑) and hence expected 
inflation (πe↑), thereby lowering the real interest rate (ir↓) even when the nominal interest rate 
is fixed at zero and stimulating spending through the interest rate channel as the schematic 
below depicts:  
Expansionary monetary policy ⇒ Pe ↑ ⇒ πe ↑ ⇒ ir ↓ ⇒ I ↑ ⇒ Y ↑ 
The above mechanism indicates that monetary policy can still be effective when real interest 
rates have already been driven down to zero by the monetary authorities. It should be noted 
that the way the interest channel functions in a given economy depends on the financial 
structure and the macroeconomic environment. 
2.3 INTEREST RATE PASS-THROUGH 
Interest rate pass-through, which is the extent to which changes in policy controlled interest 
rates are reflected in short-term and long-term retail interest rates, is measured by the degree 
and speed of adjustment from policy rate to retail interest rates. According to Ozdemir (2009: 
7), interest rate pass-through is defined as “the degree and the speed of adjustment of retail 
interest rates to money market rates”. Therefore, it is worth noting that most central banks use 
short-term interest rate as the main instrument of monetary policy. As indicated earlier, 
changes in the short-term interest rates are the first stage in the transmission of monetary 
policy process. 
Empirical literature on interest rate pass-through hold the same view that most of the central 
banks use short-term money market rates as a major monetary policy tool (Wang and Lee, 
2009; Manna et al., 2001). Manna et al. (2001) further argue that during the transmission 
process, the interest rate fluctuation becomes an important indicator to monetary policy. 
Moreover, de Bondt (2002: 5) provides a useful insight on the PT process by commenting 
that retail interest rate pass-through process is an important link in the process of monetary 
policy transmission, and the pass-through process is an important issue to address because a 
quicker and fuller PT of official and market interest rates to retail bank rates strengthens 
monetary policy transmission. 
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Interest rate PT analyses have been extensively used by several researchers, especially in the 
Euro area
20
. Stemming from the BIS (1994) report and the early work of Cottarelli and 
Kourelis (1994), pass-through analyses have been widely applied in financial markets. They 
could be used to examine how fast and how completely changes in monetary policy rates are 
passed on to bank lending and deposit rates. Furthermore, PT analysis can reveal information 
about competition in banking markets and asymmetries across countries under a single 
monetary policy (Sander and Kleimeier, 2006: 2-3).  
In Africa, some studies have also applied PT analysis. One such study is Aziakpono (2006) 
who uses pass-through analyses to measure financial integration among the SACU countries. 
Sander and Kleimeier (2006) also made use of the PT analyses in the CMA countries of the 
SACU during the period from 1991 to 2005. Also, Aziakpono, Kleimeier and Sander (2007) 
investigate banking market integration in the member countries of the SADC using a 
principal component as well as pass-through analyses. Recently, Samba and Yan (2010) use 
pass-through analysis to examine the degree of responsiveness of deposit and lending rates to 
changes in policy rates in the CAEMC area from 1990 to 2007. With regards to the WAMZ 
economies, there is to date, to the best of our knowledge, no study that has employed the 
method to investigate retail interest rate transmission among these countries. Therefore, a 
study of this nature is timely for the proposed launch of the single currency in the WAMZ in 
2015.  
2.3.1 Theories of Interest Rate Stickiness and Determinants of Interest Rate Pass-
Through 
Given the importance of interest rate pass-through and its significance in the monetary policy 
transmission process in an economy, Economists and policymakers alike in last two decades 
have been challenged by the manner with which retail interest rates adjust to changes in 
policy interest rates. The sluggish adjustment of retail interest rates to changes in policy 
controlled interest rate have undermined the conduct of monetary policy in most countries 
and even in the Euro zone using a common currency. Consequently, an obvious question that 
monetary authorities faced is: Why is it that retail interest rates neither adjust immediately, 
nor one-to-one when monetary policy rate changes? Answering this question has posed a 
major challenge to monetary authorities with regards to the effectiveness of their policies.    
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Attempts to answer the above question have given rise to a myriad of studies seeking to 
provide convincing explanations for stickiness in retail interest rates adjustment. Although a 
host of literature has tried to explain the reasons for such stickiness in lending and deposit 
rates, an early and insightful explanation of interest rates stickiness was provided by Stiglitz 
and Weiss (1981). They used a credit rationing model to explain stickiness in retail lending 
rates. On the other hand, Hannan and Berger (1991) and Neumark and Sharpe (1992) found 
that in the US there are two sources of asymmetries in interest rates which are: collusive 
pricing arrangements and adverse customer reaction. Another noteworthy contribution from 
Lowe and Rohling (1992) argues that theories used to explain price stickiness in the goods 
and labour markets can also be applied in financial markets to explain stickiness in retail 
interest rates. Consequently, they propose four theoretical explanations which are based on 
adverse selection or equilibrium risk sharing, switching costs, risk sharing and consumer 
irrationality. Also, Cottarelli and Kourelis (1994) provide some explanation for the stickiness 
of interest rates. In their cross country
21
 study, they found a number of differences in the 
speed and magnitude of PT among countries and argue that the financial structure
22
 of the 
economy accounts for the stickiness in retail interest rate PT. Recent empirical literatures 
have shown that factors such as: the structure of the financial system; degree of competition; 
bank concentration; asymmetric information; monetary policy regimes; ownership structure 
of banks; the degree of financial market openness and economic policy and regulation in the 
economy are all crucial for the PT from policy rate to lending and deposit rates. Note that the 
explanations here of these factors are brief, as a detailed description will be provided in the 
next section. 
Considering the volume of researches on the monetary policy transmission mechanisms, 
specifically IRPT, since the implementation of single currency in the wider Euro Zone and 
the differing explanations advanced for the stickiness of retail interest rates, the natural 
question that emerges is: What factors are crucial for explaining retail interest rate stickiness 
in financial markets? In what follows, some factors that account for retail interest rate 
stickiness (or determinants of IRPT) that are found in financial markets are discussed.   
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2.3.1.1 Adverse Selection 
It is a common phenomenon in financial markets that one party often does not have enough 
information about the other party to make accurate decisions. This information vacuum could 
be referred to in financial markets as information asymmetry. For instance, in banking, a 
borrower (client) has a better knowledge of his/her potential returns and risk profile of his/her 
investment project whereas the lender (bank) does not. The lack of information between the 
two parties poses a potential problem between the parties before and after the transaction. It is 
possible that potential borrowers who are likely to be high risk are the ones who most 
actively seek out a loan and are thus most likely to be selected (adverse selection). When 
confronted with situation like this, lenders, in protecting against extending bad credits, may 
decide not to extend any loan even though there are good borrowers with good credit risk in 
the market place (Lowe and Rohling, 1992: 4–6). 
Lowe and Rohling (1992: 4) argue that asymmetric information in financial markets 
introduces adverse selection and moral hazards
23
. An increase in interest rate by a bank will 
reduce expected returns on the borrowers‟ investments. Considering the risk and return 
principles in finance, which states “the higher the risks the higher the returns”, borrowers 
with less-risky investments will refrain from loan. This adversely changes the mix of 
potential borrowers (adverse selection). On the other hand, borrowers with high-risk 
investment will seek loan despite the increase in interest rate, and this ultimately leads to 
moral hazards. 
Furthermore, Lowe and Rohling (1992: 4) argue that one major issue attributed to 
asymmetric information is that an increase in the interest rate charge by a bank does not 
necessarily translate to a proportionate increase in the banks‟ expected returns. There is 
always an inverse relationship between the probability of loan defaults and banks‟ expected 
returns. Therefore, if interest rate increases, it will lead to a rise in the probability of loan 
default, and this would result in a fall in the banks‟ expected returns. Faced with this 
situation, the bank will decide not to increase its interest rates, even if its cost of funds 
increases. Therefore banks will be forced to set their interest rate below the prevailing market 
rate and ration credit. As such, the interest rate charged by the bank becomes more rigid with 
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upward stimulus. It is therefore worth noting that such price rigidity can only hold in markets 
where credits are rationed. 
2.3.1.2 Switching Costs 
When a customer decides to change from one bank to another, there are costs involved, 
which are called switching costs
24
. The higher these costs are, the more difficult it is for the 
customer to switch from one bank to another. In the bank loan market, banks are not only 
concerned about the potential expected returns on a loan transaction, but also the risk profile 
and potential behaviour of their customers. Therefore, it is imperative on the bank to obtain 
the necessary information about the characteristics of its customers. The process of collecting 
such information is costly, and the banks in most cases pass this cost onto the customer 
concerned in the form of a once-off fee. This means that, for future loan transactions, such 
fees are not applicable to the customer since the bank already has the necessary information 
on the customers‟ risk profile. With this in mind, a customer would not readily switch from 
one bank to another. Lowe and Rohling (1992: 6) note that there are regular search and 
application costs involved, and these costs are often more significant in banking than other 
goods markets. 
Switching costs therefore apply to markets with high search costs and transaction costs. Since 
the additional costs make switching from one bank to another costly for customers, they will 
in some cases accept whatever interest rate the bank offers, even though such rates may be 
higher than the current market rates. Thus, interest rate becomes sticky (Lowe and Rohling, 
1992: 6). Also, Fried and Howitt (1980: 486) argue that when the lending rate is higher than 
the marginal cost of funds, customers seldom change banks because of the switching costs. 
Additionally, Ausubel (1991: 69) argues that, even though there are other reasons for the 
stickiness of credit card rates, search/switch costs may lead to sticky interest rates.  
2.3.1.3 Risk Sharing 
In financial markets investors are exposed to several risks such as interest rate risks, credit 
risks, liquidity risks and systemic risks. Interest rate risk, according to the Bank for 
International Settlement (BIS, 1997: 6) “is the exposure of a bank‟s/firm‟s financial condition 
to adverse movements in interest rates”. Changes in interest rates affect the earnings and 
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underlying performance of both banks and their customers. Therefore, it is beneficial for both 
the bank and its customers to engage in a mutually beneficial arrangement of sharing risk 
resulting from adverse movement in interest rates. Fried and Howitt (1980: 472) suggest that 
banks and their customers should have an equilibrium risk-sharing arrangement and by means 
of such arrangements they both can share the risks associated with the uncertain future. 
Furthermore, they describe the risk-sharing arrangements as an insurance contract in which 
one party (bank, less risk-averse) agrees to compensate the other party (customer) by bearing 
risk which the customer is exposed to for a fee. Borrowers regard the fee as an insurance 
premium and would hesitate to change banks because of such arrangements. 
As a result of the risk-sharing arrangement, the bank will now charge stable interest rates and 
the customer will also be willing to compensate the bank in the form of either additional fees 
or higher average interest rate. The ultimate result of such an arrangement is stickiness in 
lending rates (Fried and Howitt, 1980: 472). Also, Fried and Howitt (1980: 472) note that the 
arrangement between the banks and their customers is usually based on maintaining a 
continuous relationship, and those long-established customers are less likely to receive 
variable interest rates than others to be rationed. The kind of arrangement between banks and 
their customers could also be referred to as a sort of implicit contract between the bank and 
its customers (Berger and Udell, 1992; Allen and Gale, 2004). 
2.3.1.4 Consumer Irrationality 
Lowe and Rohling (1992) noted that switching costs alone cannot fully explain interest rate 
stickiness in financial markets. Ausubel (1991: 71) argues that there is a class of borrowers 
who repeatedly believe that they will pay the outstanding balance before the due date but fail 
to do so, and these customers, who are insensitive to interest rate changes, are the class of 
borrowers that the banks prefer. Further, Lowe and Rohling (1992: 12) argue that high risk 
credit card borrowers, on the other hand, are more likely to be interest rate sensitive because 
they fully intend to borrow on their cards. A credit card rate reduction will only attract 
customers who fully intend to borrow (i.e., the high risk customers). This "reverse" adverse-
selection problem makes banks less likely to compete on credit card rates and thus rates are 
likely to be sticky, especially in the downward direction (Lowe and Rohling, 1992: 12). 
 
The four theories discussed above are proposed by Lowe and Rohling (1992) as a way of 
explaining interest rate stickiness in the financial market. These four theories, though they 
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provide the basis for most empirical studies on the interest rates rigidities, only present a 
succinct explanation by focusing on banks and their clients. They ignore economic factors 
other than bank-client relationships, such as level of competition and concentration in the 
banking industry, financial structures of the economy, menu costs and ownership structure of 
banks. However, in an attempt to provide a more holistic discussion on the subject of retail 
interest rate stickiness and the determinants of interest rate pass-through, the discussion 
continues with other determinants of interest rate pass-through. 
2.3.1.5 Menu Costs 
Menu costs are costs incurred by firms as a result of changing prices, creating new adverts, 
updating price lists, brochures, publishing and distributing new catalogues to its customers, 
and making its sales staff aware of the changes in price when underlying cost and demand 
condition changes or when inflation erodes existing prices (Madsen and Yang, 1998: 296–
297). Owing to the fact that these activities are time consuming and costly, firms do not often 
alter their prices, which thus contributes to price stickiness. Rotemberg and Saloner (1987: 
919) noted that the reason why prices do not respond to changes in underlying conditions is 
that there may be fixed costs attached to changing prices. Thus, in the presence of fixed costs 
of price changes, the monopolists sluggishly adjust prices. 
It is usually costly to change prices and as a result, banks may delay before responding to 
policy rate changes. In situations where banks expect that the change in policy rate is 
temporary, or expect a reversal in the policy rate change within weeks, they might leave their 
own rates unchanged (Cottarelli and Kourelis, 1994: 591). Additionally, the level of change 
in policy rate can also determine whether commercial banks will react to such changes. As 
noted by Mahadeva and Sinclair (2005: 19), “there may also be a narrow range within which 
official rates can move while provoking no retail interest rate response”. It should be noted 
that menu costs have been one of the key arguments for retail interest rate stickiness in 
banking lending and deposit rates. 
2.3.1.6 Structure of the Financial System 
The structure of the financial system has been one of the crucial parameters of the smooth 
transmission of monetary policy stance in an economy. It could affect the way in which retail 
22 
 
interest rates adjust to policy rates. For instance, empirical evidences
25
 have shown that the 
structural differences within the Euro zone have jeopardized the conduct of monetary policy. 
One early influential study of the relative importance of the financial structures in the pass-
through process is Cottarelli and Kourelis (1994). Despite the fact that this study provides the 
basis for most pass-through studies, a notable contribution is revealing that stickiness in 
lending rates is attributed to the financial structures of an economy. The authors indicate that 
structural variables, such as those reflecting the degree of competition within the banking 
system, the extent of money market development and openness of the economy, ownership 
structure of the banking system, and the degree of development of the financial system, are 
crucial in determining the speed of IRPT. Note that the above financial structure variables are 
discussed in detail under a separate heading in the ensuing sections. 
2.3.1.7 Degree of Competition and Bank Concentration 
Competition in the banking sector is highly desirable for the effective transmission of 
monetary policy impulses. Competition among banks or between banks and non-bank 
financial markets result in profit-maximizing behaviour, and such behaviour warrants banks 
to quickly adjust their retail interest rates in response to changes in market conditions. Also, 
Egert et al. (2007: 212) noted that weak competition among banks, or between banks and 
non-bank financial intermediaries, reduces the speed of adjustment of retail interest rates to 
changes in deposit rates.  Alternatively, higher banking concentration reduces IRPT since 
banks adopt oligopolistic behaviour, which leads to asymmetric adjustment of retail interest 
rates. High banking concentration may possibly lead to lower degree of competition in 
financial markets and therefore stickiness in PT from policy rate to retail rates (Cottarelli and 
Kourelis, 1994: 605). However, Cottarelli and Kourelis (1994: 613) note that if banks in 
highly concentrated financial markets are subject to threat of new entry, they behave 
competitively.  
2.3.1.8 The Ownership Structure of Banks 
The ownership structure of the banking system in economy could also influence the 
magnitude and speed of adjustment of retail interest rates to changes in policy rates. 
Ownership of the banking sector can either be state-owned or private-owned. In an economy 
where the banking system is dominated by state-owned banks, the PT is expected to be 
                                                          
25
 Cottarelli and Kourelis (1994); Mojon (2000); de Bondt (2005) 
23 
 
stickier since these banks are not under pressure to make profit. Also, the existence of 
political constraints (such as protecting the interest of the Government) and inefficiency 
could also adversely impact the speed of PT (Cottarelli and Kourelis, 1994: 613; Aziakpono 
and Wilson, 2010: 13).  
2.3.1.9 Degree of Financial Market Openness and Development 
The advent of financial innovations such as derivatives and other structured products, 
coupled with the rapid growth in the level of globalization of financial markets and the 
increasing integration between domestic and global financial markets, have made it 
challenging for monetary authorities to achieve domestic objectives of monetary policy. In 
economies with globalized and integrated financial systems, price development in other 
financial markets can trigger changes in the price of financial assets in the domestic market. 
These price developments can potentially render the tools of monetary policy being 
ineffective and the PT to be sluggish (Kuang, 2008: 5). Also, Kuang (2008: 15) argue that 
financial globalization weakens the level of IRPT especially in small economies that lack the 
ability to influence global interest rates and market conditions. 
On the other hand, Aziakpono and Wilson (2010: 13) argue that the responses of domestic 
banks to changes in policy rate depend on the liquidity position of the banks and the level of 
dependency of banks on the central bank‟s accommodation facilities. If the financial system 
is open enough for domestic banks to access external sources of financing their liquidity 
needs, it would reduce their reliance on the central bank‟s accommodation facilities.  
Therefore, in an open financial system, retail interest rates adjust sluggishly compared to 
when the financial system is closed. However, Cottarelli and Kourelis (1994: 607) contend 
that interest rates adjust quickly to changes in policy rate in more sophisticated financial 
environments. 
2.3.1.10 Asymmetric Information 
The adjustment of retail interest rates is usually affected by imperfections in financial 
markets. These imperfections create market disequilibrium information, also called 
information asymmetries. Asymmetry of market information is crucial for the speed of pass-
through since it can prevent banks from not reacting to an increase or decrease in policy rate 
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(Acheampong, 2005: 6). Empirical studies
26
 have provided sufficient evidence to show that 
the presence of information asymmetry in financial markets has contributed immensely to the 
sluggishness or incompleteness of the PT process. Also, Stiglitz and Weiss (1981)
27
 provide 
further insight into the issue of information asymmetry by arguing that banks compensate for 
taking risks by creating a wide margin between lending and deposit rates, a margin which is 
insensitive to small changes in official rates. However, Lowe and Rohling (1992: 4) comment 
that the information gap between banks and the risk profile of their customers introduces 
information asymmetry that leads to moral hazards and adverse selection problems in 
financial markets. 
Aziakpono and Wilson (2010: 13) note that asymmetric adjustments of interest rates in 
financial markets can be explained using two competing hypotheses – the collusive pricing 
behaviour of banks  and the adverse customer reaction hypotheses attributed to Hannan and 
Berger (1991); Neumark and Sharpe (1992); and Scholnick (1996). Note that these two 
concepts are crucial for this study and therefore discussed under a separate heading in the 
next section.   
2.3.1.11 Adverse Customer Reaction and Collusive Pricing Arrangements 
As already noted, rigidity in the PT is the reason for asymmetries in financial markets. 
Neumark and Sharpe (1992) following Hannan and Berger (1991) were the proponents of 
asymmetries in retail bank interest rates. From their respective studies on the US market, they 
were able to propose two competing hypotheses to explain asymmetry: collusive behaviour of 
banks and adverse customer reaction. They suggest that, in highly concentrated markets, it is 
difficult for banks to alter their collusive price arrangements. For instance, increases in 
deposit rates imply an extra payment by the bank for deposits. This implies rigidity in 
increasing deposit rates. Alternatively, Scholnick (1996) extended the collusive price 
arrangement to lending. For instance, a decrease in lending rate will result in lower revenue 
to the bank because of the loss of interest income by the bank. This means lending rate will 
be more rigid downward as banks perceive a loss of revenue. Wang and Lee (2009: 1237) 
summarized the concept by indicating that collusive pricing arrangement implies rigidity in 
increasing the deposit rate and decreasing the lending rate. The customer reaction, on the 
other hand, implies greater rigidity in a deposit rate decrease and increase in the lending rate. 
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Following Hannan and Berger (1991) and Neumark and Sharpe (1992), Scholnick (1996) 
finds evidence of collusive pricing arrangement in Malaysia and Singapore. He shows that 
deposit rates in both countries are more rigid when below equilibrium than when above it and 
further states that banks in both countries tend to adjust their deposit rates downward more 
rapidly than upward. Lim (2001), using a multivariate asymmetric error-correction model, 
also provides evidence of upward adjustment rigidity in deposit rate and downward rigidity in 
lending rate in Australia
28
.  
2.3.1.12 Monetary Policy Regimes 
The structure of the monetary policy regime is crucial for the level of PT in an economy. For 
instance, in economies where monetary policy is conducted by means of a direct control of 
interest rates and credit allocation, retail interest rates will only change when the authorities 
adjust set rates. Thus, retail interest rates become rigid. On the other hand, in liberalized and 
deregulated economies, interest rates and credit allocation are determined by market forces 
which make interest rates to be more flexible and adjust quickly to changes in monetary 
policy stance (Aziakpono and Wilson, 2010: 12). Also, economies that adopt more 
transparent monetary policies (such as inflation targeting) experience high speed of 
adjustment than economies with restrictive policies. 
2.3.1.13 Economic Policy and Regulation in the Economy 
The speed of pass-through from policy rate to retail interest rates according to Wang and Lee 
(2009: 1270) largely depends on economic policies and regulations in an economy.  Cottarelli 
and Kourelis (1994: 612) show that stickiness in lending rates is strongly influenced by not 
only structural parameters of the financial system, but also its regulatory environment.  
Regulatory measures such control on the foreign flow of capital from foreign financial 
markets reduce competitiveness in the domestic banking sector and this results in retail 
interest rate stickiness 
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2.3.1.14 Money Market Volatility, Inflation and Macroeconomic Conditions 
Studies
29
 have shown that money market rate volatility and inflation are crucial for the size 
and speed of interest rate pass-through of official rate to retail interest rates. For instance, 
Sander and Kleimeier (2004) show that lower money market volatility impacts the size and 
speed of interest rate pass-through positively while higher money market volatility negatively 
impacts interest rate pass-through.  Also, pass-through is faster when inflation is higher, but 
in low inflation monetary policy regime pass-through is expected to be slow. It has been 
shown that financial reform and more transparent monetary policies
30
 stimulate the speed of 
adjustments of interest rate more than restrictive policies (Aziakpono and Wilson, 2010: 30). 
Moreover, in periods of high interest rates volatility, higher inflation and rapid economic 
growth, banks pass on changes in policy rate to lending and deposit rates faster (Egert et al., 
2007: 212).  
The above explanations form the basis for clarifying retail rate stickiness in financial markets 
as there is no consensus in the existing literature. However, it is worth noting that available 
empirical evidences have provide differing reasons for retail interest rates stickiness across 
different markets within the same country (Lowe and Rohling, 1992; Hannan and Berger, 
1991; Neumark and Sharpe, 1992; Aziakpono, Wilson and Manuel 2007), and across 
countries (Cottarelli and Kourelis, 1994; Borio and Fritz, 1995; Mojon, 2000; Wang and Lee, 
2009; Kwapil and Scharler, 2010). Despite the fact that several authors have proposed 
differing explanations to justify the sticky or sluggish nature of retail interest rates, no 
consensus has emerged on the issue even within the EMU countries operating a single 
monetary policy.  
From the foregoing discussions, a few trends emerged which are worth mentioning. First, the 
factor that determines the magnitude and speed of the interest rate pass-through from policy 
rate to retail interest rates varies from country to country. Second, stickiness in retail interest 
rates within a country varies over time; as financial markets develop and become 
sophisticated, so the pass-through increases. Third, pass-through largely depends on the 
structure of the financial system. Finally, it was evident that as far as the current level of 
debate on factor limiting pass-through is concerned, there is no consensus in the literature. In 
what follows, the next sections review the empirical literature on interest rate pass-through. 
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Discussion begins with studies on developed economies and then moves on to research done 
on emerging and developing economies. 
2.4 EMPIRICAL REVIEW 
2.4.1 Introduction 
Early studies
31
 on the subject of monetary policy transmission mechanism and its 
effectiveness focused on price rigidities and adjustments under a framework of oligopolistic 
competition. Given the significance of the pass-through process for the conduct of monetary 
policy, interest in the speed and magnitude of retail interest rates adjustments to changes in 
policy controlled rate have heightened in recent years, and this has led to several landmark 
researches. Studies on retail interest rate pass-through became popular after the successful 
implementation of the single currencies (Euro) in Europe. The associated asymmetries and 
the observed differences in financial structure and how they affect the pass-through process 
the Euro zone have attracted lots of attention in the literature (Wang and Lee, 2009: 1272). In 
this regard, Sander and Kleimeier (2002) comment that most research on interest rate rigidity 
focuses on the Economic and Monetary Union member countries. Some examples in the Euro 
area of such studies include Sander and Kleimeier (2000); Mojon (2000); Donnay and 
Degryse (2001); Toolsema et al. (2002); de Bondt (2002); Sorensen and Werner (2006); and 
Mirdala (2009). 
Even though some authors have attempted to classify pass-through studies, it is important to 
note that there is no consensus on how these studies are classified. For instance, Sander and 
Kleimeier (2004) consider two approaches to IRPT studies, the “cost of funds approach”32 
and the “monetary policy approach”33. On the other hand, de Bondt (2002) considers a 
different approach and classifies the studies into: those that show that transmission of policy 
and/or money market rates to lending rates are incomplete in the short-run; those that 
examine the issue of asymmetry in interest rate pass-through process; and those that examine 
the pricing behaviour of banks by using bank level data. Consequent on the lack of 
consensus, the ensuing discussions are based on issues relevant to pass-through. In situations 
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where applicable, the discussions are presented in chronological order. The first focus will be 
on early studies and then progress to the current state of the debate. Note that a 
comprehensive summary of the studies discussed is provided in Appendix A. The empirical 
review begins with studies done on developed economies and then moves on to discuss 
studies done on emerging and developing economies.  
2.4.2 Developed Economies 
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) is one of the earlier works done on interest rate rigidity. Following 
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), Hannan and Berger (1991), and Neumark and Sharpe (1992) 
formed the basis for the theoretical framework that influences the studies on interest rates 
rigidities. Focusing on the US deposit markets, Hannan and Berger (1991) found that price 
rigidity is significantly greater in markets characterized by higher levels of banking 
concentration and that deposit rates are significantly more rigid when the stimulus for a 
change is upward rather than downward. This reveals asymmetry in banks‟ reaction to 
monetary policy. Their results are consistent with those of Neumark and Sharpe (1992). 
Neumark and Sharpe (1992) also find upward rigidity in the deposit rates of two hundred and 
fifty-five (255) US banks. From these studies, they proposed the hypotheses of collusive 
behaviour of banks and customer reaction hypothesis
34
. These early studies mainly focused 
on asymmetry in financial markets since asymmetry of retail interest rates adjustment has 
been viewed as one of the obstacles to the effectiveness of monetary policy. For instance, 
Borio and Fritz (1995) found asymmetries in lending rates in twelve Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries using a Distributed Lag 
Analysis (DLA) in an Error Correction (EC) framework and found mixed evidence with 
regards to the degree of pass-through. In some countries, they found high degree of pass-
through, while in others interest rate was sticky. They argue that the type of interest rates 
used could explain the differences across OECD countries. As it was evidently clear in their 
study, for policy rate to be fully reflected in retail interest rates it takes three to twenty four 
months. Also, Moazzami (1999) used an error correction model to investigate the adjustment 
lending rates to changes money market rate in Canada and the US and found that lending 
rates respond to changes in market rates with lags.   
As noted previously, the early studies on interest rate rigidities were mainly focused on price 
adjustment under oligopolistic competition. The majority of these studies were able to 
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identify possible asymmetries in financial markets which engender the need for an in-depth 
analysis into the causes of interest rates stickiness in financial markets. Motivated by this, the 
first attempt to provide a comprehensive analysis on the dynamics of interest rate adjustment 
was made by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) in 1994.  The BIS (1994) report 
shows that there are significant differences in monetary transmission within the Euro area and 
that short-term bank lending rates to enterprises are sticky (BIS, 1994). These findings 
initiated the debate on the efficiency of the interest rate transmission mechanism as a tool of 
monetary policy. Subsequent to this, several researchers were keen to uncover the factors 
responsible for such stickiness in bank lending rates. Among these researchers, Cottarelli and 
Kourelis (1994) confirmed the BIS (1994) findings that short-term pass-through is sticky and 
the degree of short-term pass-through is mainly related to factors such as the stage of 
financial market development; the degree of financial market openness; the level of 
concentration in the banking system; inflation; volatility of money market rate and bank 
costs. Following Cottarelli and Kourelis (1994), Borio and Fritz (1995) building on the earlier 
studies by BIS (1994) by using an Autoregressive Distributional Lag (ADL) and Error 
Correction Model also find significant differences in the OECD countries. They argue that 
the differences across countries are as a result of the different types of lending rate used in 
each country. However, although these results confirm the previous findings of the BIS 
(1994) report, there has been no consensus on the factors explaining the cross country 
differences in interest rates transmission. 
Studies
35
 on interest rate rigidities prior to the BIS (1994) report and the study by Cottarelli 
and Kourelis (1994) were mainly focused on the US and other markets; however, the 
successful launch of the single currency in Europe saw a refocus on the interest rate 
stickiness literature, from interest rates rigidities under oligopolistic competition to measuring 
the speed of adjustment under economic and monetary groupings. It is worthy to note that a 
common phenomenon evident within the Euro area is the incomplete pass-through of short-
term retail rates and major differences in interest rate transmission confirmed by the BIS 
(1994) report and other researchers. The incomplete nature of short-term interest rate pass-
through has heightened the debate on the subject and poses a challenge for the conduct of the 
single monetary policy operated within the Euro area.  
                                                          
35
 Hannan and Berger (1991); and Neumark and Sharpe (1992);  
30 
 
In general, most of the early empirical studies
36
 believe that the retail interest rate adjustment 
process is asymmetric. The rigidity in the pass-through is the reason for asymmetries in 
financial markets. Neumark and Sharpe (1992), following Hannan and Berger (1991), were 
the proponents of asymmetries in retail bank interest rates. From their studies, they were able 
to propose two competing hypothesis to explain asymmetry: collusive behaviour of banks and 
adverse customer reaction. They suggest that in highly concentrated markets, it is difficult for 
banks to alter their collusive price arrangements. For instance, increases in deposit rates 
imply an extra payment by the bank for deposits. This implies rigidity in increasing deposit 
rates. Alternatively, Scholnick (1996) extended the collusive price arrangement to lending. 
For instance, a decrease in lending rate will result in lower revenue to the bank because of the 
loss of interest income by the bank. This implies lending rate will be more rigid downward as 
banks perceive a loss of revenue. Collusive pricing arrangement implies rigidity in increasing 
the deposit rate and decreasing the lending rate (Wang and Lee 2009: 1271). The customer 
reaction, on the other hand, implies greater rigidity in a deposit rate decrease and increase in 
the lending rate. Following Hannan and Berger (1991) and Neumark and Sharpe (1992), 
Scholnick (1996) finds evidence of collusive pricing arrangement between Malaysia and 
Singapore. He shows that deposit rate in both countries are more rigid when below 
equilibrium than when above it and further states that banks in both countries tend to adjust 
their deposit rates downward more rapidly than upward. Lim (2001) using a multivariate 
asymmetric error-correction model also provides evidence of upward adjustment rigidity in 
deposit rate and downward rigidity in lending rate in Australia
37
.  However, Marotta (2009) 
finds weak evidence of asymmetry in the EMU countries with the exception of France and 
the Netherlands where evidence of asymmetry was found. 
It is worth mentioning that an objective analysis of pass-through literature without 
mentioning studies conducted in the Euro area would be biased in that studies on the Euro 
area have been the centrepiece of recent debate on pass-through. In this regard, attention is 
now turned to the Euro area. It has been well documented that interest rate pass-through 
process varies a lot in terms of the short-run and long-run pass-through in the Euro area. 
Studies conducted within the Euro area have shown significant difference in the pass-through 
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process, and these differences are believed to be accounted for by country-specific structural 
differences.  
A key issue that is notable as far as the pass-through process is concerned in the Euro area is 
the significant variation observed within the Euro area by most researchers. Most early 
studies
38
 find that the pass-through from policy rate to retail interest rates varies widely 
within the Euro area. For instance, a recent study by Marotta (2009) confirms the findings of 
early studies. By using Engle–Granger cointegration (Engle and Granger, 1987), ADL model 
and Dynamic Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) with data from 1994 to 2003 for nine EMU 
countries, Marotta (2009) shows that pass-through is heterogeneous across the EMU 
countries and incomplete in most countries. Furthermore, Hulsewig et al. (2009) also find 
short-run pass-through in the Euro area to be 54% which indicates an incomplete short-run 
pass-through.  
Besides the marked differences among the Euro area economies, empirically, several 
studies
39
 have shown that retail interest rates in the Euro area respond less than one-to-one to 
changes in policy rate in the short-run and in some cases in the long-run. Recent studies have 
also confirmed this assertion. For instance, Marotta (2009) found that short-run pass-through 
ranged from 12% to 107% before the introduction of the euro and from 15% to 89% after the 
euro was introduced. On the other hand, the long-run pass-through ranges from 40% to136% 
to 20% to101% before and after the introduction of the Euro. De Bondt (2005), measuring the 
pass-through from overnight interest rate to deposit and loan rates in the Euro area in the 
period 1996 to 2001, observed that the short-run pass-through for both deposit and lending 
rates is incomplete, while in the long-run, the pass-through to lending rates is complete, but 
for deposit rates is incomplete. He, however, concluded that pass-through has been quicker 
since the introduction of the euro.  
Empirical evidences
40
 on IRPT from policy interest rates to retail interest rates have shown 
that retail interest rates respond to policy rate with lags in the Euro area. Sander and 
Kleimeier (2000) using cointegration analysis explore asymmetries in the transmission of 
policy rate innovations on bank lending rates to show that the speed of adjustment of lending 
rate to policy rate is sticky in the short-run and changes differ widely within the EMU. Their 
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results have implications for the European Central Bank (ECB), which means that the ECB is 
still confronted with asymmetries that complicate the conduct of monetary policy. Donnay 
and Degryse (2001) explore the pass-through from money market rate to several bank lending 
rates and government bond rate using structural vector autoregressive model (SVAR) based 
on Cholesky decomposition and also find asymmetries in the price of credit both within and 
across countries in Europe. They confirmed that there is divergence in the lending rate pass-
through which is consistent with the findings of Borio and Fritz (1995). On this same line of 
argument, Toolsema et al. (2002) find weak evidence for convergence of monetary policy 
transmission among the EMU countries. Alternatively, Baugnet et al. (2007) show that in 
Belgium, banks adjust their retail interest rates relatively rapidly to changes in market rates, 
even though there is significant heterogeneity across sectors, products and banks. 
Recent studies
41
 follow the same trend of argument that retail interest rates are rigid in the 
short-term and complete in the long-term. Several explanations can be used to justify the 
rigidity in the short-term deposit and lending rates across the EMU countries. One common 
explanation proposed by Toolsema et al. (2002: 6) is that the differences in regulatory 
framework may cause the retail banking market to remain segmented, and the adjustment of 
policy-controlled interest rate may remain country specific, while Wang and Lee (2009) 
argue that the economic policies and regulations account for cross country differences in 
retail interest rates. Moreover, Sander and Kleimeier (2000) argue that the completeness (i.e., 
the speed and the size) of the pass-through depends on the structure of the banking market 
and potential information asymmetries in the economy. Mirdala (2009) shows that the 
efficiency of interest rate channels in the EMU are complicated. Using a Structural Vector 
Autoregressive (SVAR) methodology on the variables
42
 of four EMU countries (i.e., Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Poland and the Slovak Republic), his results show that all five variables 
are different across all the countries, and this complicates the efficiency of the interest rate 
transmission mechanism of the monetary policy pass-through in the selected countries.  
Against this backdrop, some striking evidences emerged about the studies done on the Euro 
area economies. First, it was observed that there are major differences within the Euro area in 
terms of the speed and magnitude of the pass-through. Second, most studies show differing 
results for the immediate pass-through and long-term pass-through; while some studies show 
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that pass-through is incomplete in the short-run, others show that it is complete. Third, 
another issue that is prevalent in most studies is the adjustment asymmetries. Some studies 
found evidence of asymmetric adjustment while others do not. Finally, debates on the factors 
responsible for sticky and incomplete retail interest rates adjustments are still unclear. 
Consequent on the above, attention is now turned to studies between the Euro area and 
Central and Eastern European economies.  
Another strand of studies tried to compare the magnitude and speed of pass-through between 
the Euro area and Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries
43
. In these studies it was 
evidently clear that on average the magnitude and speed of pass-through in the CEE 
economies is higher compared to the Euro area countries. For instance, Sander and Kleimeier 
(2006), by regressing a sundry of retail interest rates on 1-month money market rate using 
symmetric and asymmetric error correction models, show that pass-through in the CEE 
countries is complete and quicker than the Euro area. In confirmation to the findings of 
Sander and Kleimeier (2006), Egert et al. (2007) also find higher pass-through for five CEE 
countries and lower pass-through for three Euro area countries using dynamic OLS, ARDL 
and Engle–Granger cointegration and data from 1994 to 2005.  
To gain further insight on the discussion, attention is now turned to comparative studies 
among developed economies as well as emerging economies. One recent study in this strand 
of literature is Kwapil and Scharler (2010). Analysing equilibrium determinacy in a sticky 
price model by comparing the interest rate pass-through process in the Euro area and US, 
they show that in the US pass-through for deposit rate is almost complete but is incomplete 
for lending rates. On the other hand, they show that pass-through in the Euro area is 
incomplete for both deposit and lending rates and the immediate pass-through is 
heterogeneous. Their results on average for short-run pass-through in US were 97% and 79% 
for deposit and lending rates respectively, while in the Euro area they were 16% and 34%, 
respectively. On the other hand, the long-run pass-through was 93% and 57% for US deposit 
and lending rates respectively, while for the Euro area they were 32% and 48%, respectively. 
In another recent study, Wang and Lee (2009) using asymmetric threshold cointegration and 
EC-EGARCH (1, 1)-M model focusing on the US and nine Asian countries show that there is 
complete pass-through for US deposit rates. While eight Asian economies exhibit asymmetric 
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adjustment in the short run, five of them are found to have upward rigid adjustments in the 
deposit interest rate, and three downward rigid adjustments in the lending rates. All these 
studies propose different explanations for their findings; it should be noted, however, that 
factors such as the financial structure of the economy; regulation and legal structures; 
competition; asymmetry, stage of development of the financial markets; and economic 
policies account for most of the differences in the pass-through process. 
Most early studies on retail interest rate stickiness or interest rate pass-through were mainly 
done in developed economies such as US and the Euro area. However, there has been an 
increasing interest in the issue in emerging and developing countries. The next section will 
provide a review of some of the available literatures on emerging and developing economies.  
2.4.3 Emerging and Developing Economies 
There has been extensive literature on interest rate rigidity in developed countries in the last 
two decades, with relatively few studies on emerging and developing countries. However, the 
movement from exchange rate targeting to inflation targeting regimes in the mid 2000s by 
most emerging market and developing economies towards a market-oriented monetary policy 
operating system has increased the role of interest rate in the economy (Mohanty and Turner, 
2008: 2-5).  
Interest on banks‟ interest rate stickiness has heightened in recent years in developing 
countries primarily on account of the rigidity in retail interest rates and higher margins 
despite financial reforms and liberalization (Acheampong, 2005: 4). Also, Scholnick (1996: 
485) argues that understanding the rigidity of commercial banks‟ interest rates has important 
implications for programmes of financial liberalization in developing economies. The 
discussion starts with an overview of emerging market economies and later progresses to 
developing economies. 
Mohanty and Turner (2008) exploring monetary transmission in emerging markets provide an 
insight on the importance of the pass-through process in emerging countries by affirming 
that, in the 1980s and 1990s, emerging markets experienced several impediments to the 
operation of the interest rate channel. For instance, factors such as lack of well developed 
money and bank markets, frequent shifts in risk premium, and binding interest rate controls 
combined with non-price mechanisms for allocating credit are responsible for such 
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impediments. These factors, they argued, reduced the pass-through and the macroeconomic 
effects of policy rate to other interest rates (Mohanty and Turner, 2008: 10).  
Empirical evidences on interest rate pass-through in emerging market economies are unclear 
based on the fact that these economies are experiencing rapid changes in their financial 
systems. One early study on emerging market economies is Scholnick (1996) who finds 
evidence of asymmetries between Malaysia and Singapore. Using cointegration and error 
correction models, his results show that deposit rates in both countries are more rigid when 
below equilibrium than when above it; suggesting that banks in both countries tend to adjust 
their deposit rates downward more rapidly than upward.  
Berstein and Fuentes (2003) explore the response of commercial banks lending rate to a 
money market interest rate movement in Chile using data on lending, deposit and interbank 
rates from 1996 to 2002 and find high flexibility in retail bank interest rates and sluggish 
adjustment of lending rates to changes in policy rate. They argue that the characteristics of 
banks affect the degree of stickiness in Chile. On the same trend, Tomasz (2003) also found 
evidence of sluggishness of retail interest rate pass-through in Poland. Contrary to Berstein 
and Fuentes (2003), Tomasz argues that the degree of stickiness in retail rates is determined 
by the level of profitability of banks; more profitable banks tend to adjust lending rates faster 
than the less profitable ones. Further, more profitable banks pass-through immediately a 
larger part of market interest rate changes and tend to return faster to equilibrium. On the 
other hand, Burgstaller (2005) using a Structural VAR model shows that long-run pass-
through for most of the retail rates is found to be incomplete in Austria in the period 1995 to 
2003. 
Gonzalez and Salas-Fumas (2005) measure the magnitude and stability of the adjustment 
speed over time and its symmetry to an increase or decrease in the money market interest 
rates in Spain from 1988 to 2003 using Partial Adjustment Model (PAM). Their results show 
that the transmission parameter decreases with the size of banks, especially in loan products, 
and money market interest rate pass-through parameter is less than unity. Additionally, they 
find that pass-through parameter increases in loans during the period of nominal convergence 
but remains stable during the Euro years. On the other hand, Aydin (2007) finds evidence of 
higher pass-through for all types of loans in Turkey between 2001 and 2005. Alternatively, 
Ozdemir (2009) finds contradictory results for Turkey between 2001 and 2007. The latter 
finds greater rigidity in deposit and lending rate decreases than increases, and that retail 
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interest rates do not adjust asymmetrically to an increase or decrease in money market rate in 
Turkey. Ozdemir (2009) further confirms that pass-through from money market to deposit 
and lending rate in Turkey is complete in the long run. 
Moreover, some studies have investigated pass-through of a change in policy rate to retail 
interest rates in the context of emerging and developing African economies. One early 
attempt in Africa was Jankee (2004) who examines the rigidity of commercial banks‟ interest 
rates within a nonlinear framework in Mauritius. Using Johansen cointegration, TAR and M-
TAR models on data from 1988 to 2003, Jankee (2004) found asymmetry in lending rates 
adjustments. It was evident from his results that pass-through was incomplete in Mauritius 
witnessed by the observed values of 41% and 24% for deposit and lending rates respectively.  
One recent study on interest rate pass-through in Africa is Samba and Yan (2010), who focus 
on the interest rate pass-through from the short-term interest rates towards the long-term rates 
by using monthly interest rate series for Central Africa Economic and Monetary Community 
(CAEMC) from 1990 to 2007 in an Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ADL) framework. 
Several findings emerge from this study. First, the short-term pass-through in lending rate is 
twice the deposit rates. Based on this result, they found that the long-term pass-through of 
lending rate was greater than deposit rates. Second, the results show that lending rate is 
characterized by an overshooting effect in response to changes in the policy rate while long-
term pass-through for deposit rate is incomplete (less than unity). The authors attribute these 
findings to several imperfections in the financial systems within the CEAMC countries. For 
instance, absence of competition in the banking sector; excess liquidity in the banking system 
(explains the upward rigidity in deposit rates); and poor financial structures (i.e., stock 
markets). Moreover, when the time span is split into two interest rate cycles, they find 
evidence of asymmetry in the pass-through from policy rate to both lending and deposit rates.  
With regards to Southern Africa, pass-through analyses have been widely applied in 
estimating retail interest rates adjustments (De Angelis et al., 2005; Aziakpono, Wilson and 
Manuel, 2007; Aziakpono and Wilson, 2010), measuring banking market integration 
(Aziakpono, Kleimeier and Sander, 2007) and financial integration (Aziakpono, 2008). The 
three attempts in estimating retail interest rate adjustments that are worth mentioning are De 
Angelis et al. (2005), Aziakpono, Kleimeier and Sander (2007) and Aziakpono and Wilson 
(2010). Focusing on the period just after the Repo system was introduced and after it was 
adjusted, De Angelis et al. (2005) show that pass-through was higher in the first Repo system 
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than the second Repo system. Aziakpono, Wilson and Manuel. (2007) employed the 
asymmetric error correction model as in Scholnick (1996) and two wholesale bank interest 
rates (prime interbank lending rate and the negotiable certificate of deposit rate) to examine 
how market interest rates adjust to changes in the South African Reserve Bank (SARB) 
official rate under different monetary policy regimes in South Africa. Their results show that 
there were higher speeds of adjustment during policy regimes that are market-oriented than 
during less market-oriented eras. Thus their results suggest that a market-oriented policy 
would be more effective in transmitting the effect of the central bank‟s monetary policy 
stance to the rest of the economy. Aziakpono and Wilson (2010) measuring the speed of 
adjustment in different policy regimes in South Africa used four types of cointegration tests44, 
symmetric and asymmetric error correction model and rolling window techniques on data 
from 1980 to 2007. Their results suggest that the speed of adjustment varies across retail 
interest rates, with lending rates having the highest and government bond yield having the 
lowest speeds of adjustment. Also they found asymmetry in retail interest rates adjustment 
and proposed that such asymmetries are a result of the negative customer reaction and 
collusive pricing behaviour of banks. 
As far as the WAMZ economies are concerned, no studies have been done explicitly on this 
topic. However, a study worth mentioning is Acheampong (2005). Acheampong (2005) 
investigates the interest rate channel of monetary policy transmission by analysing both the 
impact and the long run adjustments of the lending rate to changes in the money market rates 
in Ghana. The study also uses both symmetric and asymmetric adjustment based on an error 
correction model. The author finds that interest rates in Ghana respond sluggishly to changes 
in the money market rates. The evidence does not support the hypothesis of asymmetric 
adjustment in bank interest rates to an increase or a decrease in money market rate. However, 
an analysis of the pass-through process among the WAMZ countries is therefore highly 
relevant at this time when the region is considering the launch of a single currency by 2015. 
There is a need for research to be done in this regard. This study aims to fill this gap by 
exploring the interest rate pass-through dynamics within the WAMZ countries.   
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 The cointegration tests are the Johansen Maximum Likelihood, Engle –Granger, Cointegrating Durbin 
Watson and ECM-Based tests. 
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2.5 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
This chapter reviewed the theoretical issues relating to monetary transmission mechanisms 
and retail interest rate stickiness. A brief description of the monetary policy transmission 
mechanism was provided. Interest rate pass-through and the interest rate channel were also 
discussed. The potential explanations suitable to justify interest rate stickiness or 
determinants of interest rate pass-through in financial markets proposed by Lowe and 
Rohling (1992), that is, adverse selection; switching costs; risk sharing; consumer 
irrationality; and menu costs, were discussed. Furthermore, other determinants of pass-
through such as those related to the financial structure of the economy are considered. Based 
on the discussions, one can deduce that the stickiness of retail interest rates can be attributed 
to a host of factors which are also dependent on the economic policy and the regulatory 
environment. Understanding these factors would help monetary authorities implement 
policies that aim at influencing aggregate demand. 
Careful surveys of interest rate pass-through studies reveal a number of interesting patterns in 
the empirical literatures
45
. First, interest rate pass-through estimates vary a lot from country 
to country. Second, in most countries interest rate pass-through is found to be less than one-
to-one adjustment of retail interest rates to changes in monetary policy interest rate, that is, 
interest rate is sluggish and incomplete. Third, the interest rate pass-through lacks uniformity 
between lending rates and deposit rates. For instance, in some countries deposit rates are 
stickier than lending rates while in others lending rates are stickier than deposit rates. Fourth, 
there is large variability in interest rate pass-through, and variability depends on the type of 
interest rates used. Fifth, inconclusive evidence is found as to whether retail interest rate 
adjustments are asymmetric, although, in most countries the adjustment is found to be 
symmetric. Finally, the magnitude and speed of the interest rate pass-through are found to 
decline as the maturity of the bank instrument increases. 
The striking evidences that emerge from the literature are that retail interest rates in 
developed, emerging and developing countries respond sluggishly to changes in 
official/policy rates. This complicates the conduct of monetary policy, even in the Euro area, 
which operates a single currency. The scant literature on developing countries especially in 
Africa creates a gap in the understanding of the dynamics of interest rate pass-through in 
Africa. Also, the conflicting and inconclusive empirical evidences on the dynamics of interest 
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 Note that these findings are reported in the summary of empirical pass-through studies in Appendix A. 
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rate pass-through in developed, emerging and developing economies compounded with the 
scant literature on developing West African countries raised empirical questions on the nature 
of interest rate pass-through. 
Does monetary policy stance of central banks in the WANZ economies affect the real sector 
of the economy via the interest rate channel? If they do, how much of (magnitude) and how 
quickly (speed) are these changes in monetary policy stance transmitted to their ultimate 
targets? These questions can only be answered empirically, and the answer to these questions 
has been the crux of recent researches in the field of monetary economics. The first step in 
answering such empirical questions requires a comprehensive understanding of the structure 
of the financial systems and monetary policy framework of the countries under consideration. 
In what follows the next chapter provides an overview financial system and monetary policy 
of the countries investigated. 
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CHAPTER THREE: 
OVERVIEW OF THE FINANCIAL SECTORS IN THE WAMZ 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
The financial system, which consists of all financial intermediary and financial markets and 
their relations with respect to the flow of funds to and from lenders and borrowers
46
 as well 
as the financial infrastructure, has been seen as a crucial prerequisite for the effective 
transmission of monetary policy in the economy (Haan et al., 2009: 5). Economists
47
 have 
long realized that the financial system of the economy plays a crucial role in determining the 
speed (i.e., fast or slow) and magnitude of transmission of the monetary policy decisions of 
the central bank to the rest the economy. The structure of a country‟s financial system has 
considerable effect on the central bank‟s monetary policies and may impact on its 
effectiveness. It is interesting to note that financial systems differ across countries and the 
WAMZ member states are no exceptions. Therefore, it is imperative that detailed description 
of the structure and composition of the financial system is given since it affects the degree of 
interest rate pass-through (Cottarelli et. al., 1995: 679).  Considering the fact that financial 
structures are crucial determinants of the speed of adjustment of commercial bank interest 
rates to changes in policy rate, this chapter reviews the financial system of each country.   
The focus of this chapter is to provide information on the level of development, structure and 
performance of the financial sector. Also, the structural variables that are essential for the 
pass-through process, such as the size and composition of the financial system, degree of 
competition and bank concentration, ownership structure of the banking system, economic 
policy and regulation, and financial markets‟ openness and development across the WAMZ 
economies are investigated over time. Further, since the monetary frameworks (market-
oriented or controlled) have been seen as a key determinant for the effective transmission of 
monetary policy impulses, information will be provided on the monetary policy framework of 
each country over time. The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 3.2 
provides a brief overview of some historical evidences on the WAMZ financial systems; 
recent changes have taken place in the financial sectors of the WAMZ and these changes 
have implication for IRPT in each country, therefore, in Section 3.3, the financial structure of 
the WAMZ financial systems would be described and assessed. Several pass-through studies 
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 Lenders and Borrowers refer to households, governments, business firms, and foreigners. 
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 Cottarelli and Kourelis (1994), Cottarelli et al. (1995), Mojon (2000), Schwarzbauer(2007)  
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have shown that the monetary policy regime
48
 operated in a country is crucial for interest rate 
pass-through, therefore, the focus of Section 3.4 is to provide an overview of the monetary 
policy regimes adopted by each country under investigation; and Section 3.5 concludes. 
3.2 FINANCIAL SYSTEM IN THE WAMZ: SOME HISTORICAL EVIDENCE 
West Africa has over three decades of history of economic integration. The formation of the 
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), which includes fifteen countries 
(Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Ivory Coast, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, 
Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo), dates back to 1975 and 
provides the framework for economic integration in West Africa. The Francophone countries 
with the exception of Guinea formed the first monetary zone in West Africa in 1994 (Lue et 
al., 2002). 
April 2000 marked a milestone in the history of the ECOWAS with the signing of a 
declaration for the creation of a second monetary zone. The heads of states and governments 
of Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Nigeria and Sierra Leone, acting within the ECOWAS 
framework of regional integration, formed the second West African Monetary Zone (WAMZ) 
with the primary objective of establishing a common central bank that will issue and manage 
a common currency within a cooperative framework (WAMI, 2008). The successful 
implementation of the single currency unit (CFA) by the Francophone West African countries 
prompted the other countries outside the CFA zone to form the second West African 
Monetary Zone and a common Central Bank. This drive warranted the formation of the West 
African Monetary Institute (WAMI) with an objective of forming a monetary union and 
launching a single currency (ECO) in the second West African Monetary Zone. The launch 
initially was planned for December 2009, but was later postponed to January 2015. This 
move is therefore expected to facilitate intra-regional trade and payment transactions, reduce 
foreign exchange speculation, and reduce foreign exchange transaction costs for its members.  
The past 25 years have seen revolutionary changes in the structure of the WAMZ financial 
system. Several financial institutions have emerged and a factor that has accounted for the 
observed growth in the WAMZ financial systems is financial liberalization. In the era prior to 
the 1990s and the implementation of the World Bank supported Structural Adjustment 
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 Studies such as (Gidlow, 1998; Aziakpono and Wilson, 2010) have argued that the monetary policy regime 
(whether market-oriented or controlled) operated by a country determines the speed and magnitude of the PT.  
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Programmes (SAP), the WAMZ financial sectors were characterized by state-owned financial 
institutions, which dominated the banking industry. Inefficiency and the lack of competition 
resulted in the poor performance of the financial institutions, and these institutions became 
distressed (Lue et al., 2002: 7). In most countries interest rates were administratively 
managed which had adverse implications for the speed of interest rate pass-through. This led 
to the collapse of local currencies and external debt repayment problems for most countries. 
Scholnick (1996: 485) noted that administered interest rates (both lending and deposit) distort 
investment decisions and result in the misallocation of funds. 
Most troubled countries in West Africa sought help from the World Bank, which requires 
economic reforms as a precondition for assistance. These reforms require regulatory 
authorities to reduce direct control of the economy (Lue et. al., 2002: 8). As noted by Ayadi 
et al. (2006: 318), the adoption of liberalization programmes in the 1980s by most developing 
countries was characterized by more attention being given to market forces in allocating 
credit through freely determined interest rates. Among other things, financial reforms in West 
Africa, like most Sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries, were classified into three categories 
such as improvement of the financial sector, improvement of monetary management and 
strengthening of capital movement and the foreign exchange market. 
The financial system of the WAMZ has undergone tremendous changes in the last two 
decades. Given the fact that the objectives of monetary policy cannot be achieved in isolation 
from the financial system, it is clear that some the changes in the financial system have 
implications for the way monetary policy changes are transmitted through the financial 
system. These changes could have implications for effectiveness of monetary policy. 
However, it is important to understand the composition and structure of the financial sectors 
of the countries that make up the WAMZ to uncover the monetary policy transmission 
process (i.e., speed and magnitude) in these economies. A comprehensive understanding of 
the composition and structure of the financial system will help pinpoint the factors that are 
crucial for the effectiveness of monetary policy in each economy.  
3.3 STRUCTURE OF THE WAMZ FINANCIAL SYSTEM 
The financial structure of every country plays a pivotal role in the transmission of monetary 
policy through the interest rate channel, that is, the transmission of policy interest rate to 
retail interest rates (lending and deposit rates). For instance, Agenor and Montiel (2008: 177) 
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noted that stickiness in retail interest rates in any given economy depends chiefly on the 
country‟s financial structure, and a country‟s financial structure in turn depends on other 
factors such as “the degree of development of financial markets, the degree of competition 
within the banking system, and ownership structure of financial intermediaries”. Among 
others, Cottarelli and Kourelis (1994: 590–592) followed similar arguments for the relevance 
of the financial structure in transmitting monetary policy impulses. They argued that features 
such as “the degree of development of money and financial markets; the degree of 
competition within the banking system, and between banks and other intermediaries; the 
existence of constraints on capital movements; and the ownership structure of the financial 
intermediaries are responsible for stickiness in bank lending rates.  
It is worth mentioning that the measures considered in this section are suggested by Beck et 
al. (1999; 2009) and World Bank/International Monetary Fund
49
 for analysis of the structure 
of the financial system, assessment of financial development and determining the relative 
importance of its different components. The measures considered are: ratio of liquid liability 
to GDP; deposit money bank assets to GDP; bank deposit to bank credit;  interest rate spread; 
level of bank concentration ratio; and stock market capitalization to GDP. Note that these 
measures are discussed under their appropriate sections. The next sections explore the various 
financial structures of the countries under investigation and their implications for interest rate 
pass-through. 
3.3.1 Size, Depth and Composition of the WAMZ Financial System 
The WAMZ countries‟ financial sectors have been fast expanding in the past decade, with 
large pan-African financial institutions increasing their presence in the whole of Africa, 
taking advantage in the region‟s increasingly open financial markets. The Nigerian banks are 
becoming a major player in the region. For instance, as of December 2008, there are six in 
Ghana, seven in Gambia, and seven in Sierra Leone (Table 3.1), while the other WAMZ 
member countries limit their branch networks within national borders (WAMI, 2008: 26). 
In the WAMZ, the banking industry has been the dominant sector of the financial system, 
although the non-bank financial markets are becoming prevalent. For instance, Sierra Leone 
with assistance from the Commonwealth Secretariat, has recently established a stock 
exchange, while Ghana and Nigeria had earlier established stock exchanges. Recently, 
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 See Financial Sector Assessment – A Handbook © 2005 The International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development/The World bank/The International Monetary Fund. 
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several financial institutions have emerged which foster and enhance financial 
intermediation, while other industries such as the stock markets and insurance business are 
burgeoning as alternative investment outlets (WAMI, 2008: 25). 
Table 3.1: Banks with Cross-Border Subsidiaries in WAMZ countries 
    Countries  
Bank Home Country Gambia Ghana Nigeria  Sierra Leone 
Access Bank Nigeria √ √ √ √ 
First International Bank Gambia √   √ 
Guaranty Trust Bank Nigeria √ √ √ √ 
Intercontinental Bank Nigeria  √ √  
Oceanic Bank Nigeria √ √ √  
PHB Nigeria √  √ √ 
Skye Bank Nigeria √  √ √ 
UBA Nigeria  √ √ √ 
Zenith Bank Nigeria √ √ √ √ 
Source: Compiled by author from WAMI Annual Report (2008) and various Countries‟ 
 Central Banks. 
To measure the size of the financial system Beck et al. (1999) suggested the ratio of the 
liquid liabilities to Gross Domestic Product in the economy. Beck et al. (1999) noted that the 
ratio is a better measure of the size of the financial system since it includes all banks, bank-
like and non-bank financial institutions. It has been widely used in researches as an indicator 
of financial depth. For instance, King and Levine (1993) used liquid liabilities to Gross 
Domestic Product in their finance and growth paper as a measure of financial depth. There 
are cross-country similarities and variations between Gambia, Ghana, Nigeria and Sierra 
Leone in liquid liabilities to GDP, as shown in Figure 3.1, ranging from 79% in Gambia to 
9% in Sierra Leone. A notable variation that is evident from Figure 3.1 is the ratio for 
Gambia with relative higher values amongst the four countries over time. A sharp increase set 
in after 1999 that continued till 2005 and dropped to a value of 48% in 2006, while Ghana 
and Nigeria were relatively flat ranging from 13% to 29% and 12% to 26% respectively. 
Sierra Leone, on the other hand, ranked lowest amongst the countries with relatively low 
values over time, ranging between 9% and 20%. 
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Figure 3.1: Ratio of Liquid Liabilities to Gross Domestic Products 
Source: Compiled by author based on data from Financial Structure Dataset, Beck and Al-
Hussainy (2010). 
Figure 3.1 revealed some similarities in the measures used. From both plots it is obvious that 
the ratios for Gambia are the highest followed by Ghana, Nigeria and Sierra Leone, the 
lowest. Therefore, one can argue that the level of financial depth and financial intermediation 
is very low in the WAMZ economies as a whole, although Gambia is comparatively higher 
than Ghana, Nigeria and Sierra Leone for the period under review. 
3.3.1.1 The Size of the Bank and Non-Bank Financial Sector in the WAMZ 
Reforms in the late 1980s and early 1990s resulted in a shift of the financial sectors away 
from shallow and distressed financial systems among most African countries to more market-
oriented financial systems and the WAMZ member countries were no exception. Prior to the 
1990s, the financial systems of the WAMZ member states were dominated by banks, mainly 
foreign banks owned by colonial masters and few state-owned banks (Lue et al., 2002: 25). 
The implementation of the World Bank supported Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAP) 
(between 1988 and 1998) has helped restructures the financial systems. According to Lue et 
al. (2002: 28) the “reform programmes were mainly focused on improving the banking 
legislation and supervision, deregulation of administered interest rate structure and credit 
allocation, removal of subsidized lending rates on credit to priority sectors, deregulation of 
foreign exchange markets, establishment of a non-performing assets recovery trust, and 
privatization of state-owned banks”. 
The Central Bank of Ghana (BOG) Report (2008) shows that in Ghana, as at the end of 2008, 
there were 24 commercial banks compared to 17 deposit money banks in 2001; 126 Rural 
and Community Banks; and 35 insurance companies. Non-bank financial institutions in 
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operation stood at 41, comprising 21 finance companies; 14 savings and loans companies; 
four leasing companies; one mortgage finance company; and one discount house (WAMI, 
2008: 25; Bank of Ghana, 2008). 
In Nigeria, the banking sector in the 1990s was characterized by a rapid increase in the 
number of banks. As at the end of 1997, there were 115 banks comprising 64 commercial 
banks and 51 merchant banks, compared to 10 commercial banks in 1980 and 41 merchant 
banks in 1985 (Lue et al. 2002: 35 ). As a result of the several reforms and restructuring in 
the financial sector, the Nigerian financial system as of 2008 comprised 24 deposit money 
taking banks, five discount houses, 709 microfinance institutions, 112 finance companies, 93 
primary mortgage institutions, five development finance institutions and 77 insurance 
companies (CBN, 2008; WAMI, 2008: 26). 
The banking and financial landscape in Sierra Leone has expanded in recent years. Evidenced 
by the expansion of the banking sector, the financial sector continues to deepen. Prior to the 
rebel incursion in Sierra Leone in early 1990s, there were four commercial banks. As at end 
of 2009, the financial system of the country comprised 14 commercial banks compared to 
four commercial banks in 2000. From 57 in 2008, the number of branches of commercial 
banks increased to 73 in 2009. Also, as at the end of 2009, the financial system comprised 
two discount houses, six community banks, 10 insurance companies, eight microfinance 
institutions and one mortgage finance institution (Bank of Sierra Leone, 2009: 5 and 39). 
Gambia, similar to Sierra Leone, also has a thin
50
 financial sector with 11 commercial banks 
including an Islamic Development Bank and a total of 44 branches as at the end of 2008 
compared to 4 banks in 2000. At the end of 2008, there were nine insurance companies, 62 
microfinance institutions and five finance companies in operation (WAMI, 2008: 25). Like 
other West African countries, Gambia‟s financial system is dominated by commercial banks 
which account for 97 percent of total sector assets. Although all the commercial banks are 
now privately owned, the banking industry is concentrated with the two largest banks (i.e., 
Standard Chartered Bank and Trust Bank Limited) accounting for 66 percent of the total 
banking sector assets, extending 58 percent of loans and collecting 71 percent of deposits 
(Sriram, 2009: 7).  
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 A thin financial system refers to one where the markets are characterized by low liquidity, high spreads, and 
high volatility (WAMI, 2008). 
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Table 3.2: Number Financial Institutions in the WAMZ 
  Commercial Banks Non-Bank Financial Institution 
Country 2000 2008 2000 2008 
Gambia 4 11 18 133 
Ghana 18 24 139 243 
Nigeria 89 24 749 1025 
Sierra Leone 4 13 43 103 
Total 115 72 1249 1429 
Source: Compiled by author from World Bank (2007) Making Finance Work in Africa and 
WAMI Annual Report (2008). 
In what follows, it is evident that the bank and non-bank financial institutions have grown in 
numbers in the last decade as shown in Table 3.2. A notable exception is the reduction in the 
number of commercial banks in Nigeria, from 89 in 2000 to 24 in 2008. This drastic cut in 
the number of banks is as a result of several restructuring and reforms adopted to maintain 
banking sector soundness, stability and enhance supervision within the Nigerian banking 
system.  
A common feature of the financial systems in most emerging and developing countries is that 
their financial systems are dominated by the banking sector. To show the importance of the 
financial services performed by commercial banks relative to the size of the economy, the 
study considers the ratio of deposit money bank assets to GDP as shown in Figure 3.2.  
 
Figure 3.2: Deposit Money Banks Assets to GDP 
Source: Compiled by author based on data from Financial Structure Dataset, Beck and Al-
Hussainy (2010). 
This measure according to Beck and Demirguc-Kunt (2009: 8) provides evidence of the 
importance of the financial services performed by commercial banks (Deposit money banks 
assets to GDP) relative to the size of the economy. In Figure 3.2, it is clear that the sizes of 
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commercial banks relative to the size of the economies in Gambia, Ghana and Nigeria are 
larger compared to Sierra Leone.  
3.3.1.2 Competition, Concentration and Efficiency of the WAMZ Banking Sector  
Monetary policy impulses are rapidly transmitted in open financial systems where there are 
several banking institutions and market conditions are competitive. Thus, a key determinant 
of interest rate pass-through is the degree of competition within the banking sector. 
Alternatively, in highly concentrated banking sectors, the responsiveness of retail interest 
rates to changes in policy rate becomes sluggish and asymmetric
51
 (Kamin et al., 1998: 24–
25). Competition within the banking system of any country is crucial for interest rate pass-
through. For instance, an economy with limited alternative sources of finance and lower 
degree of competition in the credit and deposit markets will have lower elasticity of demand 
for loans and ultimately limited response of retail interest rates to changes in policy rate 
(Agenor and Montiel, 2008: 177). Empirical evidence has shown that the levels of 
competition and concentration of the financial system are crucial for the determination of the 
speed of adjustment or the rate at which commercial banks interest rates respond to changes 
(increase or decrease) in official interest rates. For instance, studies
52
 have shown that in 
highly concentrated markets, retail interest rates adjust asymmetrically to changes in official 
interest rates. It is noteworthy that in financial systems where the banking sector is dominated 
by state-owned or state-subsidized banks the responsiveness of retail interest rates to policy 
rates could be sluggish because these banks are not under pressure to maximize profit and in 
some instances may want to protect the political interest of the government by keeping 
interest rates stable even when there is stimulus for banks to increase or decrease interest 
rates.  
The last three decades saw a number of major changes in the financial landscape of the 
WAMZ.  Against such background of far-reaching structural changes, this section poses the 
question: How have deregulations in the WAMZ financial systems changed competition and 
concentration conditions? To answer this question, the degree of competition and 
concentration are examined by using the economic indicators of competition and 
concentration. The three variables that are used as indicators of intermediation efficiency, 
                                                          
51 Note that this is not always the case. Authors such as Cottarelli and Kourelis (1994) have argued that banks 
can still be competitive in concentrated markets if they are subject to threat of new entry. 
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competition and concentration in the WAMZ economies: bank credit to bank deposit, interest 
rate spread/margin and bank concentration ratio, will be discussed sequentially.  
To assess the degree of competition in the banking sector of the WAMZ, the study uses Bank 
Credit to Bank Deposits ratio which, according to Beck and Demirguc-Kunt (2009: 9), is the 
ratio of claims on the private sector to deposit in commercial banks. They commented that the 
bank credit to bank deposit ratio measures the extent to which commercial banks intermediate 
the economy‟s savings into private sector credits. They further noted that an increase in the 
bank credit to bank deposit ratio is an indication of an increase in not only the level of 
economic development but the level of financial development. Figure 3.9 depicts plots of the 
bank credit to bank deposit ratios. 
 
Figure 3.3: Bank Deposit to Bank Credit 
Source: Compiled by author from Financial Structure Dataset by Beck and Al-Hussainy 
(2010). 
Figure 3.3 shows that there are variations amongst the countries, ranging from 19.9% in 2001 
in Sierra Leone up to 157.3% in 2008 in Nigeria. It shows that Nigeria has high 
intermediation efficiency compared to the other economies, whereas in Gambia and Sierra 
Leone there has not been a clear trend over time. In Ghana since 1995, the ratio shows a 
consistent increase until 2000, begins to drop for three years and starts rising again in 2004. 
Note that low ratios indicate financially underdeveloped economies in which banks lack the 
ability to attract deposits and channel these deposits into private sector credits (Beck and 
Demirguc-Kunt (2009: 9). The reverse is true. 
Attention is now turned to interest rates spread (interest rates margin) which is the difference 
between lending and deposit rates. It could also be referred to as the difference between 
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earnings generated from a bank‟s assets and payments made on its liabilities. High spread 
between lending and deposit rates is an indication of concentration in the banking market. 
Thus, as noted by Hannan and Liang (1993), concentration in the banking market may lead to 
higher spread between deposit and lending rates. Figure 3.4 shows plots of interest rate 
spread for the economies under review from 1990 to 2009. 
 
 
Figure 3.4: Interest Rate Spread in the WAMZ: 1990-2009 
Source: Compiled by author from World Development Indicators (WDI) and Global 
Development Finance (GDF), World DataBank (World Bank, 2010). 
In Gambia and Sierra Leone the loan market is much smaller and concentrated as the few 
banks operate in the form of conglomerates. The few large banks adjust interest rates to 
preferred customers sluggishly to market conditions. For instance, in Gambia, real lending 
rates and interest spreads at commercial banks have been high. This is due to factors such as 
high lending rates, weak legal environment and attractive high yields on government 
securities (Sriram, 2009: 8). Despite the rapid growth in the banking sector (from four banks 
in 2000 to fourteen in 2009) and the influx of foreign banks, Sierra Leone recorded the 
highest average spread and lending rates for the period under review as shown in Figure 3.4. 
This is an indication that banks dominate the financial system and that the non-bank financial 
markets, which are expected to compete with banks and serve as alternative sources of 
funding for firms and household in the economy, are still underdeveloped. Nigeria has the 
lowest interest spread and has been trending downwards over time. The low average interest 
rate spread in Nigeria reflects the high degree of competition in the banking markets and the 
active non-bank financial markets. Thus, it is expected that interest rate pass-through would 
be high in Nigeria compared to the other countries. 
To gauge the level of competition in the WAMZ banking sectors, the Bank Concentration 
ratio, which is calculated as the ratio of the three largest banks assets to total banking sector 
0
5
10
15
20
25
1
9
9
0
1
9
9
1
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
3
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
5
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
7
1
9
9
8
1
9
9
9
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
1
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
5
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
7
2
0
0
8
2
0
0
9
P
er
ce
n
ta
g
es
GMB GHA NGA SLE
51 
 
assets, was used. The plots in Figure 3.6 indicate that there has been no clear trend between 
Gambia, Ghana and Sierra Leone, but a slight decrease in Ghana‟s concentration ratios 
between 2005 and 2008. In Nigeria the concentration is very low compared to the other 
countries over time. It has been argued that low degree of bank concentration could mean 
high degree of competition in the banking market. The existence of active capital markets in 
Ghana and Nigeria provides households and firms with access to alternative sources of 
funding, such as securities markets, and this in turn is expected to increase the speed at which 
retail rates respond to changes in deposit rates. 
 
Figure 3.5: The Degree of Bank Concentration in the WAMZ Countries. 
Source: Compiled by author from Financial Structure Dataset by Beck and Al-Hussainy 
(2010). 
Economic theory suggests that the presence of active domestic securities markets should 
accelerate the speed of adjustment of retail interest rates to policy rates. For instance, Kamin 
et al. (1998: 28) suggest that in a well-developed and competitive capital markets, retail 
interest rates often respond to policy rates flexibly. This is expected to be the case for Ghana 
and Nigeria which have active securities markets. In Nigeria, the consolidations of the 
banking industry and the several reforms have intensified competition in the banking 
industry. The increase of the minimum capital requirement of approximately USD200 million 
has engendered banks to seek additional markets (WAMI, 2008: 26). In Ghana, the 
competitive environment between the banking sector and the non-bank formal and informal 
markets ensures provision of alternative sources of funding for business.  
In an economy with developed non-bank financial markets, banks compete with other 
financial institutions as both borrowers and lenders, and this helps to stabilize and increase 
competition in the financial system. Increased competition will ultimately increase the speed 
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of adjustment of retail interest rates to official rates. As mentioned earlier, some of the 
WAMZ member countries such Nigeria and Ghana have made significant progress in 
establishing most of these institutions while in Gambia and Sierra Leone these institutions are 
burgeoning. For instance, prior to the civil war in Sierra Leone, the banking sector was highly 
concentrated: Barclays and Standard Chartered Bank together accounted for over 80 percent 
of the domestic market (Lue et al. 2002: 36). 
As pointed out in the Section 2.3 of chapter two, the levels of financial development in the 
economies have implications for monetary policy transmission process. Economic theory 
predicts that an increase in the number of financial institutions and the emergence of non-
bank financial institutions will be followed by innovations, increased level of intermediation, 
introduction of new products and these developments will provide alternative sources of 
funding for firms. Such improvements in the financial system will encourage competition not 
only within the banking market but also between the banks and non-bank financial markets. 
When such competitive environment is created economic theory suggests that the interest rate 
pass-through from policy interest rates to commercial banks interest rates will be quicker. 
The next section explores the Non-Bank financial Markets in the WAMZ. 
3.3.1.3 The Size of the Non-Bank Financial Markets53 in the WAMZ 
A developed financial system will include a variety of non-bank financial institutions besides 
banking institutions. It has also been argued that non-bank financial markets such as the 
capital markets and interbank markets play pivotal roles in the transmission of monetary 
impulses in the economy. The non-bank financial markets provide alternative sources of 
funding for firms and households and in some cases performed the traditional role of 
commercial banks. Therefore, they are seen as an alternative to banks and compete with 
banks in both deposit and lending markets. The active presence of non-bank financial 
institutions in the economy is highly relevant for enhancing competition, market discipline 
and development of the financial system. Lue et al. (2002: 2) noted that banks promote 
market discipline, including their private clients by conducting credit risk analyses. Likewise, 
other institutions and markets also exercise discipline over banks, and this in turn strengthens 
the financial system. In this section, an overview of the capital, interbank and insurance 
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 Non-bank financial markets include stock markets, bond markets, government securities markets, secondary 
markets for mortgages and insurance, spot and forward foreign exchange markets, and forward markets for 
equities and bonds. 
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markets of the WAMZ will be presented and, thereafter, their implication for interest rate 
pass-through. 
3.3.1.3.1 The Capital Markets 
Stock exchanges, though confined within the national boundaries of the WAMZ member 
countries, have been in operation in Nigeria and Ghana since 1960 and 1989 respectively. 
Quite recently, Sierra Leone with assistance from Common Wealth Secretariat has also 
established a stock exchange, in June 2009.  
The Ghana Stock Exchange (GSE) was formed in 1989 and started trading with 11 
companies listed in 1990. Ghana‟s stock market capitalization expressed as a percentage of 
GDP stood at 18% at the end of December 2008. This figure is very low compared to other 
stock exchanges in Africa, for instance the Johannesburg Stock Exchange at the end of 2008 
closed with 308%. The low stock market capitalization as a percentage to GDP is evidence 
that the exchange is dominated by debt offerings, and government bonds account for a 
significant proportion (BOG, 2008).  Over the years, the GSE has witnessed a level of 
growth: from a total of 11 listed companies in 1990, there were 36 quoted firms by December 
2008 (WAMI, 2008: 27). The performance of the GSE in 2008 improved during the recent 
financial crises. The annual report shows that the all-share index recorded over 50 percent 
appreciation. According to WAMI (2008: 27), GSE market capitalization stood at GHc. 17.89 
billion (USD 15 billion) at the end of 2008.  
Established in 1960, the Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE) commenced operation in 1961 with 
19 companies listed, and by the end of 2006 there were 228 listings; currently the NSE 
consists of six branches. The 2007/2008 financial turbulence reduced the number of equity 
and debt listings to 213 by the end of the first quarter of 2009. The NSE like its GSE 
counterpart also has government bonds dominating the debt offerings with low stock market 
capitalization as a percentage to GDP of 17% in 2006. The banking sector is the dominant 
sector of the exchange and accounts for over 60 percent of the top 20 companies‟ market 
capitalization (CBN, 2009). 
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Figure 3.6: Ratio of Stock Market Capitalization to GDP in Ghana, Nigeria and 
South Africa 
Source: Compiled by author from Financial Structure Dataset by Beck and Al-Hussainy 
(2010). 
Figure 3.6 illustrates an equity market indicator that is used in empirical studies to indicate 
the size of the stock market relative to the size of the economy (Beck and Demirguc-Kunt, 
2009: 13). It is clear from Figure 3.6 that in terms of stock market capitalization relative to 
the size of the economy, GSE is larger than the NSE. The market capitalizations of the GSE 
and NSE are very low compared to the JSE (i.e., Johannesburg Stock Exchange in South 
Africa) and those of advanced countries (Figure 3.6).  
The size and the liquidity level of the stock market have implications for the transmission of 
monetary policy stance of the central bank. Economic theory predicts that economies with 
large and liquid stock markets will have high speed of pass-through since stock markets serve 
as an alternative source of funding for firms and household. Other measures, such as stock 
market total value traded to GDP, stock market turnover ratio and listed firms to population, 
used as indicators of capital market development are reported in Appendix B. Sierra Leone 
assisted by the Common Wealth Secretariat has established a stock exchange in 2009. The 
Sierra Leone Stock Exchange (SLSE) is still at its formation stage and as at the end of 2009 
trading activities have still not commenced.  
However, due to the low market capitalization and slow growth in this sector, a technical 
committee comprising experts from the stock exchanges and WAMI staff, has been set up for 
the harmonization of activities of the exchanges. This move is aimed at boosting growth of 
the capital markets, integration of the exchanges and promotion of cross-listing of stocks in a 
unified regional market (WAMI, 2008: 27). The unification and integration of the stock 
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exchanges in the WAMZ would have implications for the capital markets of the member 
states and the management of monetary policy in the region. It is expected that a growth in 
the capital markets of the region will be crucial for the effectiveness of monetary policy and 
enhance the speed with which retail interest rates respond to policy rates.  
3.3.1.3.2 The Inter-Bank and Money Markets 
The money market, which is described as a market for short-term funds usually with maturity 
not exceeding one year, is a key vehicle for the transmission of monetary policy impulses. 
The nature of instruments used in this market can be both short and long term and they can be 
used for either monetary policy or to procure government debt (Haan et al., 2009: 71). The 
WAMZ member countries‟ money markets, like other money markets, are dominated by 
commercial banks. These banks, according to Haan et al. (2009: 71–72), depend on the 
money market for the management of their short-term liquidity positions and for the 
fulfilment of their minimum reserve requirements. Other participants in the WAMZ money 
market include money market funds, insurance companies and pension funds, while 
participation of discount houses is limited. 
Money market in Gambia is an evolving market, evident by the increase in the volume of 
transactions from D575.00 million (USD 22 million) in 2007 to D1,075.50 million (USD 41 
million) in 2008, reflecting an 87.04 percent growth (WAMI, 2008). Intensified activities are 
also witnessed in the inter-bank market as almost all the banks in the country actively 
participate in this market. On the other hand, the inter-bank and money market in Sierra 
Leone though active is characterized by few instruments such as 91-day, 182-day, 364-day 
treasury bills and one year treasury bond. The commercial banks, National Social Security 
and Insurance Trust (NASSIT), discount houses, other financial institutions, and individuals 
are the investors in this market. However, the Bank of Sierra Leone (BSL) recently replaced 
the rediscount window with a repo and reverse repo mechanism. This action is expected to 
stimulate activities in the inter-bank market and better manage the overall liquidity in the 
banking system (BSL, 2009: 27). Conversely, Nigeria‟s money and inter-bank market is more 
robust with a wide range of instruments compared to those of Gambia and Sierra Leone 
(WAMI, 2008). By implication, interest rate pass-through is expected to be higher in Nigeria 
than the other countries. 
An active and intensified inter-bank market is crucial for monetary policy transmission since 
banks depend on this market for their short-term liquidity position. However, it is noteworthy 
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that the importance of the inter-bank market depends largely on whether the financial system 
is open or closed. In an opened financial system banks can easily access external sources of 
funding. In such an open financial system, commercial banks may be slow to react to changes 
in policy rate; thus the transmission of monetary pulses becomes rigid. While in a closed 
financial system, there are limited sources of finance available to commercial banks, which 
hence rely heavily on short-term accommodation from the central bank. The interest rate 
pass-through is expected to be higher in a closed financial system than an open financial 
system.  
3.3.1.3.3 Insurance Markets 
The insurance sector in the WAMZ is very small compared to that in developed countries, 
and it is characterized by licensed life and non-life insurance companies (including licensed 
insurance brokers and loss adjusters). The insurance market consists of about 150 licensed 
life and non-life companies. Nigeria accounts for the largest market share in the industry with 
over 100 licensed insurance companies contributing a gross annual industry premium of USD 
673 million and market share of the top ten companies of 58 percent as of 2008. Ghana 
accounts for around 35 licensed life and non-life insurance companies accompanied by a total 
gross annual premium of USD 168 million. The top ten insurance companies in Ghana 
account for 75 percent of the total market share as of 2008 (WAMI, 2008: 28). 
Despite the low capital requirements for insurance companies in Gambia and Sierra Leone, 
the insurance markets are very thin in these countries compared those in Nigeria and Ghana. 
In Sierra Leone the insurance market comprises ten (10) registered companies, while Gambia 
has nine (9) registered companies.  The capital requirement for insurance companies in 
Gambia is USD 0.68 million, and in Sierra Leone, USD 0.08 million. These figures contrast 
with those of Nigeria which has capital requirements of $17.0 million, $25.0 million and $83 
million respectively for life, non-life and re-insurance. In Ghana, the capital requirement is 
$1.0 million, and $2.5 million for direct insurance and re-insurance respectively. In the next 
section the degree of competition and concentration in the WAMZ banking sector are 
discussed. 
3.4 MONETARY POLICY FRAMEWORK IN THE WAMZ 
The monetary policy regime in an economy is crucial for the speed of adjustment of retail 
interest rates to changes in monetary policy rates. It has been argued that economies that 
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adopt monetary policies that promote free market principles and competition in the financial 
system and more transparent monetary policy tend more to a high speed of adjustment than 
those with restrictive policies (Aziakpono and Wilson, 2010: 29–30). Central banking in the 
WAMZ has witnessed continuous changes, and these changes are in line with international 
trends in central banking. For instance, Ghana adopted formal Inflation Targeting in 2007, 
while Gambia and Sierra Leone have restructured their respective central banks and now 
have active interbank markets and have introduced the Repo rate. In this regard, the Repo 
rate
54
 and the Reverse rate
55
 have become the main instruments for conducting monetary 
policy (WAMI, 2008: 29). This is an indication that the central banks are now shifting from 
non market-oriented policy instruments to more market oriented ones. 
Consequent to the rapid growth in the banking industry within the WAMZ region, monetary 
policy management is gradually moving from direct controls, such as interest rate controls 
and credit ceiling and cash reserve requirements, to be more market-oriented (WAMI, 2008: 
25–27). With market-oriented regimes, it is expected that retail interest rates will respond to 
official rates within short lags.   
3.4.1 Monetary policy framework in Gambia 
The Central bank of Gambia (CBG) was established in 1971. The primary objective among 
others of monetary policy in Gambia is price stability. Other objectives include achieving and 
maintaining exchange rate stability, and having a sound and vibrant financial system to 
encourage and promote sustainable economic development. In the late 1990s, interest rates in 
Gambia were very high due to the tight monetary policy strategy of the CBG to contain 
inflation to levels below 6% in the economy (Lue et al., 2002: 26, WAMI, 2008: 35).  
The current operating framework of monetary policy in Gambia is monetary targeting. The 
bank adopts broad money (M2) as its intermediate target and reserve money as operating 
target. Continuous monitoring of the net domestic assets and net foreign assets of the CBG on 
a weekly basis is the crux of its implementation. To signal the policy stance, the authorities 
announce the rediscount rate during the MPC bimonthly meetings. Gambia uses treasury bills 
as the main policy instrument through open market operations. Instruments such as 
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 The Repo rate refers to the rate at which banks invests their excess funds in Government securities or central 
bank securities. 
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 The Reverse repo rate refers to the rate at which banks obtain funds from the central bank pledging 
Government securities held to the central bank. 
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rediscount window, reserve requirement and purchase/sales of foreign exchange are also used 
to influence liquidity conditions in the market (Sriram, 2009: 9–10). 
3.4.2 Monetary policy framework in Ghana 
The objective of monetary policy in Ghana since the establishment of the Central Bank of 
Ghana (BOG) in 1957 is maintaining price stability and this has remained unchanged. 
Monetary policy implementation in Ghana has undergone several changes through phases. 
Prior to the 1980s, the BOG used a controlled regime with direct instruments, but after the 
successful launch of the Economic Recovery Program (ERP) in early 1983, the use of an 
indirect instrument under the monetary framework was adopted. This framework was in 
effect until the adoption of the current regime of inflation targeting (Amoah and Mumuni, 
2008: 13).  
In the late 1990s and early 2000s, the BOG was faced with turbulent monetary policy 
management as a third of the total money supply was held in private hands outside the 
financial system. This raised concern for the central bank, which stimulated commercial 
banks to intensify their campaigns for the mobilization of deposit to the banking system and 
to mop up the excess liquidity (Lue et al., 2002: 27). The aim of monetary policy in Ghana as 
at 2008 was to reduce end-period inflation to the range of 6 to 8 percent using inflation 
targeting framework. Further to successful implementation of the inflation targeting regime, 
anecdotal evidence shows that market interest rates were responsive to movements in the 
monetary policy rates (WAMI, 2008: 40).  
The BOG, in May 2007, announced the adoption of inflation targeting as its monetary policy 
framework with a medium term target of 5% CPI inflation. Ghana is the second Sub-Saharan 
African country to adopt inflation targeting framework following South Africa. Further to 
this development, the financial system is expected to be more market-oriented. Also, it is 
expected that an inflation targeting regime will enhance accountability and transparency of 
monetary policy and therefore high or complete IRPT from policy rate to retail interest rates 
(Liu et al., 2008: 506). 
3.4.3 Monetary Policy Framework in Nigeria 
The Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) like other central banks has the responsibility of overall 
control and administration of monetary and financial sector policies of the Federal 
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Government. Consequently, CBN is responsible for administration of banks and other 
financial institutions. Further to the amendment of the bank‟s mandate, the 1991 Act required 
that the sole aim of the CBN is ensuring high standards of banking practice and financial 
stability through its surveillance activities, as well as the promotion of an efficient payment 
system (CBN, 2008). 
Since inception in 1959, the CBN has adopted several monetary policy regimes. Exchange 
rate targeting regime was adapted from 1959 to 1973, and monetary targeting regime from 
1974 to date. Under these regimes, direct and indirect monetary controls were implemented 
from 1974 to 1992 and 1993 to date respectively. These policy regimes were operated on a 
short-term basis (i.e., annually) from 1959 to 2002. However, the CBN introduced a medium 
term monetary policy framework in 2002 to address the long standing lag with which 
monetary policy actions affect its ultimate objective in the short-term (CBN, 2008). 
As of 2008, monetary policy was focused on maintaining a disinflationary path with the sole 
aim of achieving single-digit headline inflation. The CBN adopted a tight monetary policy 
stance to sustain monetary and price stability. Subsequent to this the CBN maintained a 
Monetary Policy Rate (MPR) at 9.5% and continued to use Open Market Operation (OMO) 
for liquidity management (WAMI, 2008: 50). 
3.4.4 Monetary Policy Framework in Sierra Leone 
In Sierra Leone the monetary policy objective is to achieve and maintain price stability. The 
operating target for achieving this goal is reserve money. The main monetary tool of Bank of 
Sierra Leone (BSL) is the weekly primary auction of treasury bills. BSL relies on indirect 
instruments of monetary policy such as Open Market Operation (OMO), Reserve 
Requirements and Repo/Reverse repo transactions (BSL, 2009: 5). 
As of 2008, the aim of monetary policy in Sierra Leone was to contain inflationary pressure; 
ensuring high and sustainable growth and financial stability. Achieving these goals requires a 
tightening monetary policy to limit the effect of external shocks. At the end of 2008, the BSL 
introduced the 182 day and 364 day Treasury Bills to enhance monetary policy management 
(WAMI, 2008: 56). 
Like other African countries, Sierra Leone adopted the World Bank sponsored adjustment 
programs in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The series of coups d‟état in 1992 and 1997, and 
the anarchic situation in the country led to a collapse in the formal financial system in May 
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1997. However, the financial system was revamped in 1999 when economic and financial 
stability was restored by the Nigerian led ECOWAS/United Nations forces (Lue et al., 2002: 
36).  
3.5 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
The preceding sections presented an overview of the financial systems and monetary policy 
framework in the WAMZ economies. One thing that became increasingly clear in the 
overview is that, in all four countries, both monetary policy framework and banking 
industries have changed as a result of the liberalization efforts embraced by the countries in 
the 1980s and 1990s. It is important to note that the forward looking monetary policy 
strategies adopted by the various monetary authorities, adoption of inflation targeting regime 
in Ghana, opening of a stock exchange in Sierra Leone, an increasing number of banks and 
the increased competition in the banking industry, have laid the ground for more efficient and 
effective financial markets in the region. 
The insight obtained from the preceding overview reveals that the interest rate channels of 
monetary transmission could play a role in transmitting monetary impulses in the various 
economies and consequently their interest rate pass-through. However, a thorough analysis is 
required before any conclusion can be drawn as to whether the interest rate channel is 
important for the effectiveness of monetary policy and, consequently, at what magnitude and 
speed the monetary policy stance is transmitted. The next chapter presents the methodology 
for the assessment of the speed and magnitude of the pass-through.  
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CHAPTER FOUR: 
METHODOLOGY AND EMPIRICAL FRAMEWORK 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
Studies on monetary policy transmission and interest rate pass-through have widely used 
several variants of time series techniques to investigate the relationship between two or more 
variables. One common technique in the literature is the use of cointegration and error 
correction techniques to search for long-run equilibrium relationships among variables. Since 
the seminal work of Engle and Granger (1987), several variants of cointegration technique 
have been developed and adapted in empirical studies to find long-run relationships between 
two or more variables in a system.  
The main focus of this chapter is to provide the general framework for the empirical analysis. 
In pursuing the objectives stated in chapter one of the study, this chapter presents both 
empirical and analytical methodology for the study. The focus of this study is to examine the 
magnitude, speed and the possibility of asymmetry in the pass-through of official rates to 
retail rates in four of the five countries that make up the WAMZ. To do this, the study 
examines the relationship between official interest rate and retail interest rates (i.e., lending 
and deposit rates) using a rolling regression analysis in an error correction model (ECM) 
framework. The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 4.2 defines the data and 
the sources from which they are obtained; Section 4.3 discusses the estimation techniques. 
The analysis starts with the unit root tests followed by the tests for cointegration and ends 
with the empirical pass-through analysis, and Section 4.4 concludes the chapter.  
4.2 DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
4.2.1 Data Definitions, Selection and Sources 
The study investigates the interest rate pass-through of changes in the official interest rate to 
retail interest rates in four Anglophone West African countries. To this end, the study uses 
monthly data on Central Bank‟s policy/official rates and retail interest rates from 1989 to 
2009 for all the interest rate series for Gambia, Nigeria and Sierra Leone. The interest rate 
series for Ghana starts from 2000 and ends in 2009. This is due to several constraints; lack of 
data on the retail lending rate series for Ghana and limited availability of data on average 
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lending rate to manufacturing. Following Acheampong (2005), average lending rate to 
manufacturing was used as a proxy for lending rates which is evidence of the fact that the 
Ghanaian loan market is dominated by the manufacturing sector. Discount rate to commercial 
banks for Gambia and Nigeria are used as variables representing the central bank official 
interest rates, while the 91-day treasury-bill rates are used as official interest rate for Ghana 
and Sierra Leone. Except for Ghana, for which average lending rate to manufacturing is used 
as proxy for lending rate, all lending and deposit rates for the countries under investigation 
represent commercial banks‟ retail rates. All the interest rates series are sourced from the 
International Monetary Fund‟s (IMF) International Financial Statistics (IFS) database via 
Thomson DataStream with the exception of Ghana‟s lending rate, which was obtained from 
the download facility of the Central Bank of Ghana. Table 4.1 provides further information 
on all the interest rate series for the countries under investigation. 
Table 4.1: Summary of data used for estimation (policy and retail interest rates) 
  Type Acronym Source Start date End date 
Gambia           
Discount Rate Official rate DISR IMF/IFS 1989M01 2009M12 
Lending Rate Retail rate LR IMF/IFS 1989M01 2009M12 
Deposit Rate Retail rate DR IMF/IFS 1989M01 2009M12 
Ghana           
Treasury Bill Rate Official rate TBR IMF/IFS 2000M01 2009M12 
Lending Rate Retail rate LR BOG 2000M01 2009M12 
Deposit Rate Retail rate DR IMF/IFS 2000M01 2009M12 
Nigeria           
Discount Rate Official rate DISR IMF/IFS 1989M01 2009M12 
Lending Rate Retail rate LR IMF/IFS 1989M01 2009M12 
Deposit Rate Retail rate DR IMF/IFS 1989M01 2009M12 
Sierra Leone           
Treasury Bill Rate Official rate TBR IMF/IFS 1989M01 2009M12 
Lending Rate  Retail rate LR IMF/IFS 1989M01 2009M12 
Deposit Rate Retail rate DR IMF/IFS 1989M01 2009M12 
Notes: DISR-Discount Rate, DR-Deposit Rate, LR-Lending Rate, TBR-Treasury Bill Rate, 
BOG - Central Bank of Ghana, IMF/IFS - International Monetary Fund/International 
Financial Statistics. 
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To conduct a detailed analysis of interest rate dynamics in the countries under investigation, 
two sets of analyses will be done. First, analysis for the entire sample period will be 
conducted. Second, the rolling regression technique
56
 will be applied with a sample period of 
six years (i.e., 72 observations). A total of sixteen (16) samples will be analysed starting with 
January 1989 to December 1994, January 1990 to December 1995, January 1991 to 
December 1996 and so on until January 2004 to December 2009. For Ghana, five (5) samples 
will be analysed starting from January 2000 to December 2005, January 2001 to December 
2006 and so on until January 2004 to December 2009. The idea behind the rolling window is 
that it reveals the dynamic development of the pass-through over time (Aziakpono and 
Wilson, 2010: 17). The rolling regression technique is very important evidence of the fact 
that financial systems of the countries under investigation have witnessed significant changes 
and these changes have implications for monetary policy and the level of interest rate pass-
through.  
Figure 4.1 shows a plot of the interest rate series (i.e., policy, lending and deposit rates) for 
the countries under investigation. It is evident from the plot that lending rates on average are 
very high in Ghana with an average of 32 percent followed by Sierra Leone which averaged 
31 percent. Gambia also has an average lending rate of 27 percent and Nigeria recorded the 
least with an average of 20 percent for the period under review. One reason for the low 
lending rate in Nigeria is the result of the several financial reforms which have enhanced 
competition among banks and the non-bank financial sectors. One notable exception is the 
interest rates for Sierra Leone. Between the periods 1990 to 1996, lending and deposit rates 
were very high with a maximum of 73 percent for lending rates and 70 percent for deposit 
rates. The reason for this was the civil war, which officially started in Sierra Leone in 1991 
and caused instability in the financial system of the country. 
 
 
                                                          
56
Rolling regression is a technique with fixed number of observations and the start date and the end date 
successively increase by one observation. See Brooks (2008: 246) for detailed explanation. 
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A: Policy rates – 1989 to 2009 
 
B: Deposit rates – 1989 to 2009 
 
C: Lending rate – 1989 to 2009 
 
Figure 4.1: Interest Rate Behaviour: 1989–2009 
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4.3 ESTIMATION TECHNIQUES 
4.3.1 Tests for Cointegration 
It is a common phenomenon that time series data are non-stationary but move together over 
time, that is, there exist some influences on the series which implies that the series are bound 
by a long-run equilibrium relationship. Non-stationary variables are said to be cointegrated if 
a linear combination of them is stationary (Brooks, 2008: 336). Also, if the interest series are 
cointegrated, it means they have a long-term, or equilibrium, relationship between them. 
(Gujarati and Porter, 2009: 764). The essence of cointegration analysis is to determine 
whether such a long-run relationship exists, and if so, the number of cointegrating vectors. 
The primary model that shows the linear relationship between the interest rate series is 
commonly specified as: 
                          (4.1) 
where yt represents the endogenously determined commercial banks retail interest rates (i.e., 
Lending and Deposit rates); xt denotes the exogenously determined central bank 
policy/official rates (here discount rates or treasury bills rates); β0 denotes the intercept 
coefficient; β1 is the slope coefficient/long-run parameter and ut is the stochastic error term. 
Equation (4.1) can be used for the bi-variate cointegration analysis to examine the dynamics 
of interest rates (retail and policy) amongst the countries under investigation.   
The natural starting point for a study of this nature is to specify a model such as Equation 
(4.1) which can be used for estimating the short-run error correction and the long-run 
cointegrating vectors. It should be noted that variables used to estimate such models have 
time series properties, and it is therefore imperative that the interest rate series are tested for 
unit root. Testing time series data for unit root is necessary to avoid spurious
57
 or nonsense 
regression. Therefore, to avoid spurious regression, the analysis starts by conducting unit root 
tests. The aim of the unit root test is to determine the order of integration among the interest 
rate series. That is, whether the series are integrated of order zero I(0), order one I(1) or 
higher orders. Note that if the interest rate series are integrated of order I(1), econometric 
theory suggests that the linear combination of them will produce a residual that is integrated 
of order I(0) implying that the series have a long-run equilibrium relationship; hence they are 
                                                          
57
 According to Brooks (2008: 19) a spurious regression is one with significant coefficient estimates and high R
2
 
but makes no economic sense. 
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cointegrated. However, cointegration can still be present when I(0), I(1) and I(2) variables are 
combined (Harris, 1995: 80). 
Statistical techniques such as graphical analysis; autocorrelation function (ACF); 
Correlogram; Unit Root tests (e.g., Dickey–Fuller test; Augmented Dicky–Fuller (ADF) test; 
Philips–Perron; Ng–Perron); and those that directly test for stationarity58, have been 
developed to investigate unit roots/stationarity. In this study, the ADF test (tests the null 
hypothesis that the series have a unit root against the alternative of stationarity) and the 
Kwiatkowski, Philips, Schmidt and Shin (KPSS, 1992) test (tests the null hypothesis of 
stationarity against the alternative of non-stationarity) are used to examine the stationarity 
properties of the series
59
. The ADF test has been widely used in empirical studies but has 
been criticized for its poor size and power properties (Brooks, 2008: 330–340). Consequent 
to these criticisms, the KPSS test will be used to complement the ADF test. Unlike the ADF 
test, the KPSS test does not suffer from small sample problems (Burger, 2008: 11). After 
establishing the order of integration of the interest rate series, the next step is to test for 
cointegration.  
Several techniques
60
 for testing for cointegration between series of non-stationary data have 
been employed in empirical studies of this nature. For the purpose of this study, four 
approaches will be used to test for cointegration among the interest rate series. These include: 
the Johansen Maximum Likelihood approach (Johansen, 1988), the Engle–Granger approach, 
the Cointegrating Regression Durbin–Watson (CRDW) approach and the Error Correction 
based approach
61
. The next section discusses the econometric procedures for the empirical 
pass-through analysis. 
4.3.2 Empirical Pass-Through Analysis 
Pass-through analysis of interest rates is attributed to the pioneering work of Cottarelli and 
Kourelis (1994). After this study, pass-through analysis has been extensively employed in 
empirical studies in diverse ways. For instance, it can be used to estimate the speed of 
adjustment of retail interest rates to changes in policy rates, the level of competition in 
banking markets, and asymmetries across countries using a single monetary policy. An 
                                                          
58
 See Gujarati and Porter (2009:748–759) for full discussion on these tests. 
59
 For detailed discussion of the ADF and KPSS test, see Brooks (2008: 327–331) 
60
 Johansen and Juselius, Engle–Granger, Cointegration Regression Durbin-Watson, Autoregressive Distributed 
Lag and Error Correction Model Based techniques. 
61
 The cointegration tests are not discussed here since they have been widely applied in empirical studies. 
However, chapter seven of Brooks (2008) and Kremers et al. (1992) provided detail analysis of the tests. 
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important application of the pass-through analysis is to investigate the monetary policy 
transmission process as it can be used to unveil how fast and how complete changes in 
monetary policy rates are transmitted onto retail interest rates (Sander and Kleimeier, 2006: 
216).  
Variants of the pass-through methodology have been widely applied in the euro zone and 
other regional economic groupings; for instance, Samba and Yan (2010) - CAEMC; 
Hulsewig et al. (2009) - Euro area; Aziakpono, Kleimeier and Sander (2007) - SADC; Sander 
and Kleimeier (2006) - CMA; and de Bondt (2005) - Euro area. The study focuses on the four 
Anglophone West African countries which are members of the WAMZ. Following the 
influential work of Cottareli and Kourelis (1994) which has been followed by de Bondt et al. 
(2002); Toolsema et al. (2002); Sander and Kleimeier (2004; 2006); Aziakpono and Wilson 
(2010), the empirical model showing the relationship between the interest rates is specified 
as: 
               
  
                          
  
           (4.2) 
where RRt represents the endogenously determined commercial banks retail interest rates 
(i.e., Lending and Deposit rates); PRt denotes the exogenously determined central bank 
policy/official rates (here discount rates and treasury bills rates); m* and n* indicate the 
optimal lag lengths; α0 denotes the intercept or the credit risk premium (Marotta, 2009: 192) 
and based on the cost of funds approach, α0 represents a constant markup or markdown on the 
retail interest rates (de Bondt, 2002: 8; Aziakpono and Wilson, 2010: 19). The parameter α1 is 
the slope/long-run parameter and εt is the stochastic error term. The slope/long-run parameter 
(α1) shows the percentage change in policy rate that is reflected in changes in retail interest 
rates in the long-run; it shows by how much retail interest rates change in response to a 
change in policy interest rates (Samba and Yan, 2010: 36).  Building from the cost of funds 
approach proposed by de Bondt (2005: 45) and followed by Aziakpono and Wilson (2010: 
19), it is expected that 0≤ α1 ≤1. A value close to zero for α1 implies that the degree of long-
run pass-through is incomplete or slow. On the other hand, if α1 is equal to one the long-run 
pass-through is said to be complete. In certain instances, it is also possible for α1 to have a 
value greater than one; in such a case there is an over pass-through
62
. Most empirical studies 
have shown that even though the long-run PT exhibits some degree of variability from one 
                                                          
62
 See de Bondt (2005: 45) and Aziakpono and Wilson (2010: 19) for further explanation. 
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country to another, it is in most cases close to one (i.e., complete). This phenomenon is 
common in most advanced and emerging economies.  
The presence of cointegration reveals that there is a stable long-run relationship between the 
interest rate series. Therefore the empirical long-run pass-through can be estimated as: 
                       (4.3) 
The above equation is the parameterized form of Equation (4.1) and shows the long-run 
relationship between retail interest rates and policy rates. The parameters θ0 and θ1 denote the 
long-run intercept and slope coefficients respectively. Note that if the interest rates series are 
cointegrated, the long-run pass-through, otherwise known as long-term multiplier θ1 can be 
estimated from Equation (4.3). A value of one (1) indicates that long-run PT is complete, 
while a value less than one (1) indicates incomplete pass-through. As mentioned earlier, 
determining whether the long-run and short-run PTs are complete or incomplete is very 
important for a study of this nature since a complete PT is an indication of an effective 
interest rate channel. Theory suggests that when two or more series are cointegrated there is a 
long-run or equilibrium relationship between them, although in the short-run there may be 
disequilibrium. 
However, monetary authorities are more concerned about the immediate or short-term impact 
than long-term impact of monetary policy on their target variables. Hence, analyses of the 
short-run response of the interest rate series to a change in policy rate are crucial for a study 
of this nature. Note that the times series for interest rates exhibit an I(1) property (Sander and 
Kleimeier (2004: 464). Building from the model in Equation (4.2), the empirical short-run 
pass-through model will be estimated using first differences to avoid the problem of spurious 
regression as shown below: 
                
  
                             
  
         (4.4) 
where ∆ denotes the first differenced operator of the parameters, m* and n* represent the 
number of lags chosen while the β0 and β1 parameters are the short-term intercept and slope 
coefficients respectively. The slope coefficient (β1) is interpreted as the short-run or 
immediate pass-through. It is very important in pass-through analysis as it shows the 
immediate effect of changes in policy rates on retail interest rates (Aydin, 2007: 15). Also, in 
Sander and Kleimeier (2004: 465) terminology, it could be referred to as the impact 
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multiplier. Thus, if β1 is equal to one (β1=1) it indicates that the short-run PT is complete. 
Alternatively, if β1 assumes a value less than one (β1<1) it indicates an incomplete short-run 
PT of changes in official rates to retail interest rates (Sander and Kleimeier, 2004: 465). 
Several factors can account for the incomplete PT of changes in official rates to retail interest 
rates; fortunately, these factors have already been discussed in Section 2.3.1. It is worth 
mentioning that estimating Equation (4.4) at first difference will lead to a loss of information 
about long-run relationships but Sander and Kleimeier (2004: 464) noted that such 
information could be recovered if retail interest rates (RR) and policy rates (PR) are 
cointegrated.   
The long-run pass-through can also be computed from equation (4.4) as an alternative to 
equation (4.3). This alternative procedure for computing the long-run PT was proposed by 
Kwapil and Scharler (2010: 243) as follows:  
       
 
              
 
            (4.5) 
where βRR is the coefficient of retail interest rates and β1 denotes the coefficient of policy 
interest rate. As highlighted earlier, if θ1=1 pass-through is complete and a value less than 
one (θ1<1) indicates stickiness in lending and deposit rates. It is worth noting that there are 
instances in which the long-run pass-through would be greater than one (θ1>1). Such a 
situation is described as overshooting or overpass-through. According to Sander and 
Kleimeier (2004: 465) overshooting may not necessarily imply banks are rationing credit but 
being compensated for higher risk.   
4.3.3 Equilibrium Correction or Error Correction Model (ECM) 
The Granger Representation Theorem suggests that if two variables, for instance policy rate 
and retail interest rates, are cointegrated, the relationship between them can be expressed as 
an error correction model (Gujarati and Porter, 2009: 764). Leuvensteijn et al. (2008: 15) 
noted that an error correction model unravels the long-run co-movement of variables from the 
short-run adjustment towards the equilibrium; therefore the relationship between non-
stationary but cointegrated variables should be based on an error correction model. Note that 
if the error correction coefficient is statistically significant, one can deduce that market forces 
are in operation to restore long-run equilibrium (Aziakpono, Wilson and Manuel, 2007: 9). 
Therefore, if policy rate and retail interest rates are cointegrated, it shows that they have a 
stable long-run equilibrium relationship, while a short-run disturbance between policy rate 
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and retail interest rates is corrected or adjusted back towards equilibrium by the error 
correction mechanism (Aziakpono, Wilson and Manuel, 2007: 9).  
Applying the error correction framework to the relationship between policy rates and retail 
interest rates using monthly data, one can deduce that the error correction framework 
therefore represents, within a month, how much retail interest rates (i.e., lending and deposit) 
adjust to return to their long-run equilibrium after a shock or change in the policy rate. The 
model specified in Equation (4.4) accounts for the short-run dynamics of the pass-through 
and leads to the loss of information about long-run relationships even though it avoids the 
problem of spurious regression. According Sander and Kleimeier (2004: 464), if retail 
interest rates and policy rate are cointegrated, information about long-run relationships can be 
recovered by augmenting Equation (4.4) with a lagged error correction term (ECT) as shown 
below: 
               
  
                             
  
                       (4.6) 
where △ indicates first difference  βECT is the coefficient of the error correction term and it 
measures the speed of adjustment to equilibrium. The coefficient of βECT is expected to be 
negative to restore equilibrium and its size determines the speed of adjustment to long-
run equilibrium.  t is the white noise error term. ECTt-1 is the error correction term 
representing a series of the residuals obtained from the cointegrating Equation (4.2) and if it 
is statistically significant, it could mean that market forces are in operation to restore long run 
equilibrium after any short run disturbance (Aziakpono, Wilsin and Manuel, 2007: 9).  
The error correction model in Equation (4.6) indicates that a change in retail interest rates 
depends on a change in policy interest rates and also on the equilibrium error term (Gujarati 
and Porter, 2009: 764). The expected sign of βECT 
should be negative and thus implies that the 
change retail interest rates should be negative to restore equilibrium. 
Once the short-run dynamics between policy and retail interest rates have been estimated 
from an error correction model, the usual procedure is to determine the time taken for the 
retail interest rates to return to attain the long-run adjustment. The procedure used to 
determine this is called the Mean Adjustment Lag (ML) attributed to Doornik and Hendry 
(1994). The next section discusses the concept of ML, symmetric and asymmetric 
adjustments in an error correction framework. 
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4.3.4 Mean Adjustment Lag: Symmetric and Asymmetric Error Correction Framework 
It is important to note that while error correction showed the adjustment of retails interest 
rates towards equilibrium, the ML shows the time taken for these rates to achieve the long-
run PT. The symmetric mean adjustments lag of a complete pass-through can be calculated 
from Equation (4.6) above. The mean lag which shows the speed of adjustment of retail 
interest rates back to equilibrium after a change in monetary policy was proposed by Doornik 
and Hendry (1994) and has been followed by Scholnick (1996); Sander and Kleimeier 
(2004); Chong et al. (2006); Egert et al. (2007); Aziakpono, Wilson and Manuel (2007); 
Kwapil and Scharler (2010); and Aziakpono and Wilson (2010). It is calculated as follows: 
                       (4.7) 
The above Equation (4.7) could also be referred to as the degree of rigidity for the symmetric 
error correction model. With reference to this study, Equation (4.7) assumes that the 
adjustments are symmetric when the retail interest rates are above or below their equilibrium 
level (Scholnick, 1996: 489). Therefore, high mean lag implies high rigidity (i.e., slow 
adjustment) of retail interest rates to changes in the policy rates. Conversely, a low mean lag 
shows low rigidity (fast adjustment) of the retail interest rates to changes in policy rate 
(Aziakpono, Wilson and Manuel, 2007: 9). 
To detect potential asymmetry in the adjustment of retail interest rates to changes in policy 
rate, the study follows the technique proposed by Scholnick (1996) to examine the 
asymmetric adjustment of retail interest rates when above or below their equilibrium level. 
When a residual is above its mean, it can be interpreted as the retail interest rate being above 
its equilibrium level with respect to policy interest rate. The technique required that each 
residual (labelled here as EC) obtained from the cointegrating regressions be divided into two 
distinct set of series, EC
+
 and EC
-
, where EC
+
 represents the error correction term when 
residuals are above their equilibrium levels, and EC
-
 represents the error correction term 
when residuals are below their equilibrium levels; these are estimated as follows: 
         if      
        if            (4.8) 
and 
          if      
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         if           (4.9) 
where μ is the mean of residual (EC). Splitting the residuals has implication for the speed of 
adjustment of retail interest rates after a change in the policy rates. Recall that the 
cointegrating residuals are I(0), which literally implies that the series are mean reverting. 
Therefore, applying this to the study, if the residual is above its mean, it can be translated as 
retail interest rates (lending or deposit rate) are also above their equilibrium levels with policy 
rate. When such disequilibrium situations exist, it is desirable for these rates to trend 
downwards to equilibrium. On the other hand, when the residual is below its mean, retail 
interest rates are below their equilibrium levels with policy rate. Hence, it is expected to 
move back upward to equilibrium. 
The asymmetric short-run dynamic equation can be obtained from Equation (4.6) as follows: 
                        
  
              
  
           
         
      
           (4.10) 
where θ1 and θ2 are the coefficients of the error correction terms when the retail interests are 
above and below equilibrium respectively. Therefore, the derived asymmetric mean 
adjustment lags are: 
                      (4.11) 
and 
                      (4.12) 
Equations (4.11) and (4.12) are the asymmetric adjustment lags in retail interest rates when 
they are either above (4.11) or below (4.12) their equilibrium means. To test whether 
asymmetry exists, Scholnick (1996: 490) suggests using the Wald Test with a χ2(1) 
distribution on the restriction that θ1 = θ2 in Equation (4.10) (i.e., Equations 4.11 and 4.12 are 
equal). Therefore, equality implies symmetry (or no asymmetry), otherwise, asymmetry 
exists (Aziakpono and Wilson, 2010: 21). The importance of asymmetric mean adjustment is 
that it reveals whether the speed of adjustment is faster upwards or downwards. This further 
provides an indication of the direction of the rigidities in the interest rates being analysed. 
In particular, the Wald test has implications for this study as it reveals the asymmetric 
responses to shocks or innovations in monetary policy. For instance, retail interest rates react 
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differently to expansionary and contractionary monetary policies. Therefore, when residuals 
are above equilibrium levels, retail interest rates move down, and when residuals are below 
their equilibrium levels, retail interest rates move up. 
4.4 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
This chapter set out an analytical framework in which the methodological issues relating to 
the measurement of interest rate pass-through are analysed. The chapter starts with the 
definition, sources and scope of the data used for the empirical investigation. It progressed by 
discussing the empirical model and techniques employed to estimate such models. It started 
with the first step in which a test for stationarity or unit root on the series is carried out. The 
two commonly used techniques in the literature for testing for stationarity (i.e., ADF and 
KPSS) are proposed. Once the stationarity and correct order of integration of the series have 
been inferred, the usual procedure is to estimate the long-run relationship, otherwise known 
as cointegrating relationship. To obtain robust cointegrating relationship, four approaches for 
testing for cointegration are proposed. 
Once the null hypothesis of non cointegration has been rejected and cointegration between 
the series has been ascertained, a thorough pass-through analysis is conducted to unveil the 
short-run and long-run pass-through dynamics of interest rates for both the entire estimation 
period and rolling windows. The rolling window technique is used to identify whether pass-
through of monetary policy impulses has become similar over time. The error correction 
model which measures the degree of adjustment to equilibrium will be estimated. From the 
error correction framework, and following Scholnick (1996), the symmetric and asymmetric 
adjustments will be estimated using the mean adjustment lag proposed by Doornik and 
Hendry (1994). The mean adjustment lag shows the degree of rigidity for the symmetric error 
correction model when retail interest rates are either below or above their equilibrium level. 
The Wald test will be used to confirm the presence of asymmetry. 
However, to achieve the objectives set out in chapter one, the above analytical framework 
will be applied to the four Anglophone West African countries. The next chapter presents and 
discusses the results from the empirical estimation. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter the results of the interest rate pass-through analysis are presented and 
discussed as described in chapter four. Several findings emerged from the empirical pass-
through analysis and these are presented at two levels: the first set of results will include the 
estimates for the entire sample period and the second set of results will include the estimates 
of the rolling windows for each country. The results are presented in sections as follows: 
Section 5.2 presents the results of the unit root tests while Section 5.3 presents the findings 
from the cointegration analyses. In Section 5.4, the pass-through analyses for the WAMZ 
economies are presented and discussed. This includes graphical analysis of the findings while 
Section 5.5 presents the results from the symmetric and asymmetric adjustments models. 
Section 5.6 concludes the chapter. The analyses start with the descriptive statistics of the 
interest rate series. To observe the nature of the interest rate series, the descriptive statistics, 
which include mean, median, standard deviation, minimum and maximum, were obtained and 
reported in Table 5.1 below:  
Table 5.1: Descriptive Statistics of the Interest Rates Series 
Country Series Period Obs. Mean Median Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
  DISR 1989:01-2009:12 252 14.78  14.00 5.03  9.00 29.00 
Gambia LR 1989:01-2009:12 252 27.02  26.50  3.50  24.00 36.50 
  DR 1989:01-2009:12 252 13.63 12.50 2.54 10.00 22.00 
  TBR 2000:01-2009:12 120  22.13  23.20 10.57 9.38 46.75 
Ghana LR 2000:01-2009:12 120 32.39 31.75  7.97 9.80 47.75 
  DR 2000:01-2009:12 120  15.99 14.00 7.79 7.25  33.50 
  DISR 1989:01-2009:12 252 15.00 14.00 3.93  6.00  26.00 
Nigeria LR 1989:01-2009:12 252 20.67 20.07 3.85 10.04  37.80 
  DR 1989:01-2009:12 252 13.70 13.13 3.82  5.08  27.00 
  TBR 1989:01-2009:12 252  25.37 19.93 17.13  3.80  95.20 
Sierra  LR 1989:01-2009:12 252 30.93  25.00 12.82 20.00 73.50 
Leone DR 1989:01-2009:12 252 16.21 10.00  14.16  5.13  70.60 
Notes: DISR-Discount rate; LR-Lending rate; DR-Deposit rate; and TBR-Treasury bill rate 
Source: Author‟s estimates. 
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Descriptive statistics of the series indicate that interest rates are significantly different among 
the WAMZ countries for the period under review. Sierra Leone recorded the highest interest 
rates
63
 with 95.20, 73.50 and 70.60 percent for policy, lending and deposit rates respectively, 
followed by Ghana with 46.75, 47.75 and 33.50 for policy, lending and deposit rates 
respectively. Gambia and Nigeria recorded similar averages with a notable exception of the 
minimum lending rate, which is 24.00 and 10.04 for Gambia and Nigeria respectively.  
Before proceeding to discuss the results of the unit root tests, graphical plots of the changes 
in each country‟s interest rates over time are presented in Figure 5.1. 
A: Gambia - 1989 to 2009 
  
 
B: Ghana - 2000 to 2009 
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C: Nigeria - 1989 to 2009 
  
 
D: Sierra Leone - 1989 to 2009 
  
 
Figure 5.1: Changes in Interest Rates over time   
Note: D represents changes in the relevant interest rate. 
It is evident from Figure 5.1 that several upward and downward changes in the policy rates 
have been made during the period under review. The plots in Figure 5.1 above clearly show 
that both lending and deposit rates, though with lags, respond to changes in the central bank‟s 
policy rates in all four countries. Close examination of the plots revealed that, with the 
exception of Nigeria, lending rates are sticky when policy rates adjust downward, and deposit 
rates are also sticky when policy rates adjust upward. Even though there are some indications 
in the four countries that retail rates adjust to policy rates, which indicate that there are 
transmission mechanism of monetary policy in the WAMZ, the crucial issues in the monetary 
policy transmission process that are of relevance to the monetary authorities centre not only 
on whether changes in policies are transmitted but how fast (speed) and how much 
(magnitude) of the change in policy controlled rate is transmitted to the ultimate targets. The 
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plots above can only give a superficial insight on the speed and magnitude of these 
adjustments. The results of the empirical analyses on the speed and magnitude of these 
adjustments are reported in Section 5.4.  
To provide some insights on the relationship of the variables, simple correlation matrices 
were computed. The reason for this is to provide an indication of the presence or absence of 
pass-through. The results of the simple correlation matrices for the level and first difference 
series are presented in Table 5.2.  
Table 5.2: Correlation Analysis between Policy and Retail Interest Rates. 
  Level Series     First Difference Series 
Gambia 
  DISR DR LR   DDISR DDR DLR 
DISR 1.00     DDISR 1.00     
DR 0.78 1.00  DDR 0.36 1.00   
LR 0.72 0.81 1.00 DLR 0.40 0.33 1.00 
Ghana  
  TBR DR LR   DTBR DDR DLR 
TBR 1.00     DTBR 1.00     
DR 0.93 1.00  DDR 0.43 1.00   
LR 0.87 0.88 1.00 DLR 0.05 0.30 1.00 
Nigeria 
  DISR DR LR   DDISR DDR DLR 
DISR 1.00     DDISR 1.00     
DR 0.69 1.00  DDR 0.38 1.00   
LR 0.83 0.85 1.00 DLR 0.49 0.51 1.00 
Sierra Leone 
  TBR DR LR   DTBR DDR DLR 
TBR 1.00     DTBR 1.00     
DR 0.87 1.00  DDR 0.18 1.00   
LR 0.83 0.94 1.00 DLR 0.26 0.54 1.00 
Notes: DISR-Discount rate; LR-Lending rate; DR-Deposit rate; TBR-Treasury bill rate and D 
before each abbreviation mean Difference. 
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For the first difference series, the table shows that Gambia‟s LR has the highest correlation 
with DISR, with a correlation of 40%, followed by DR with a correlation of 36%. For Ghana 
the opposite is the case, DR has the highest correlation with TBR of 43% while LR has a very 
low correlation of 5%. The low level of correlation of LR to TBR can also been seen from the 
plots of DLR in Figure 5B above. Although the changes in TBR were frequent, LR graph 
remained relatively flat throughout the period. In level terms, the correlation coefficients vary 
between 0.72 and 0.94 implying policy and retail interest rates move together. Of all the 
countries Nigeria‟s LR records the highest correlation to DISR of 49% while DR is correlated 
with DISR by 38%. Sierra Leone recorded the lowest level of correlation of DR and TBR of 
18% and a correlation of 26% between LR and TBR. Before proceeding to analyses of the 
results in relation to the objectives set in chapter one, attention is first given to the unit root 
tests performed on each series. These unit root tests were performed to determine if the series 
are all I(1) (i.e., integrated of order one). The next section discusses the results of the unit 
root tests.  
5.2 UNIT ROOT TESTS 
As mentioned earlier in chapter four, the empirical analysis starts by determining the order of 
integration and testing for unit root on the interest rate series using the ADF and KPSS tests. 
To ensure robustness of the results, the tests were conducted at levels and first difference 
under the various assumptions (see Appendix C).   
5.2.1 Unit root analyses for the entire sample 
Table C-1.0 in Appendix C shows the unit root tests results for policy rates (DISR or TBR), 
lending rates and deposit rates for Gambia, Ghana, Nigeria and Sierra Leone for the entire 
sample period. The tests were conducted with level and first difference series with the 
deterministic assumptions of „intercept‟ and „intercept and trend‟. From Table C-1.0 it is 
evident that both the ADF and KPSS tests indicate that the interest rate series in all countries 
appear to be non-stationary at levels, but stationary when differenced once (i.e., I(1)). Further 
to this, cointegration tests were carried out for the entire sample period and the results for the 
cointegration tests are reported in Section 5.3. The next section discusses the unit root results 
for the rolling windows. 
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5.2.2 Unit root analyses for the rolling windows 
The results of the ADF and the KPSS tests for the rolling windows are reported in Table C-
1.1, Table C-1.2, Table C-1.3 and Table C-1.4 for Ghana, Gambia, Nigeria and Sierra Leone 
respectively. Even though in some cases examined some series are I(0), the tests show that 
most of the interest rate series are stationary at first differences. There are cases where unit 
root could not be tested for Gambia. For instance, five out of sixteen rolling windows for the 
ADF test and two out of sixteen rolling windows for the KPSS test for deposit could be tested 
for unit root. This is due to deposit rates during these periods remaining constant. Nigeria 
also witnessed similar situation with discount rates fixed for the 1994–1999 rolling window. 
As stated earlier in the chapter and having shown that most of the interest rate series are I(1), 
the next step is to test the interest rate series cointegrating relationship. The results for the 
cointegration tests are presented and discussed in the next section.   
5.3 COINTEGRATION ANALYSES 
As pointed out in chapter four (methodology), four techniques were used in testing for the 
existence of stable long-run relationship among interest rates series. The tests used were the 
Johansen maximum likelihood estimator (JJ), the Engle and Granger approach (EG), the 
Cointegrating Regression Durbin–Watson (CRDW), and the Error Correction Model based 
approach (ECM). Note that in cases where the various approaches are in disagreement as to 
whether to reject or accept the null hypothesis of no cointegration, the error correction-based 
test was used to confirm the presence of cointegration. This decision rule was based on the 
proposition made by Artis and Zhang (1998: 121) that the ECM statistic for testing for 
cointegration can generate more powerful tests than the Engle–Granger based tests and 
CRDW. In cases where the error correction-based method is not applicable, cointegration is 
confirmed if cointegration is found from any two approaches. The results for the Johansen 
(JJ) test, Engle-Granger (EG), Cointegrating Regression Durbin–Watson (CRDW) test and 
Error Correction Model (ECM) based tests are reported in Appendix D. Based on the 
bivariate estimations
64
 of the interest rates series several findings emerged and the 
discussions of these findings are the focus of the ensuing sections. 
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 The cointegration tests are between lending rates and policy rates, and deposit rates and policy rates. 
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5.3.1 Cointegration analyses for the entire sample  
Consequent upon the unit root test results, the tests for cointegration among the series was 
conducted for the entire sample period for all the countries; Table 5.3 presents a summary of 
the cointegration tests. It is clear from Table 5.3 that for the entire sample period the null of 
no cointegration could be rejected for both lending and deposit rates and across all the 
countries based on the estimates of the ECM statistics, which suggest that there is a stable 
long-run relationship between policy rates and retail interest rates. There are also similarities 
in the results reported in Table 5.3. It appears that for Gambia, Ghana and Nigeria, the null of 
no cointegration in the deposit could not be rejected for the Johansen and CRDW in all three 
countries, but could be rejected for the Engle-Granger and ECM statistics tests.  
Table 5.3: Summary of interest rate pass-through analysis for the entire sample period 
  Sample Cointegration Tests 
Interest Rates From To JJ EG CRDW ECM-Based Concl. 
Gambia  
Lending Rate 1989 2009 yes yes no yes yes 
Deposit Rate 1989 2009 no yes no yes yes 
Ghana  
Lending Rate 2000 2009 yes yes yes yes yes 
Deposit Rate 2000 2009 no yes no yes yes 
Nigeria  
Lending Rate 1989 2009 no yes yes yes yes 
Deposit Rate 1989 2009 no yes no yes yes 
Sierra Leone  
Lending Rate 1989 2009 yes yes no yes yes 
Deposit Rate 1989 2009 yes yes no yes yes 
Note: JJ- is the Johansen method, EG- Engle-Granger method, CRDW- Cointegration 
Regression Durbin–Watson test, ECM-Based - Error Correction Based test. 
 
It is worth noting that a cointegrating relationship was found in all the interest rate series rates 
and across all countries from the Engle–Granger and ECM based tests for the full sample 
period. However, the presence of stable long-run cointegration relationships suggests that 
interest rate pass-through analysis can be done to unveil both the short-run and long-run 
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dynamics of the interest rate series. The next section presents and discusses the results for the 
rolling window analysis. 
5.3.2 Cointegration analyses for the rolling windows 
As noted earlier the rolling windows estimation was used to examine whether cointegration 
relationships exist between the interest rate series and how they may have changed over time; 
these results are presented in Appendix D, tables D-1.1 to D-1.4. Overall, the results suggest 
that there were some degrees of disparity among the various methodologies as to whether to 
accept or reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration. As noted earlier, if the presence of 
cointegration is found by any two methods the null of no cointegration would be rejected.  
The results suggest that the strongest evidence of cointegration in all countries is between 
lending and policy rates. Cointegration was strongest between lending and policy rates in 
Gambia and Nigeria where the null of no cointegration was rejected in fifteen out of the 
sixteen rolling windows, similarly in Ghana where five out five rolling windows are 
cointegrated. As far as Sierra Leone is concerned, the null of no cointegration was rejected in 
twelve out of sixteen rolling windows for lending rates. Lending rates are not cointegrated 
with policy rates in 1997–2002 and 1996–2001 rolling windows in Gambia and Nigeria 
respectively. In Sierra Leone, lending rates are not cointegrated with policy rate in 1995–
2000, 1998–2003, 1999–2004 and 2002–2007 rolling windows. 
Turning to the analyses for deposit rates, with the exception of Ghana where five out of the 
five rolling windows show evidence of cointegration, the strongest evidence of cointegration 
in deposit and lending rates was found in Nigeria. The weakest evidence of cointegration 
came from Gambia where the null hypothesis of no cointegration could not be rejected in five 
out of sixteen rolling windows. In Sierra Leone, the null of no cointegration was rejected in 
twelve out of sixteen rolling windows. In Gambia deposit rates are not cointegrated with 
policy rate in 1990–2005, 1995–2000, 1996–2001, 1997–2002 and 2000–2005 rolling 
windows, while in Nigeria deposit rates are not cointegrated with policy rate in 1994–1999, 
1995–2000 and 2003–2008 rolling windows. In Sierra Leone, deposit rates are not 
cointegrated with policy rates in 1999–2004, 2002–2007, 2003–2008 and 2004–2009 rolling 
windows. 
Overall, the Johansen Maximum Likelihood and the CRDW accepted the highest null of no 
cointegration in both lending and deposit rates for the rolling windows. It is clear from the 
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results in Appendix D that the null of no cointegration in most cases could be rejected in both 
the full sample and rolling windows for lending rates and deposit rates. Once the presence of 
cointegration and a stable long-run relationship between policy rate and retail interest rates 
has been ascertained, the next step, as stated in chapter four, is to unveil the short-run and 
long-run interest rate pass-through dynamics. 
It is worth noting that the presence of cointegration only tells us that there is a stable long-run 
relationship between policy rate and retail interest rates. The cointegration results cannot tell 
us how fast and how much of the changes in official rates are transmitted to lending and 
deposit rates. To achieve this, an error correction model for the two types of interest rates in 
the economies analysed is used to unveil the dynamics of the short-run and long-run interest 
rate pass-through. The next section discusses the results of the short and long-run pass-
through.  
5.4 RESULTS FROM INTEREST RATE PASS-THROUGH ANALYSES 
5.4.1 Short-Run Pass-Through Analyses 
One of the objectives set out in chapter one was to examine the short-run and long-run 
dynamic adjustment of lending and deposit rates to changes in policy controlled interest rate. 
To achieve this objective, focus is first turned to the short-run pass-through. The short-run 
pass-through or the impact multiplier, which measures the immediate adjustment of retail 
interest rates to changes in policy-controlled interest rate, is crucial in determining the 
effectiveness of monetary policy in an economy.  
As pointed out, the tests have shown that the interest rate series are cointegrated, and 
consequent upon these results, the ECM model was estimated and the results reported in 
Appendix D.  The analyses continued with the examination of the degree of pass-through 
completeness between the types of interest rate series in all countries. Overall, the results for 
both the short-run and long-run pass-through show high levels of disparities in the entire 
sample and the rolling window analyses. Note that the analyses covered a period of twenty-
one (21) years from January 1989 to December 2009 for Gambia, Nigeria and Sierra Leone. 
Based on the unavailability of data for Ghana, the sample period of ten (10) years was 
estimated. The analysis was done at two levels. First, the entire sample period was estimated 
for all economies analysed. Second, to capture the dynamics of interest rate pass-through 
over time, rolling samples of six years (72 observations) were estimated. The graphical plots 
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of the pass-through results are presented in the next section while the summary of the results 
is reported in tables D-1.0 to D-1.4 in Appendix D. 
5.4.1.1 Short-Run Pass-Through analysis of the entire sample period 
It is clear from Figure 5.2 that the short-run pass-through or impact multipliers in all the 
countries are very low and statistically different from one for both lending and deposit rates. 
An important finding for a study of this nature is the difference between the short-run pass-
through of lending and deposit rates. The results show discrepancies across countries and 
between deposit and lending rates. The size of the short-run pass-through for deposit rates 
ranges from 13% to 47%, indicating that when policy rates change less than half of the 
changes are passed through to deposit rates. On the other hand, when policy rate changes, a 
minimum of -6% and a maximum of 66% is passed through to lending rates in the WAMZ 
economies. Note that in Nigeria and Sierra Leone, short-run PT was higher in lending rates 
than deposit rates, whereas short-run pass-through in deposit rates was greater than lending 
rates in Gambia and Ghana. 
 
Figure 5.2: Estimated Short-Run Pass-Through 
Source: Author‟s estimates. 
Figure 5.2 shows that, in the short-term, both lending and deposit interest rates are sticky. For 
instance, when policy rate changes only 26%, 66% and 30% of the change can be passed 
through to lending rates in Gambia, Nigeria and Sierra Leone respectively. The short-run 
pass-through for Ghana is alarmingly low with -6%. One possible explanation for this could 
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be the type of lending rate used
65
. As argued by Achaempong (2005), the manufacturing 
sector is the dominant sector in the loan market in Ghana and thus, it is possible that the 
manufacturing corporations would have close ties with the banks that may have occurred as a 
consequence of long-term relationships. In such situations, the banks and their customers 
(manufacturing corporations, which are less risky) may have entered into implicit contracts in 
which the banks offered stable interest rates in order to protect customers from volatile 
interest rates (Allen and Gale, 2004). Deposit rates also showed a weak and incomplete short-
run pass-through of 29%, 35%, 47% and 13% for Gambia, Ghana, Nigeria and Sierra Leone 
respectively. Thus, one can argue that the short-run pass-throughs of both lending and deposit 
interest rates are weak and incomplete in the WAMZ economies. 
5.4.1.2 Short-Run Pass-Through Analysis for the Rolling Windows 
The rolling windows have been done with 72 observations (i.e., 6 years), the results of which 
are reported in tables D-1.1 to D-1.0 of Appendix D. The results for the rolling windows 
show some disparities between lending and deposit rates over time. Figure 5.3 presents 
graphical plots of the impact multipliers of lending rates, and Figure 5.4 presents the impact 
multipliers for deposit rates. 
 
Figure 5.3: Short-Run Pass-Through – Lending Rates. 
Source: Author‟s estimates. 
Figure 5.3 shows that the lending rates short-run pass-through for Nigeria was exceptionally 
high from the 1989–1994 up to 1993–1998 rolling windows compared to the other countries 
analysed and even exhibit over shooting effect in the 1993–1998 rolling window. Also, it is 
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 As noted in chapter four, lending rate to manufacturing was used as a proxy for commercial banks lending 
based on the unavailability of lending rates series. 
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clear from Figure 5.3 that the lending rate short-run pass-through was stable for most of the 
period. The short-run pass-through in Nigeria decreases from the all time high short-run 
coefficient of 1.08 and moves towards the level of the short-run pass-through in Gambia and 
Sierra Leone.  
In what follows, it also appears that since the 1994–1999 rolling window, Gambia, Nigeria 
and Sierra Leone moved towards similar levels. In other words, it is evident that there is 
convergence of the short-run pass-through. The short-run pass-through in Ghana also showed 
some level of convergence from 2000–2005 to 2002–2007 rolling windows and later diverges 
with a decreasing pass-through. A more salient point to note about the level of convergence 
in the WANZ economies is that the period of convergence coincided with the signing of a 
declaration for the creation of a second West African Monetary Zone in April 2000 by the 
heads of states of Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Nigeria and Sierra Leone. 
Despite the convergence in the short-run lending rates pass-through, the results in Table D-
1.1 to Table D-1.4 show that the short-run lending rates pass-through in Gambia, Ghana and 
Sierra Leone are similar and very low ranging from -1.29 to 0.41. With regards to Nigeria, 
the results show that short-run lending rates pass-through range from -0.04 to 1.08. Thus, 
there is sufficient evidence to argue that there are discrepancies in the short-run lending rate 
pass-through across countries and incompleteness over time.  
 
Figure 5.4: Short-Run Pass-Through – Deposit Rates 
Source: Author‟s estimates. 
As far as short-run pass-through for deposit rates are concerned, there are also some 
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1998 rolling windows for Nigeria, the plots in Figure 5.4 show that short-run pass-through of 
deposit rates remained low, hovering between 51% and -8% from the 1993–1996 to 2004–
2009 rolling windows. This implied that there are high levels of short-run rigidities in deposit 
rates in the WAMZ. Notably, in Nigeria the short-run pass-through was hovering around 67% 
and 78% from 1989–1994 to 1993–1998 rolling windows. From 1993–1998 rolling window, 
similar patterns occurred in Nigeria and Sierra Leone short-run pass-through with Nigeria 
beginning to drop from 1993–1998 until the 1996–2001 rolling windows to become similar to 
Sierra Leone over time. Though in Gambia and Ghana there were gaps in the plots; their 
short-run pass-throughs are not significantly different from the other countries from 1998–
2003 to 2004–2009 rolling windows. Note that in the 2002–2007 rolling window Ghana, 
Nigeria and Sierra Leone converge to the same level of short-run pass-through. Also, with 
exception of Sierra Leone, Gambia, Ghana and Nigeria begin to converge towards higher 
pass-through in the 2003–2008 rolling window.    
It was noted in chapter four that coefficients less than one for short-run pass-through indicate 
a sluggish adjustment of deposit and lending rates to changes in policy rate in the short-run, 
thus retail interest rates are sticky. It is worth mentioning that the incomplete short-run pass-
throughs found for both lending and deposit rates are not unique to the WAMZ economies. 
Empirical evidences have shown that short-run pass-through in most cases is incomplete, not 
only in developing economies but also in emerging and developed economies. For instance, 
Hulsewig et al. (2009) reported an immediate PT of 54% for the Euro area. Also, Kwapil and 
Scharler (2010) found weak and incomplete short-run pass-through of 16% and 34% for 
deposit and lending rates respectively in the Euro area. Corresponding to these findings in the 
Euro area, Wang and Lee (2009) found that short-run pass-through in nine Asian countries 
range from 0.0003 to 0.47 for deposit rates and -0.004 to 0.179 for lending rates
66
. Attention 
is now turned to the long-run pass-through for deposit and lending rates in each country over 
time.  
5.4.2 Long-Run Pass-Through Analyses 
The detailed results of the long-run pass-through are reported in Appendix D, tables D-1.0 to 
D-1.4. Though the estimates for the long-run PT are higher than those of the short-run pass-
through, it is clearly evident that the pass-throughs are weak and incomplete for the WAMZ 
economies. Figures 5.5, 5.6 and 5.7 show plots of the results for lending and deposit rates for 
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the entire sample period, and lending rates and deposit rates for the rolling windows over 
time, respectively.   
5.4.2.1 Long-Run Pass-through analyses for the entire sample period 
Notably, long-run pass-through from policy rate to lending and deposit rates is less than one 
(1) in all four economies analysed, implying that interest rate pass-through is incomplete in 
the long-run. The meaning of this is that a one percent change (increase/decrease) in policy 
rates would not be accompanied by an equivalent change in retail interest rates in the WAMZ 
economies. Figure 5.5 shows the plots of the long-run pass-through for the entire sample 
period.  
 
Figure 5.5: Estimated Long-Run Pass-Through 
Source: Author‟s estimates. 
Starting with the Gambian economy, the long-run pass-through coefficients of deposit and 
lending rates are statistically significant although are quite low. It is clear from Figure 5.5 
that only 40% and 50% are passed through in the long-run to deposit and lending rates 
respectively when policy rates change. This implies that not all of the change is transmitted to 
both deposit and lending rates when policy rates change. Thus the long-run pass-throughs of 
deposit and lending rates are incomplete in Gambia. Sundry factors could be responsible for 
this, but one argument forwarded by Sriram (2009) is that in Gambia the banking sector, 
which is the dominant sector in the financial system, is highly concentrated with low degree 
of competition among banks. Other factors could be the underdeveloped state of the financial 
structures and non-availability of active non-bank financial intermediaries.  
As far as Ghana is concerned, Figure 5.5 shows that 69% and 66% of the changes in policy-
controlled rates are transmitted to deposit and lending rates respectively in the long-run. The 
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long-run pass-through coefficients are statistically significant but low, indicating an 
incomplete pass-through from policy rate to both deposit and lending rates. Pass-through in 
Ghana could not be complete because of the interest rate used. Ghana‟s pass-through 
coefficients are a bit high compared to those of Gambia. As noted in chapter three, one reason 
for this could be as a result of the availability of non-bank financial institutions such as 
securities markets, and the recent adoption of the inflation targeting framework in Ghana in 
2007 is expected to stimulate pass-through. In an inflation targeting regime, interest rates 
become the most closely watch variable by the monetary authorities. Thus changes in policy 
interest rates are expected to be fully passed to retail interest rates in the short-run and long-
run. 
The analyses of the WAMZ economies continue with Nigeria. It is clear from Figure 5.5 that 
Nigeria records the highest coefficient of long-run pass-through among the economies 
analysed, with statistically significant coefficients of 81% for lending rates. This implies that 
when there is a change in official rate, 81% is transmitted to lending and deposit rates in the 
long-run. Likewise, 67% is passed through to deposit rates in the long-run. The long-run 
pass-through , though not complete in Nigeria, is relatively close to one for lending rates. The 
high long-run pass-through could be attributed to factors such competition in the banking 
sector, financial reforms, relatively active capital market and an active non-bank financial 
market with a wide range of products compared to the other WAMZ economies. 
With regards to Sierra Leone, Figure 5.5 shows that the long-run pass-through coefficients 
are 72% and 62% for deposit and lending rates respectively. This implies that 72% and 67% 
is passed through to deposit and lending rates respectively when official rates change. Sierra 
Leone though has the highest long-run pass-through for deposit rate; the coefficients for retail 
interest rates are statistically different from one. Thus, it is evident that long-run PT is 
incomplete. Sierra Leone like Gambia also has a highly concentrated banking sector with low 
degree of competition.  
5.4.2.2 Long-Run Pass-Through analyses of the rolling windows 
It is evidently clear from Figure 5.6 that there are huge discrepancies in the long-run pass-
through across countries over time. With the exception of Nigeria, Figure 5.6 shows that 
there is no evidence of complete pass-through in the other countries over time. The lending 
rates long-run pass-through in Gambia, Ghana and Sierra Leone fall within the range of 2% 
and 65% throughout the estimated period indicating that there is no evidence of complete 
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lending rates pass-through over time. In Nigeria, lending rate long-run pass-through ranges 
from 13% to 108% indicating that there are instances in which long-run pass-through were 
complete. It is however worth mentioning that in six out of sixteen rolling windows the pass-
through is greater than one
67
 and in one rolling window it equals one in Nigeria. Note that 
these periods coincided with the implementation of the World Bank sponsored financial 
reforms. This result is not surprising; as indicated in chapter three, the Nigerian banking 
sector is competitive, less concentrated and developed compared to the other three economies 
analysed.  
 
Figure 5.6: Long-Run Pass-Through – Lending Rates 
Source: Author‟s estimates. 
Figure 5.6 shows substantial variation in the lending rate long-run pass-through of Nigeria 
and Gambia starting from 1993–1998 to 2004–2009 rolling windows, whereas in Ghana and 
Sierra Leone lending rates long-run pass-through were relatively stable. Note that from the 
1993–1998 rolling window onwards, Sierra Leone continuously has the lowest long-run pass-
through among these economies. In Gambia, Nigeria and Sierra Leone, although each at 
different levels, pass-throughs were relatively stable from 1989–1994 to 1993–1998 rolling 
windows. Between the 1993–1998 and 1994–1999 rolling windows, pass-through in Nigeria 
and Sierra Leone dropped to become similar. Some indications of convergence start in the 
2001–2006 and continue to 2004–2009 rolling window except for 2004–2009, where Ghana 
diverges. Despite the disparities in the long-run pass-through across the countries, there is 
evidence that these countries are trending towards similar levels since 2001–2006 rolling 
window as shown in Figure 5.6.  
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 When the value of pass-through is greater than one it indicates over pass-through or overshooting effects. 
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Turning to deposit rates, Figure 5.7 shows plots of the long-run pass-through for deposit 
rates. Like lending rates, deposit rates also show discrepancies across countries over time. In 
Gambia, Ghana and Nigeria there were considerable variations in the long-run pass-through 
of deposit rates ranging from -0.03(-3%) to 1.18(118%) over the estimated period. While in 
Sierra Leone it was relatively stable since 1994–1999 onwards.  
 
Figure 5.7: Long-Run Pass-Through – Deposit Rates 
Source: Author‟s estimates. 
Figure 5.7 suggests that the first visibility of convergence occurred in 1992–1997 to 1994–
1999 windows where Gambia and Sierra Leone were converging to a lower pass-through 
later joined by Nigeria in the 1993–1998 windows. Evidence of convergence is also visible in 
the 2001–2006 windows when all the countries follow a decreasing trend in lower pass-
through, but in the 2003–2008 windows all countries began to increase with the exception of 
Nigeria. The long-run pass-through of Nigeria witnessed a constant increase from 1989–1994 
to 1993–1998 windows and a fall to 0.31(31%) in 1994–1999. From there it climaxed to the 
all time high of 1.18(118%) in the1997–2002 window. A key observation in the patterns for 
both lending and deposit rates pass-through is that there were high pass-throughs in the first 
five rolling windows, a period that coincided with the implementation of the World Bank 
sponsored Structural Adjustment Programmes in all the economies analysed. 
With regards to the differences between the short-run and long-run pass-throughs of lending 
and deposit rates, Figure 5.8 revealed that for most of the estimated periods the long-run 
pass-through is larger than the short-run pass-through.  
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A: Gambia 
 
B: Ghana 
 
C: Nigeria 
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D: Sierra Leone 
 
Figure 5.8: Short-Run and Long-Run Pass-Through for rolling windows 
Source: Author‟s estimates 
Only in Gambia and Nigeria in the 2004–2009 window is the short-run greater than the long-
run pass-through. The disparity between the short-run and long-run pass-through is not only 
unique to the WAMZ economies. Empirical evidences
68
 from advanced and emerging 
economies have shown incomplete pass-through across retail interest rates in both the short-
run and the long-run. 
Notably, both the short-run and long-run pass-throughs for the entire sample period are less 
than one among all four WAMZ economies, implying that pass-through is incomplete. There 
are considerable discrepancies in the empirical findings for the pass-through between lending 
and deposit rates. However, these results are not unique to this study, as empirical evidences 
have shown that pass-through is also complete in most advanced, emerging and developing 
economies
69
. On a whole the results report in Appendix D suggest the following: first, both 
long-run and short-run pass-through are incomplete. Second, the gap between short-run and 
long-run pass-through is wide in all countries. Third, among the economies analysed, Nigeria 
has the highest pass-through while Sierra Leone has the lowest. Fourth, in Nigeria pass-
through is complete in some rolling windows in the long-run and the short-run for lending 
and deposit rates.  Finally, among the retail interest rates, on average the pass-through is 
                                                          
68
 Mojon (2000); de Bondt (2005); De Graeve et al. (2007); Wang and Lee (2009); Kwapil and Scharler (2010); 
and Marotta (2009). 
69
 See Appendix A for summary of these studies. 
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largest for lending rates in all countries. There are possible reasons why this might be the 
case.  
First, the incomplete pass-through could be as result of the underdeveloped financial systems 
in the WAMZ. As noted in chapter three, the financials systems of the WAMZ are 
underdeveloped with a limited range of financial products and limited alternative sources of 
funding. The unavailability of alternative sources of funding might force bank customers to 
accept whatever interest rates they face and make retail interest rates less sensitive to change 
in policy rates.  Second, incomplete pass-through could be as a result of a high degree 
concentration in the banking sectors. When the banking sectors are highly concentrated, retail 
interest rates often do not respond to changes in policy rates. Third, the low degree of 
competition within the banking sector, and between banks and non-bank financial 
institutions, might have contributed to the incomplete pass-through. The degree of 
competition in the financial system has important implications for interest rate pass-through. 
It should be noted however that the reason for incomplete pass-through might be country-
specific in some cases. 
It is worth noting that the short-run and long-run pass-through analyses do not tell the 
complete story of interest rates adjustment dynamics. They only tell how much (magnitude) 
of the policy-controlled rate is transmitted to deposit and lending rates and thereby confirm 
whether the PT is complete or incomplete. A crucial aspect of the analysis that cannot be 
explained by short-run and long-run pass-through coefficients is whether the adjustment in 
lending and deposit rates to changes in policy-controlled rate is fast (speed) or how sticky is 
the adjustment upwards or downwards. The ensuing sections provide detailed analysis of the 
adjustments in an error correction framework. 
5.5 SYMMETRIC MEAN AND ASYMMETRIC ADJUSTMENT IN THE ECM 
5.5.1 Mean Adjustment Lags 
The mean adjustment lag (ML) measures the time taken for a change in the policy rate to be 
fully passed through to both lending and deposit rates. A high mean adjustment lag value 
indicates high rigidity or slower adjustment and a low value implies high speed of adjustment 
of retail interest rates in response to changes in policy rates. Note that policymakers are not 
just interested in the magnitude of adjustments reflected on the ultimate target of monetary 
policy but also the speed of transmission at which these changes are conveyed to the ultimate 
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targets. Therefore, determining whether retail interest rates quickly reflect changes in policy 
rate or whether such changes are rigid is of utmost importance. Also note that in rolling 
windows where cointegration was not found, it is impossible to calculate an error correction 
model, and thus mean adjustment lags cannot be calculated. The next section discusses the 
mean lag adjustments and the results are reported in Appendix D, tables D-1.0 to D-1.4.   
5.5.1.1 Mean Adjustment Lags for the entire sample period 
Figure 5.9 shows plots of the ML for lending and deposit rates for the entire sample period. It 
is clear from Figure 5.9 that Nigeria has the lowest ML in lending rates indicating that the 
speed of adjustment is highest in Nigeria in comparison to the other economies analysed. 
Ghana comes second, Sierra Leone third and Gambia exhibits the least speed of adjustment. 
On the other hand, the ML for deposit rates is lowest in Ghana, closely followed by Nigeria 
and Gambia, with Sierra Leone having the highest, suggesting that Sierra Leone has the 
lowest speed of adjustment in deposit rates to changes in policy rate.  
 
Figure 5.9: Mean Adjustment Lag of the entire sample period – Lending and Deposit 
Rates  
Source: Author‟s estimates. 
It is evident from Figure 5.9 above that there is some degree of rigidity in adjustment in the 
lending and deposit rates of the WAMZ economies. The results are not surprising as they 
reflect the earlier findings of incomplete short-run and long-run pass-through. Of the two 
retail rates used, ML for lending rates are lower in Ghana, Nigeria and Sierra Leone than 
deposit rates suggesting that lending rates adjust more quickly to changes in policy rates than 
deposit rates in these economies. Only in Gambia where deposit rates adjust faster than 
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lending rates. The results reported in Appendix D suggest that when the central bank changes 
policy rate, it takes approximately, thirteen, three, two and eight months for such changes to 
be fully reflected in lending rates in Gambia, Ghana, Nigeria and Sierra Leone respectively. 
Also, deposit rates adjust in seven, six, seven and nineteen months to changes in policy rates. 
What is apparent about the ML in all four economies analysed is that the speed of adjustment 
is very high for both lending and deposit rates implying that the transmission of monetary 
policy action to its ultimate target is slow and could take considerable length of time in 
Gambia and Sierra Leone. The next section discusses the findings for the rolling windows. 
5.5.1.2 Mean Adjustment Lags for the rolling windows 
For the periods in which cointegration was found in the rolling window analysis, on average 
it takes lending rates to fully adjust to changes in policy rates four, three, four and eight 
months in Gambia, Ghana, Nigeria and Sierra Leone respectively. Note that MLs were only 
calculated for rolling windows where long-run equilibrium relationships are found. This 
explains the breaks in the ML and ML plots in Figures 5.10 and 5.11.  
 
Figure 5.10: Mean Adjustment Lag of the rolling windows – Lending Rates 
Source: Author‟s estimates. 
Overall, it was manifested in the short-run and long-run pass-through that the mean lags for 
lending rates were very low in Nigeria for the first five rolling windows (1989–1994 to 1993–
1998), indicating a high speed of adjustment. For example, during the rolling windows 
(1989–1994 to 1993–1998) lending rates fully adjust to policy rates less than a month in 
Nigeria. These indicate a high speed adjustment in early 1990s followed by a slower speed of 
adjustment of seven months in the 1994–1999 rolling window. These periods of higher speed 
of adjustment coincided with the post liberalization period when the banking sector became 
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more competitive. After the 1994–1999 rolling window, the ML for Nigeria averaged 
between three and eight months for the rest of the estimated period. The highest in ML 
occurred in the 2002–2007 rolling window in Nigeria. In Ghana ML for lending rates is 
relatively stable throughout the estimated period, ranging from one to four months. The 
highest speed of adjustment of 1.41 months is observed in the 2003–2008 rolling window 
while the lowest speed of adjustment of 4.42 months is observed in the 2004–2009 rolling 
window. In Gambia the speed of adjustment in lending rates was stable in the first six rolling 
windows, with an average speed of 2.39 months, and started slowing down to 8.41 months in 
the 2002–2007 rolling windows. The speed of adjustment started increasing in the 2003–2008 
to 2004–2009. Sierra Leone recorded the lowest speed of adjustment in lending rates for the 
rolling windows analyses. For instance, the speed of adjustments range from 2.81 to 16.18 
months; these indicate high rigidity in the transmission of monetary policy in Sierra Leone. In 
Sierra Leone the speed of adjustment witnessed a stable decrease from a speed of 2.81 to 8.22 
months for the first eight rolling windows and increased to 3.74 months in the 1997–2002 
rolling windows. After the 1997–2002 rolling window the speed of adjustment started 
decreasing to reach the all-time low of 16.18 months in the 2003–2008, therefore, indicating 
a very high rigidity in lending rate adjustments. 
 
Figure 5.11: Mean Adjustment Lag of the rolling windows – Deposit Rates 
Source: Author‟s estimates 
Attention is now turned to deposit rates. Figure 5.11 shows plots of the ML for deposit rates 
of the economies analysed. Note that for the periods in which cointegration was found, on 
average, it takes deposit rates to fully adjust to changes in policy rates three, five, three and 
nine months in Gambia, Ghana, Nigeria and Sierra Leone respectively. It is apparent from the 
results in Appendix D that lending rates adjust faster than deposit rates in most cases. In 
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Ghana, speed of adjustment was stable and increasing over the period, ranging from a 
maximum of 6.12 months in 2000–2005 rolling window to 2.79 months in 2004–2009 rolling 
windows. In the first three rolling windows, deposit rate adjusted to changes in policy rate in 
less than a month in Nigeria. It slowed down to 2.66 months in the 1992–1997 rolling 
windows. After the 1993–1998 rolling window, the speed of adjustment was fairly stable in 
Nigeria with an average speed of adjustment of 4.81 months for deposit rate to fully adjust to 
changes in policy rate. The highest speed of adjustment in deposit rate in Sierra Leone 
occurred in the 1997–2002 rolling window of 3.96 months and the lowest, of 14.68 months, 
in the 1990–1995 rolling window. The speed of adjustment in Sierra Leone was unstable 
throughout the estimated period ranging from 3.96 to 14.68 months; this indicates a very high 
rigidity in the transmission of monetary policy in Sierra Leone. In Gambia proper inference 
cannot be made on the speed of adjustment of deposit rate to changes in policy rate since in 
most of the windows a stable relationship between deposit rate and discount rates (policy 
rates) was not found. However, in the rolling windows where cointegration was found, the 
speed of adjustment ranged from 1.00 to 7.65 months, and after the 1999–2004 rolling 
window the speed of adjustment continued to increase until 2004–2009, indicating that the 
transmission policy is becoming faster in Gambia. 
From the above analyses, some striking evidence emerged. One could expect that the speed 
of adjustment should be slow in the developing WAMZ economies but this is clearly not the 
case. The ability of monetary authorities to influence economic activities via changes in 
policy rates in the WAMZ was surprisingly high, especially in Ghana and Nigeria, compared 
to the findings in some emerging and advanced economies. For instance, in the Euro area, de 
Bondt (2005) found that speed of adjustment ranged between 2.8 to 10.2 months for lending 
rates and 3 to 23.8 months for deposit rates. Also, Chong et al. (2006) found a high speed of 
adjustment in Singapore, ranging from 6.0 to 13.2 months for deposit rates and 8.3 months 
for lending rates. Charoenseang and Manakit (2007) also found speed of adjustment to be 
between 0.25 and 15.57 for lending rates, and 7.09 and 12.52 months for deposit rates in 
Thailand. Scholnick (1996) found the speed of adjustment in lending rates to be 11.4 and 8.3 
months in Malaysia and Singapore respectively. These findings show that the speed of 
adjustment in the WAMZ economies is comparatively high and in line with some emerging 
economies in Asia and advanced economies in the Euro area. The next section discusses the 
asymmetric mean adjustment lags.    
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5.5.2 Asymmetric Mean Adjustment Lags in the ECM 
While the mean adjustment lag shows how long it takes lending and deposit rates to fully 
reflect changes in policy rate in the long-run, the asymmetric mean adjustment lag determines 
the speed of adjustment in lending and deposit rates back to equilibrium when they are either 
above or below their equilibrium levels. Recall that the Wald Test with a χ2(1) distribution 
was used to test whether the coefficients of the positive and negative residuals are equal in 
Equation 4.10 in chapter four (i.e.,  θ1 = θ2), if the coefficients of the Wald Test are 
significant it implies there is asymmetric adjustment and if insignificant the adjustment is 
symmetric. The asymmetric mean adjustment lags which described the behaviour of 
commercial banks in adjusting retail interest rates in response to changes in policy interest 
rates were estimated as described in chapter four and the results are reported in Appendix E, 
tables E-1.0 to E-1.4. 
5.5.2.1 Asymmetric Mean Adjustment Lag for the entire sample period 
Figure 5.12 shows the plots of the estimated asymmetric mean adjustment lag of lending rates 
for the entire sample period for the economies analysed. It is apparent from Figure 5.12 that 
there are disparities across countries when lending rates are either above or below their 
equilibrium levels. For example, lending rates are rigid downward in Nigeria and Sierra 
Leone while rigid upwards in Gambia and Ghana. 
 
Figure 5.12: Asymmetric Adjustment: Entire sample period for Lending Rates  
Source: Author‟s estimates. 
The results regarding asymmetry in Gambia show that there is significantly upward 
asymmetric adjustment in lending rate to changes in policy rate. This is evident from the plot 
in Figure 5.12 with higher upward rigidity of 49.10 months, indicating that commercial banks 
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in the Gambia adjust lending rates upward rigidly. Such behaviour is consistent with the 
customer reaction hypothesis. On the other hand, significant downward asymmetric 
adjustment in lending rates was found in Sierra Leone suggesting that commercial banks in 
Sierra Leone rigidly adjust lending rates downwards. This behaviour by commercial banks in 
Sierra Leone is consistent with the collusive pricing arrangement among commercial banks in 
the loan market. It appears that commercial banks in Sierra Leone operate in unison in fixing 
prices. Breaking this pricing arrangement would mean loss of revenue if there was a decrease 
in lending rates, thus causing high rigidities in lending rate decreases rather than in lending 
rate increases.  There is no evidence of asymmetry in lending rates in Ghana and Nigeria. 
 
Figure 5.13: Asymmetric Adjustment: Entire sample period for Deposit Rates  
Source: Author‟s estimates. 
With regards to deposit rates, the empirical tests suggest that there is upward asymmetric 
adjustment in deposit rates in Gambia. Deposit rate is rigid when below equilibrium levels 
implying that deposit rate is more rigid when increasing compared to when the rates are 
decreasing, supporting the collusive pricing arrangement among commercial banks in 
Gambia. Also, downward asymmetric adjustment in deposit rates is found in Nigeria. This 
means that deposit rates are less rigid when increasing compared to when they are decreasing 
implying that commercial banks Nigeria tend to adjust their deposit rates upward faster than 
adjusting them downward. This behaviour of commercial banks is consistent with the 
customer reaction hypothesis among banks in the deposit market. These results are consistent 
with previous empirical findings. For instance, Hannan and Berger (1991); Neumark and 
Sharpe (1992) and Scholnick (1996) found that deposit rates are less rigid when they are 
above their equilibrium levels than when below equilibrium levels. That is less rigid when 
they are decreasing compared to when they are increasing. There are no evidences of 
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asymmetric adjustment in deposit rates in Ghana and Sierra Leone. The next section 
discusses the results of the asymmetric mean adjustment lag for the rolling windows analyses. 
5.5.2.2 Asymmetric Mean Adjustment Lag for the rolling windows 
The empirical tests show that there are huge discrepancies in lending and deposit rates among 
the economies analysed as shown in figures 5.14 and 5.15 below. 
A: Gambia 
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C: Nigeria 
 
D: Sierra Leone 
 
Figure 5.14: Asymmetric Adjustment: Rolling windows – Lending Rates 
Source: Author‟s estimates. 
The rolling window results of the asymmetric mean adjustment provided insufficient 
evidence of asymmetry in lending rates in Gambia. For instance, nine out of fifteen rolling 
windows where cointegration was found accepted the null hypothesis of no asymmetry while 
six rolling windows rejected the null hypothesis. The direction of asymmetry was found to be 
constant over time in the six cases where asymmetry was confirmed with lending rates 
significantly rigid downward supporting the collusive pricing arrangement among 
commercial banks. The all time high downward rigidity in lending was shown in the 1994–
1999 rolling window 1994–1999 of 476.71 months implying that lending rate was highly 
rigid downward during this period in Gambia as shown in Figure 5.14. Also, in Ghana three 
out the five rolling windows rejected the null of no asymmetry while the other two accepted 
it, but the direction of asymmetry seem to be mixed. In the rolling windows 2001–2006 and 
2002–2007, lending rate was significantly more rigid in downward adjustment than upward 
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adjustment, supporting collusive pricing arrangement among banks. Conversely, in the 2004–
2009 rolling window lending rate was more rigid upward than downward, supporting the 
customer reaction hypothesis. 
In Nigeria, cointegration was found in fifteen rolling windows and out of these the null 
hypothesis of no asymmetry could not be rejected in nine and was rejected in six rolling 
windows, indicating some evidence of asymmetry in lending rates. The results show that the 
direction of asymmetry was constant upward over time, thus supporting the hypothesis of 
negative customer reaction. The negative customer reaction found in Nigeria was as a result 
of the increased level of competition among commercial banks. As far as Sierra Leone is 
concerned, the empirical evidences suggest that there are no evidences of significant 
asymmetric adjustment in lending rates, with the null hypothesis of no asymmetry being 
accepted in eleven out of the twelve rolling windows where cointegration was found. Upward 
asymmetric adjustment in lending rates was only found in the 1996–2001 rolling window 
which supports the theory of negative customer reaction. 
A: Gambia 
 
B: Ghana 
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C: Nigeria 
 
D: Sierra Leone 
 
Figure 5.15: Asymmetric Adjustment: Rolling windows – Deposit Rates 
Source: Author‟s estimates. 
The analyses of the WAMZ economies continue with deposit rates. Figure 5.15 shows mixed 
results in terms of the adjustment rigidity and the direction of asymmetry across countries. In 
Gambia, the results of the rolling windows of deposit rates suggest that in six of the ten 
rolling windows where cointegration was found the null hypothesis of no asymmetry could 
not be rejected; thus, asymmetry was only found in four rolling windows. The directions of 
asymmetric adjustments are rigid downward in the 1989–1994 and 1993–1998 rolling 
windows, supporting the theory of negative customer reaction. On the other hand, in the 
1999–2004 and 2004–2009 rolling windows asymmetric adjustments are rigid upward, 
supporting the theory collusive pricing arrangement of commercial banks. 
In the case of Ghana, the null hypothesis of no asymmetry could not be rejected in three of 
the five rolling windows and the directions of asymmetric adjustment in deposit rates were 
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more rigid upward. Therefore, one could argue that there is significantly rigid upward 
asymmetric adjustment of commercial banks deposit rates in Ghana during the 2003–2008 
and 2004–2009 rolling windows, suggesting that commercial banks have collusive pricing 
arrangement among them. 
Asymmetry in Nigeria was not very pronounced as asymmetric adjustment in deposit rates 
was found in three out of the thirteen rolling windows where cointegration was found. In the 
rolling windows between 1992–1997 and 1993–1998, deposit rate was more rigid in 
downward adjustment than upward, therefore supporting the theory of negative customer 
reaction. In the rolling window 2004–2005, however, deposit rate was more rigid in upward 
adjustment than in downward adjustment, thus supporting the collusive pricing arrangement 
in the deposit market in Nigeria. Overall, there is weak evidence of asymmetry in Nigeria. 
Finally, the results for Sierra Leone regarding asymmetric adjustments of deposit rates 
suggest that, out of the twelve rolling windows where cointegration was found for deposit 
rates, only the 1991–1996 rolling window confirmed the existence of rigid asymmetric 
upward adjustment in deposit rates. Thus one can conclude that there is no asymmetric 
adjustment in commercial bank deposit rate.    
5.6 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
On the whole, the evidences show that there are significant differences across the WAMZ 
economies concerning the nature of the pass-through and speed of adjustments of changes in 
policy controlled interest rates to deposit and lending rates in both the full sample period and 
the rolling windows analysis. From the analyses several findings emerged which are worth 
mentioning
70
: First, the evidence in all four countries analysed suggest that the interest rate 
series are mainly I(1). Having confirmed the order of integration of the variables, the test for 
cointegration was conducted and the results suggest that both lending and deposit interest 
rates are cointegrated with policy interest rates for the entire sample period in all four 
countries. While empirical tests for the rolling window analysis of lending rates show that the 
null of no cointegration could be rejected in fifteen out of sixteen rolling windows in Gambia 
and Nigeria, five out of five in Ghana and twelve out of sixteen rolling windows in Sierra 
Leone. On the other hand the null of no cointegration in deposit rates was rejected in thirteen, 
                                                          
70
 A detailed summary of the findings are presented in Section 6.2 in chapter six.  
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twelve and eleven out of sixteen rolling windows in Nigeria, Sierra Leone and Gambia 
respectively. In Ghana, the null of no cointegration was rejected in all five rolling windows. 
The results from the empirical pass-through analysis were mixed across the WAMZ 
countries. There were differences in the level of short-run and long-run pass-through across 
the WAMZ countries in the full sample and rolling windows. Overall, it was concluded that 
pass-through was incomplete in the WAMZ for the full sample period. The pass-throughs 
show some semblance of convergence towards a slower short-run pass-through in the 1994–
1999 and 1993–1998 rolling windows for lending and deposit rates respectively. In the long-
run pass-through, although evidence of convergence among the countries was mixed, the 
2001–2006 rolling windows provided some evidence of convergence in lending and deposit 
rates.    
The mean adjustment lags, which show how long it takes for retail interest rates to fully 
adjust to changes in policy rate in the long-run, suggest that the average speeds of adjustment 
for the full sample period were six and nine months for lending and deposit rates respectively, 
whereas the average speeds of adjustment for the rolling windows were four and five months 
for lending and deposit rates respectively. These results suggest that monetary policy 
transmission in the WAMZ economies is on average similar to those of emerging Asian 
economies. Finally, evidences of asymmetric adjustments were found in both lending and 
deposit rates amongst the WAMZ economies. Thus, the adjustment behaviour of commercial 
banks in the Gambia were considered asymmetric in both loan and deposit markets. Such 
behaviour of commercial banks in Gambia is consistent with negative customer reaction 
hypothesis and collusive pricing arrangement among banks. Also, significant evidence of 
asymmetry was found in lending rates adjustment in Sierra Leone implying that commercial 
banks in Sierra Leone have a collusive pricing arrangement. In Nigeria, weak evidence of 
asymmetry was found in deposit while no evidence of asymmetry was evident in Ghana. 
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CHAPTER SIX: 
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION 
6.1 SUMMARY OF STUDY AND FINDINGS 
The transmission of monetary policy in the context of developing countries has been the crux 
of monetary policy debate in recent years. The modes at which changes in policy stance of 
the monetary authorities are transmitted to their ultimate targets have posed lots of challenges 
for the conduct of monetary policy in developing economies. This study set out to investigate 
the degree of responsiveness of retail interest rates to changes in policy controlled interest 
rates and to determine the speed of adjustment of retail interest rates to changes in policy 
rates. Also, the study examines whether the interest rates set by commercial banks adjust 
asymmetrically or not to changes in policy rate in Gambia, Ghana, Nigeria and Sierra Leone. 
To this end, monthly interest series – deposit rate, discount rate, lending rate and Treasury 
bill rate – spanning the periods 1989 to 2009 for Gambia, Nigeria and Sierra Leone; and 2000 
to 2009 for Ghana were used for the empirical analysis. The key objectives of the study were 
threefold. The first objective was to provide an overview of the financial system and 
monetary policy framework of the Anglophone West African economies; the second, to 
examine how lending and deposit rates respond to changes in the official rates and to see 
whether there is convergence among these countries over time; the final, to examine the 
relative adjustment of commercial banks‟ interest rates to changes in official rates when they 
are either above or below their equilibrium levels in all the four countries.   
The study progressed with a review of both theoretical and empirical literature which formed 
the basis for the empirical analysis. Monetary policy transmission mechanism in developing 
countries, interest rate channel of monetary policy transmission, interest rate pass-through 
and its determinants were reviewed. Sundry factors determining the degree of pass-through 
and their implications for pass-through were discussed. The four theories of interest rates 
stickiness proposed by Lowe and Rohling (1992) – adverse selection, switching costs, risk 
sharing and consumer irrationality – were discussed, followed by other determinants of pass-
through such as menu cost, structure of the financial system, asymmetric information, degree 
of financial market openness, implicit contract, market volatility, inflation, economic policy 
and regulation. Of these, the structure of the financial system was found to include other 
structural variables, such as the degree of competition within the banking system, the extent 
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of money market development and openness of the economy, ownership structure of the 
banking system, and the degree of the financial system development, which all have 
implications for the magnitude and speed of interest rate pass-through. 
An extensive review of existing pass-through literature, which covered developed, emerging 
and developing economies, was done. The literature on the Euro area economies showed 
mixed results for the level of pass-through. But when the Euro area economies were 
compared with the CEE economies, pass-through was higher and almost complete in the CEE 
countries compared to the Euro area countries. Also, researches that compared the emerging 
and developing economies (for example, the Euro area and Asian countries) and other 
advanced economies (for example, USA) showed that pass-through was higher in advanced 
economies with well-developed financial markets, while pass-throughs in most cases were 
low in emerging and developing economies. Researches done on African economies are scant 
and the few available ones mainly focused on Southern African countries. From the review of 
empirical literature some noteworthy findings were revealed. First, there are significant 
variations in the degree of pass-through across countries. Second, less than one-to-one pass-
through was observed in some advanced, emerging and developing countries implying that 
pass-through may be sluggish and incomplete. Third, there were differences in the degree of 
pass-through in lending and deposit rates; that is, no uniformity in the pass-through. Fourth, 
large variability in pass-through was observed and found to be dependent on the type of 
interest rates used. Fifth, evidences of asymmetric or symmetric adjustment were 
inconclusive. Finally, the speed and magnitude of pass-through were found to decline as 
maturity of the bank instrument increases.  
To achieve the first objective stated in chapter one, an extensive overview of the financial 
systems of the WAMZ economies was done which revealed that for the period under review 
several changes have taken place in all four countries. It was apparent that the World Bank 
sponsored financial liberalization programmes embraced by these countries brought immense 
changes in the respective financial systems. The financial sectors have witnessed high level 
of expansion of the banking sector, and non-bank financial markets are also growing rapidly 
in the WAMZ. These developments have led to innovations and the introduction of new 
products in the financial markets which have enhanced competition in these countries. Also, 
the opening of a stock exchange in Sierra Leone, adoption of forward looking monetary 
policy framework, adoption of inflation targeting regimes in Ghana, introduction of the Repo 
and reverse Repos in Gambia and Sierra Leone, and an increased number of banks have laid 
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the ground for development of the financial system. Thus, monetary policy stance of the 
central bank is expected to be transmitted quickly and monetary policy would be effective. 
The analyses were done at two levels, the first level covered the entire sample period and in 
the second level rolling windows of six years (i.e., 72 observations) were estimated. The 
empirical analysis started by determining the order of integration of the interest rate series, 
and evidence shows that the interest rate series are largely I(1). Next, four cointegration 
techniques were employed to examine the long-run equilibrium relationship between policy 
interest rates and retail interest rates. The analyses showed that the null hypothesis of no 
cointegration was rejected for lending and deposit rates in all the countries for the entire 
sample period. Whereas, for the rolling windows analyses, the null hypothesis of no 
cointegration between policy rates and lending rates was rejected in one, one and four out 
sixteen rolling windows in Gambia, Nigeria and Sierra Leone for lending rates respectively. 
On the other hand, the null hypothesis of no cointegration between policy rates and deposit 
rates was rejected in five, three and four out of sixteen rolling windows in Gambia, Nigeria 
and Sierra Leone respectively. In Ghana, the null hypothesis of no cointegration in both 
lending and deposit rates was rejected in all five rolling windows.   
The second objective of the study required an examination of how lending and deposit rates 
respond to changes in policy rates and whether the pass-through among the WAMZ 
economies have converged over time. This objective was achieved by estimating an empirical 
pass-through model from which the long-run and short-run pass-through coefficients were 
obtained. The empirical pass-through results for the estimates of the full sample suggest that 
there is incomplete pass-through in all four countries analysed in the short-run and long-run. 
The long-run pass-through ranges between 50% and 81% for lending rates and 40% and 72% 
for deposit rates. Nigeria has the highest long-run pass-through in lending rates of 81% 
followed by Ghana, Sierra Leone and Gambia with a pass-through of 66%, 62% and 50% 
respectively. For deposit rates, Sierra Leone has the highest pass-through of 72%, closely 
followed by Ghana and Nigeria with 69% and 67% respectively; Gambia has the least with 
40%. On the other hand, as expected, the short-run pass-through was found to be lower 
compared to the long-run pass-through and it ranges between -6% and 66% for lending rates 
and 13% and 47% for deposit rates. Nigeria has the highest short-run pass-through in lending 
rate of 66% followed by Sierra Leone, Gambia and Ghana with 30%, 26% and -6% 
respectively. The estimates of the short-run pass-through for deposits showed Nigeria has the 
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highest, of 47%, followed by Ghana, Gambia and Sierra Leone with 35%, 29% and 13% 
respectively.  
The pass-through estimates for the rolling windows are mixed for both deposit and lending 
rates. Nigeria has the highest pass-through coefficients for both lending and deposit rates 
which range from -4% to 108% and -8% to 78% for short-run lending and deposit rates 
respectively. In the long-run pass-through coefficients range from 13% to 108% and -3% to 
118% for lending and deposit rates respectively. In Gambia, short-run pass-through 
coefficients range from -1% to 35% and 0.1% to 51% for lending and deposit rates 
respectively, while the long-run pass-through estimates show the pass-through to range from 
27% to 65% and 0.2% to 45% for lending and deposit rates respectively. In Ghana, short-run 
pass-through range from -129% to 20% and 2% to 34% for lending and deposit rates 
respectively while the long-run pass-through estimates range from 33% to 64% and 33% to 
76% for lending and deposit rates respectively. For Sierra Leone short-run pass-through 
range from -6% to 41% and -2% to 20% for lending and deposit rates respectively, while the 
long-run pass-through estimates range from 2% to 56% and 7% to 69% for lending and 
deposit rates respectively. Factors such as the state of development of financial markets with 
limited range of financial products and alternative sources of funding for firms, a lack of 
competition in the banking sectors and between banks and non-bank financial intermediaries, 
and a high degree of concentration in the banking sector are identified as the main 
contributing factors for the incomplete pass-through in the WAMZ. 
Evidence of convergence were found in lending rates short-run pass-through in the 1994–
1999 rolling window in Gambia, Nigeria and Sierra Leone. Ghana also showed some level of 
convergence with other countries in the 2000–2005 to 2002–2007 rolling windows. For 
deposit rates, the level of convergence was mixed among the countries, but some evidence of 
convergence became apparent between Nigeria and Sierra Leone in the 1993–1998 rolling 
window, and in the 2002–2007 rolling window Ghana, Nigeria and Sierra Leone had similar 
pass-through. With the exception of Sierra Leone, all the other countries began to converge 
towards higher short-run pass-through in the 2003–2008 rolling window.  
The third objective of the study was to unveil the dynamic adjustment of retail interest rates 
to changes in policy rate. This objective was achieved by estimating an error correction 
model from which the mean adjustment lags, which measure the speed of adjustment of retail 
interest rates, were calculated. The results for the full sample showed that it takes two, three, 
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seven and twelve months in Nigeria, Ghana, Sierra Leone and Gambia respectively for 
changes in policy rates to be fully reflected in lending rates, whereas it takes five, six, seven 
and eighteen months for deposit rates to fully adjust to changes in policy rate Ghana, Nigeria, 
Gambia and Sierra Leone. Thus, it is clear that the speed of adjustment was faster in Nigeria 
than the other countries, followed by Ghana. Also, the mean adjustment lags were calculated 
for the rolling windows in which cointegration were found. Overall, it takes lending rates to 
fully adjust to changes in policy rates an average period of four, three, four and eight months 
in Gambia, Ghana, Nigeria and Sierra Leone respectively and for deposit rates, it takes three, 
five, three and nine months in Gambia, Ghana, and Sierra Leone respectively. Speed of 
adjustments, though unstable for most countries, improved in deposit rates of Gambia, 
Ghana, Nigeria and Sierra Leone for the 2004–2009 rolling window. In Gambia, speed of 
adjustment in deposits improved from 2.58 to 1.67 months, and in Ghana from 4.41 to 2.79 
months, in the 2004–2009 rolling windows. In Nigeria, speed of adjustment in deposit rates 
improved from 9.96 to 6.51 months, and in Sierra Leone from 12.20 to 8.41 months, in the 
2004–2009 rolling window. Speed of adjustment in lending rates is becoming slower in 
Gambia, Ghana and Nigeria but is becoming faster in Sierra Leone in the 2004–2009 rolling 
window. One of the possible reasons put forward for the stickiness in lending rate 
adjustments could be as a result of the recent financial crisis, which increased the risk of 
defaults on loan agreements. Thus, commercial banks charge high interest rates to 
compensate for risk, causing retail interest rate adjustment to be sticky. 
The second aspect of the third objective required an assessment of the speed of adjustments 
of commercial banks‟ interest rates to changes in policy interest rate when they are either 
below or above their equilibrium levels. The empirical tests revealed some rigidity in the 
adjustment of lending and deposit rates in both the full sample period and rolling windows in 
all four economies analysed. For instance, the full sample estimates showed evidence of 
upward and downward asymmetric adjustments of lending rates in Gambia and Sierra Leone 
respectively while downward and upward asymmetric adjustments of deposit rates were also 
observed in Nigeria and Gambia respectively. On the other hand, rolling windows analyses 
also provided some evidence of both downward and upward asymmetric adjustment in 
lending and deposit rates. Following Hannan and Berger (1991), Neumark and Sharpe (1992) 
and Scholnick (1996), two competing hypotheses were used to argue for the asymmetric 
adjustment of commercial banks‟ interest rates to changes in policy rates in the WAMZ 
economies. The hypotheses are the negative customer reaction and collusive pricing 
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arrangement among commercial banks. The results showed that, on one hand, commercial 
banks are quick in increasing their lending rates upward when policy interest rate increased, 
and rigid in adjusting it downwards when policy interest rate decreased in Gambia and 
Ghana. This suggests that commercial banks are in a collusive pricing arrangement and the 
credit markets in Gambia and Ghana are less competitive and concentrated, but these are 
expected to improve with the recent influx of foreign banks
71
, the introduction of the Repo 
and reverse repo rates in Gambia, and the introduction of the inflation targeting regime in 
Ghana in 2007.  On the other hand, in Nigeria and Sierra Leone, commercial banks are 
becoming more rigid in adjusting their lending rates upward when policy interest rates 
increase than in downward adjustment in response to a decrease in policy interest rate, 
suggesting commercial banks are becoming more competitive and sensitive to customer 
reaction.     
6.2 POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This study investigates the dynamic adjustment of commercial banks‟ interest rates to 
changes in the central bank‟s policy on interest rate and whether the interest rate pass-through 
has converged over time in Gambia, Ghana, Nigeria and Sierra Leone operating under the 
framework of the WAMZ. The findings from the empirical analysis have implications for 
both monetary and financial policies in the WAMZ economies. From a monetary policy point 
of view, it is fundamental to appreciate the magnitude and the speed at which monetary 
policy decisions influence retail interest rates on loans and deposits as they are crucial in 
determining the level of consumption, savings and investment in an economy. The 
implications and their recommendations are as follows: 
First, the analyses showed that the effectiveness of monetary policy in influencing economic 
activities depends on the state of financial system development of the economy as the 
development of financial markets tends to lead to faster and larger pass-through. This study 
suggests that all four countries have a lower degree of financial market development 
compared with advanced economies. Empirical evidences on advanced countries such as US 
and the Euro area, where pass-through was found to be higher, show that these countries have 
developed financial markets, characterized by efficiency, innovations and wide range of 
products. Therefore, financial reforms and policies that promote financial market 
                                                          
71
 The number of commercial banks rose from four in 2000 to eleven in Gambia as of the end of 2008. 
112 
 
development should be adopted and must become the utmost priority in the WAMZ 
economies for the monetary policy to be effective in influencing economic activities.  
Second, the incomplete pass-through, sluggish and asymmetric adjustments of commercial 
banks‟ interest rates in the region, is due in part to the lack of intense competition within the 
banking sector and between banks and non-bank financial intermediaries. For instance, stock 
markets, which are expected to serve as alternative investment outlets and spur competition in 
the financial system are little capitalized, are not too active in Ghana and Nigeria and are 
non-existent in Gambia, although Sierra Leone has opened one in 2009. This condition has 
reinforced the pre-eminence of bank loans as the main debt instrument available to economic 
agents in the region. Thus, economic agents are forced to accept whatever interest rates they 
faced. One possible way to circumvent this issue is for the monetary authorities to be 
committed in rendering the already established Ghanaian and Nigerian stock exchanges 
active and highly capitalized by encouraging cross border listings of companies. This would 
enable the diversification of assets in the WAMZ and ultimately reduce interest margin and 
increase the speed of pass-through in the region. It is therefore imperative on the monetary 
authorities in the WAMZ economies to adopt policies that stimulate competition, not only 
within the banking sector but also between banks and non-bank financial intermediaries. 
Third, as noted in chapter three, the WAMZ financial systems are dominated by the banking 
sector whereas other non-bank financial intermediaries are either underdeveloped or non-
existent in some countries. This left economic agents with no alternative sources of funding 
and investment but to rely on bank loans, which are expensive and in most cases short-term. 
Even though a lot of progress has been made by each country in terms of establishing a 
number of non-bank financial intermediaries, the pace at which they grow relative to the 
banking sector is sluggish. Therefore, monetary authorities in the WAMZ economies must 
implement policies that would attract investment into non-bank financial intermediaries 
especially in Gambia and Sierra Leone.  
Fourth, the monetary policy orientation in the economy is also crucial for the effectiveness of 
monetary policy. Economies that have adopted financial reforms, market-oriented and more 
transparent monetary policies, tend to have a higher speed of adjustment as evident in the 
case of Nigeria and Ghana. Monetary policy regimes seem to be an indispensable factor for 
the magnitude and speed of pass-through in the WAMZ economies. This was evident in the 
overall level of pass-through and speed of adjustment in the results of Ghana and Nigeria. 
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This calls for the intervention of the monetary authorities to harmonize the monetary policies 
in the WAMZ countries which would enhance the speed of interest rate pass-through in 
Gambia and Sierra Leone. 
Finally, the findings in this study have highlighted several issues in the WAMZ with regards 
to the transmission of monetary policy and interest rate pass-through dynamics which are 
crucial for the proposed launch of the common currency in the WAMZ by 2015 and the 
conduct of monetary policy for each member state, including the West African Monetary 
Institute (WAMI). Also, this study could also serve as a reference for commercial banks and 
investors interested in investing in the WAMZ economies and as the basis for future studies 
on the WAMZ economies. 
6.3 AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
The study looked mainly at the adjustment of commercial banks‟ deposit and lending rates 
and the effectiveness of monetary policy in four Anglophone West African countries and 
assessed the level of stickiness in commercial banks‟ interest rates adjustment. The empirical 
tests show that interest rate pass-throughs in the WAMZ, though similar to some findings in 
emerging Asian and Euro area countries, are incomplete and sticky in some cases. A possible 
area for future research may be to include more market interest rates such as bank rate, 
money market rates and government yield to explore the dynamics of interest rate adjustment 
in the WAMZ.  
Also, this study did not model the determinants of interest rate pass-through or factors that 
affect interest rate pass-through over time in the WAMZ countries. A possible area in which 
future studies could be extended is by modelling variables that determine the degree of 
interest rate pass-through. Further, as the current study has looked at the first stage of the 
monetary policy transmission mechanism, future studies may explore the other stages of the 
monetary policy transmission mechanism.  
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APPENDICES 
Appendix A: Summary of Empirical Pass-Through Studies 
Study Country(s) 
Covered 
Sample Variables Used Estimation 
Method(s) 
Pass-Through Speed of 
Adjustment 
Asymmetric Adjustment Remark(s) 
Policy Rate Market Interest 
Rates 
Short-run  Long-run Present Increase Decrease 
Kwapil and 
Scharler (2010) 
US and Euro 
area 
1995-2003 Three-months 
money market 
rate 
Sundry of 
deposit and 
lending rates 
ARDL and EG 
Cointegration  
Average PT 
US: DR=0.97 
LR=0.79 Euro 
area DR=0.16 
LR=0.34 
Average PT 
US: DR=0.93 
LR=0.57 Euro 
area DR=0.32 
LR=0.48 
NA No Evidence NA NA PT in the US was almost 
complete and symmetric. 
Whereas PT in the Euro 
area was incomplete. 
Samba and Yan 
(2010) 
CAEMC 1990-2007 Money market 
rate 
Deposit and 
Lending rates 
ARDL DR=0.37 
LR=0.67 
DR=0.33 
LR=6.21 
DR=0.036 
LR=0.00216 
Evidence of 
Asymmetry 
Not 
reported  
Not 
reported 
Long-run PT of Deposit 
rates is incomplete and 
long-run pass-through of 
lending rates exhibit 
overshooting effects. 
Aziakpono and 
Wilson (2010) 
South Africa 1980-2007 Bank rate Lending, 
deposit, money 
market, 
treasury bill 
and 
government 
bond yield rates 
EG and 
Johansen 
cointegration, 
CRDW and 
ECM-based 
cointegration 
PT: Ranged LR 
= 0.40 to 1.00, 
DR = -0.01 to 
0.81, TBR = 
0.24 to 1.00, 
MMR = 0.32 to 
1.27and GBY = 
0.02 to 0.33 
PT: Ranged LR 
= 0.93 to 1.04, 
DR = 0.44 to 
1.20, TBR = 
0.65 to 1.23, 
MMR = 0.68 to 
1.28 and GBY 
= 0.04 to 0.41 
ML: Ranged 
LR = 0.43 to 
0.86, DR = 
0.59 to 3.58, 
TBR = 0.33 
to 6.83, 
MMR = 0.01 
to 6.81 and 
GBY = 4.57 
to 12.10 
Evidence of 
Asymmetry 
Yes Yes Heterogeneous PT and 
speed of adjustment across 
rates. Highest speed 
occurred in LR and lowest 
in government bond yield. 
Asymmetric adjustments 
were found in both lending 
and deposit rate increases 
and decreases.  
Wang and Lee 
(2009) 
U.S.A and 
nine Asian 
countries 
1988-2004 
and Hong 
Kong 1994-
2004  
Interbank, 
money market, 
Federal fund 
rate  
Deposit and 
lending rates. 
Asymmetric 
Threshold 
cointegration 
test and EC-
EGARCH 
(1,1)-M model 
US: DR=0.85 
LR=0.92 Asian: 
DR=0.0003 to 
0.47 LR=-0.004 
to 0.18. 
 
US: DR=0.99 
LR=0.86 
Asian: 
DR=0.10 to 
0.87 LR=0.23 
to 0.73. 
 
NA Present in 
eight 
countries.  
NA NA Complete PT for U.S 
deposit rate and incomplete 
PT for Asian countries.  
Marotta (2009) Nine EMU 
countries 
including 
UK 
1994-2003 One-month 
Interbank rate 
Short-term 
business 
lending rate 
ARDL, 
Dynamic OLS 
and EG 
Cointegration 
Before break 
0.12-1.07 After 
break 0.15-0.89 
Before break 
0.40-1.36. After 
break 0.20-
1.01. 
Before break 
(-0.19) to (-
0.61). After 
break (-0.29) 
to (0.95) 
France and 
Netherlands 
NA NA PT is heterogeneous and 
incomplete across countries. 
Weak evidence of 
Asymmetric PT.  
Hulsewig et al. 
(2009) 
Euro area 1991-2002  Short term Euro 
Interbank rate 
Retail  bank 
lending rates 
New Keynesian 
DSGE model 
0.54 (54%) NA NA NA NA NA Pass-Through was 
incomplete in the Euro area 
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Study Country(s) 
Covered 
Sample Variables Used Estimation 
Method(s) 
Pass-Through Speed of 
Adjustment 
Asymmetric Adjustment Remark(s) 
Policy Rate Market Interest 
Rates 
Short-run  Long-run Present Increase Decrease 
Ozdemir, B.K 
(2009) 
Turkey 
 
2001-2007 Money market 
rate 
Lending and 
deposit rates 
Symmetric and 
asymmetric 
error correction 
model 
 
Incomplete Complete PT: 
LR=1.19 and 
DR=1.05 
LR= 0.35 and 
DR=0.12 
Weak 
evidence 
NA Rigidity 
in DR 
decreases 
and 
rigidity in 
LR 
decreases. 
Greater rigidity in deposit 
and lending rate decreases 
than increases. Pass-through 
from money market to 
deposit and lending rate is 
complete in the long run 
Mirdala (2009) 4 EMU 
countries 
1999-2008 Money market 
rates 
Short-term 
rates  
SVAR Incomplete Vary across 
countries and 
incomplete 
NA NA NA NA PT is different for all five 
variable.   
Leuvensteijn et 
al. (2008) 
Euro area 1994-2004 3-months 
money market 
rates 
Interest rates on 
mortgage, 
consumer, short 
and long term 
loans to ent., 
consumer and; 
time and 
current A/c 
deposits 
Panel 
cointegration 
and ECM 
PT: Ranged 
ML from -0.21 
to 0.51 CL 
from -0.005 to 
0.35 SL from 
0.05 to 0.57 LL 
from 0.16 to 
0.99 
CA from 0.09 
to 0.37 TD 
from 0.14 to 
0.97 
PT: Ranged 
ML from 0.84 
to 1.27 CL 
from 0.31 to 
1.33 SL from 
0.32 to 1.34 LL 
from 0.61 to 
0.98 
CA from 0.06 
to 0.43 TD 
from 0.61 to 
0.92 
NA NA NA NA In the long run, bank loan 
rates are closer in line with 
market rates where 
competition is higher. 
Stronger loan market 
competition reduces bank 
loan rates while changes in 
market rates are transmitted 
more rapidly to bank rates.  
Liu et al. (2008) New 
Zealand 
1994-2004 Overnight 
Interbank and 
OCR rates 
Fixed 
mortgage, 
Bond, Base 
lending, 
floating 
mortgage rates.   
Philips-
Lorentan, SEC, 
EG-OLS and 
ARDL 
LR=0.51, DR= 
0.44 and MR= 
0.32 to 0.88. 
LR=0.76, DR= 
0.83 and MR= 
0.18 to 0.93. 
Speed of 
Adjustment 
LR=2.36, 
DR=1.46 and 
MR=0.22 to 
1.96. 
Weak 
Evidence 
Mean 
Adjustme
nt Lag 
ranges 
from 0.58 
to 1.74 
Mean 
Adjustme
nt Lag 
ranges 
from 0.45 
to 2.25 
Long-term PT of retail rates 
varies across financial 
products. 
 Short-term rates show 
higher degree of PT and 
faster adjustment speed than 
long-term rates. 
Evidence of asymmetry in 
the adjustment of retail 
rates. 
Gambacorta 
(2008) 
Italy 1993-2001 Repo rate Lending rate 
(short term) 
and deposit rate 
GMM 
estimator 
LR=0.45 
DR=0.45 
LR=1.01 
DR=0.70 
LR=-0.4 and 
DR=-0.6 
NA NA  NA PT is Heterogeneous. PT is 
lower for highly capitalised 
and liquid banks.  
Sudo and 
Teranishi (2008) 
Twelve Euro 
countries 
2003-2008 ECB policy rate Bank loan 
interest rates 
EMC model 0.20 to 0.81 NA (-0.07) to (-
0.42) 
NA NA NA PT vary and sticky across 
countries.  
Baugnet, Collin Belgium 2003–2006 Market rate Deposit and 
loan rate. 
Partial 
Adjustment 
PT ranged DR 
from 0.10 to 
PT ranged DR 
from 0.10 to 
PT ranged 
DR from 
NA NA NA Higher PT and speed of 
adjustment. Heterogeneity 
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Study Country(s) 
Covered 
Sample Variables Used Estimation 
Method(s) 
Pass-Through Speed of 
Adjustment 
Asymmetric Adjustment Remark(s) 
Policy Rate Market Interest 
Rates 
Short-run  Long-run Present Increase Decrease 
& Dhyne (2007)   Model 0.98. LR from 
0.50 to 0.97. 
0.98. LR from 
0.50 to 0.97. 
0.37 to 0.92. 
LR from -
0.93 to 1.75. 
across sector, products and 
banks 
De Graeve et al. 
(2007) 
Belgium 2003-2008 Money market 
rate 
Deposit and 
lending rates 
Cointegration 
and error 
correction 
model 
Range: 
DR=0.22 to 
0.85 LR=0.19 
to 98 
Range: 
DR=0.53 to 
0.98 LR=0.65 
to 0.99 
Range: 
DR=0.22 to 
2.43 and 
LR=0.17 to 
1.45  
Present in 
Deposit rates 
High 
speed of 
downwar
d 
adjustmen
t 
NA Complete PT in most LR 
and incomplete in Most DR. 
Incomplete PT in nine retail 
products while complete PT 
was found in four retail 
products. 
Aydin (2007) Turkey 2001-2005 Money market 
rate 
Corporate,  
housing, cash 
and automobile 
loans 
Panel 
cointegration 
and ECM 
Corporate=0.22
, housing=-
0.16, cash=-
0.22 and 
automobile=0.6
4 
Corporate=0.63
, housing=1.59, 
cash=1.06 and 
automobile=1.1 
Corporate=1.
19, 
housing=2.90
, cash=1..67 
and 
automobile=
0.84. 
NA NA NA Higher PT for all types of 
loans in the long-run. Long 
run co-movement between 
rates is more apparent when 
the loan market is 
functioning more properly. 
Whereas, incomplete PT in 
the short-run. 
Aziakpono, 
Wilson and 
Manuel (2007) 
South Africa 
 
1973 - 2004 
 
Repo rate Prime interbank 
lending and 
negotiable 
certificate of 
deposit rates 
 
EG 
cointegration 
and asymmetric 
error correction 
model 
 
Range: 
LR=0.28 to 
1.15 and 
NCD=0.76 to 
1.09 
Range: 
LR=0.89 to 
1.21 and 
NCD=0.84 to 
1.09 
Range: 
LR=0.25 to 
2.17 and 
NCD=0.01 to 
1.65 
Weak 
evidence 
NA NA High speed of adjustment of 
market interest to changes 
in the official rate. Higher 
speed of adjustment during 
more market oriented 
regime than less market-
oriented eras. 
Egert et al. 
(2007) 
5 CEE and 
3Euro area 
countries 
1994-2005 Policy rate Deposit, 
lending and 
money market 
rates 
EG, 
cointegration, 
Dynamic OLS 
and ARDL 
PT vary across 
countries 
widely 
PT vary across 
countries  and 
over time 
widely 
NA Weak 
evidence 
NA NA Large disparity in the PT 
across countries and over 
time. Generally higher in 
the CEE countries than the 
Euro area countries.  
Charoenseang 
and Manakit 
(2007) 
 
Thailand 2000-2006 Repo rate Deposit and 
lending rates 
EG 
cointegration 
and ECM 
PT only 
complete  for 
interbank rate 
PT incomplete 
but complete 
for interbank 
rate 
Range from 
0.25 to 12.52 
Weak 
evidence  
NA NA PT was very low and 
incomplete. 
Chionis and Leon 
(2006) 
Greece 1996-2004 Money market 
rate 
Lending and 
deposit rates 
Cointegration 
and ECM 
Before EMU: 
LR=0.09, 
DR=0.06. After 
EMU: LR=0.50 
DR=0.64 
Before EMU: 
LR=1.86, 
DR=1.24. After 
EMU: LR=0.78 
DR=0.68. 
NA NA NA NA Higher PT before joining 
the EMU than after joining 
the EMU. 
Chong et al. Singapore 1983-2002 Interbank offer Lending and EG Incomplete for Incomplete for MAL range Asymmetry Range: Range: Incomplete PT for both 
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Study Country(s) 
Covered 
Sample Variables Used Estimation 
Method(s) 
Pass-Through Speed of 
Adjustment 
Asymmetric Adjustment Remark(s) 
Policy Rate Market Interest 
Rates 
Short-run  Long-run Present Increase Decrease 
(2006) rate deposit rates cointegration 
and ECM 
all rates in all rates` from 5.0 to 
19.50 
in lending 
and deposit 
rates 
LR from 
6.9 to 
14.7. DR 
from 4.2 
to 10.5 
LR from 
10.4 to 
30.1. DR 
from 6.0 
to 18.6. 
lending and deposit rate. 
Asymmetric adjustment in 
both lending and deposit 
rates. 
Sander and 
Kleimeier (2006) 
8 CEECs 
and 4 Euro 
area 
countries 
1993-2003 Money market 
rate 
Interest rates on 
mortgage, 
consumer, short 
and long term 
corporate loan, 
consumer and 
time deposits 
and savings A/c 
TAR models, 
symmetric and 
asymmetric 
ECM 
Incomplete PT in LR was 
complete in the 
CEEC. 
Incomplete PT 
for deposit. 
NA NA NA NA PT in the CEECs is 
complete and faster than in 
the aggregate Euro zone. PT 
differences within the 
CEECs can be explained by 
a handful of financial 
structure variables and 
macro-controls  
De Bondt (2005) Euro Area 1996-2001 Overnight 
interest rate 
Loan rate and 
deposit rate 
ECM and VAR Incomplete LR PT 
complete and 
DR PT 
incomplete 
Range: LR 
from 2.8 to 
10.2. DR 
from 3 to 
23.8. 
NA NA NA Higher PT after the Euro 
was introduced.  
De Angelis et al. 
(2005) 
South Africa 1998-2004 Repo rate  Prime 
interbank, 
prime lending 
rates and NCD 
EG 
cointegration 
and ECM 
Complete  Complete PT NA NA NA NA Higher PT in the first 
monetary policy regime. PT 
was complete in almost all 
interest rates. 
Tieman (2004) Romania and 
Eastern 
European 
Transition 
countries 
1995-2004 Central bank 
policy rate 
Lending and 
deposit rates 
ECM Incomplete PT Incomplete but 
PT in DR was 
higher than LR. 
Higher for 
deposit rate 
than lending 
rate. 
NA NA NA PT and MAL are higher in 
deposit rate than lending 
rate. 
Jankee (2004) 
 
 
Mauritius 
 
1998- 2003 
 
Interbank 
money market 
rate 
Lending and 
deposit rates 
Coinegration, 
ECM, TAR and 
M-TAR models  
Incomplete 
LR=0.24 and 
DR=0.41 
NA LR=-0.60 
and DR=0.64 
Present in LR LR rigid 
upward 
LR rigid 
downwar
ds  
Higher PT was observed in 
deposit rate than lending 
rate. Lending rate was 
asymmetric. 
Toolsema, 
Sturm, and Haan 
(2002) 
6 EMU 
countries 
1980-2000 3-month 
interbank rate 
Lending rates Distributed Lag 
Analysis and 
Error 
Correction 
Analysis 
PT: Ranged 
from 0.08 to 
0.87  
PT Ranged 
from 0.71 to 
1.027. 
Speed of 
adjustment 
ranged from 
0.001 to 
0.248 
NA NA NA Major differences in the 
pass-through amongst EMU 
countries, both for the short 
and long term PT. Weak 
evidence for convergence of 
monetary policy 
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Study Country(s) 
Covered 
Sample Variables Used Estimation 
Method(s) 
Pass-Through Speed of 
Adjustment 
Asymmetric Adjustment Remark(s) 
Policy Rate Market Interest 
Rates 
Short-run  Long-run Present Increase Decrease 
transmission. 
Scholnick (1996) Malaysia 
and 
Singapore 
1983–1992 
(Singapore) 
1983–1994 
(Malaysia) 
 
Money market 
rates 
 
Lending and 
deposit rates. 
Johansen 
cointegration 
and error 
correction 
model 
 
Malaysia: 
LR=0.10 
DR=0.08. 
Singapore: 
LR=0.12 
DR=0.12 
NA Malaysia: 
LR=11.4 
DR=6.2. 
Singapore: 
LR=7.5 
DR=7.0 
All rates 
asymmetric 
except 
Singapore 
LR 
Malaysia: 
LR=6.1 
DR=3.0. 
Singapore
: LR=8.3 
DR=4.7 
Malaysia: 
LR=6.1 
DR=7.5 
Singapore
: LR=9.9 
DR=7.4 
Deposit rate in both 
countries are more rigid 
when below equilibrium 
than when above it. 
Suggesting that banks in 
both countries tend to adjust 
their deposit rates 
downward more rapidly 
than upward. 
Cottarelli et al. 
(1995) 
Italy 1986-1993 Money market 
rate 
Lending rates Error correction 
model 
PT=0.07 PT=0.92  NA NA NA NA Incomplete short-run PT. 
High degree of stickiness is 
explained by the constraints 
to competition in the 
banking and financial 
system. 
Neumark and 
Sharpe (1992) 
U.S.A 1983–1987 TBR Certificate of 
deposit and 
money market 
rates 
Switching 
model, OLS 
and PAM 
NA NA NA Strong 
evidence  
NA NA Banks are quicker to adjust 
their deposit rates 
downwards when above 
equilibrium that they are to 
adjust their deposit rates 
upward when below 
equilibrium 
Hannan and 
Berger (1991) 
U.S.A 
 
1983-1986 Three-months 
TBR 
Deposit rate 
and Money 
market deposit 
A/c,  
Multinomial 
Logit Model 
 
NA NA NA Present in 
deposit rate 
Rigid 
when 
there is 
stimulus 
for an 
increase 
Less rigid 
when 
there is 
stimulus 
for a 
decrease.  
Greater price rigidity in 
more concentrated markets. 
Deposit rates were more 
rigid upwards than 
downwards. 
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Appendix B: Financial Systems Size and Development Indicators 
Figure B - Capital Market Indicator Development Indicators 
Figure B-1.1: Stock Market Total Value Traded Ration to GDP 
 
Figure B-1.2: Stock Market Turnover Ratio 
 
Figure B-1.3: Number of Listed Companies to Population 
 
Sources: Compiled by author based on data from Financial Structure Dataset, Beck and Al-
Hussainy (2010) 
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Appendix C: Results of the Unit Root Tests. 
Table C-1.0: Unit Root Results for the entire sample period for all countries. 
      Gambia Ghana Nigeria Sierra Leone 
 Tests Type     DISR TBR DISR TBR 
ADF 
Level 
Intercept -2.29 -1.57 -1.71 -2.25 
Intercept & trend -2.32 -1.82 -2.61
B
 -2.86
B
 
1st Diff 
Intercept -4.72
A
 -5.85
A
 -15.37
A
 -12.52
A
 
Intercept & trend -4.73
A
 -5.84
A
 -15.41
A
 -12.51
A
 
KPSS 
Level 
Intercept 0.11
A
 0.78 0.76 0.66
B
 
Intercept & trend 0.11
C
 0.24 0.20
A
 0.10
A
 
1st Diff 
Intercept 0.08
A
 0.13
B
 0.12
A
 0.05
A
 
Intercept & trend 0.07
A
 0.08
A
 0.03
A
 0.04
A
 
LR 
ADF 
Level 
Intercept -2.15 -1.36 -2.62
C
 -1.35 
Intercept & trend -2.24 -2.12 -3.33
C
 -2.43 
1st Diff 
Intercept -7.89
A
 -10.70
A
 -19.59
A
 -22.26
A
 
Intercept & trend -7.87
A
 -10.67
A
 -19.57
A
 -22.24
A
 
KPSS 
Level 
Intercept 0.46
B
 0.95 0.73
A
 1.11 
Intercept & trend 0.15
B
 0.21
A
 0.09
A
 0.19
B
 
1st Diff 
Intercept 0.08
A
 0.11
A
 0.07
A
 0.11
A
 
Intercept & trend 0.08
A
 0.09
A
 0.05
A
 0.11
C
 
DR 
ADF 
Level 
Intercept -2.35 -1.11 -2.26 -1.36 
Intercept & trend -2.73 -0.40 -3.12 -2.05 
1st Diff 
Intercept -15.75
A
 -5.57
A
 -20.16
A
 -8.81
A
 
Intercept & trend -15.73
A
 -9.39
A
 -20.12
A
 -8.80
A
 
KPSS 
Level 
Intercept 0.46
A
 0.73
A
 0.63
B
 0.98 
Intercept & trend 0.09
A
 0.24 0.12
C
 0.23 
1st Diff 
Intercept 0.07
A
 0.20
A
 0.04
A
 0.10
A
 
Intercept & trend 0.05
A
 0.09
A
 0.04
A
 0.10
A
 
Note: 
A
=significant at 1%; 
B
=significant at 5% and 
C
=significant at 10% 
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Table C-1.1: Unit root results of rolling windows for Ghana 
      2000-2005 2001-2006 2002-2007 2003-2008 2004-2009 
TBR   Assumptions           
ADF 
Level 
Intercept -0.86 -1.68 -1.24 -1.80 -1.94 
Intercept & trend -3.07
B
 -4.35
A
 -3.54
A
 -0.74 0.54 
1st Diff 
Intercept -4.86
A
 -4.66
A
 -6.39A -4.89
A
 -2.62
C
 
Intercept & trend -4.90
A
 -4.68
A
 -6.32
A
 -5.34
A
 -2.48 
KPSS 
Level 
Intercept 0.91 0.98 0.98 0.55
B
 0.38
C
 
Intercept & trend 0.06
A
 0.09
A
 0.09
A
 0.23 0.25 
1st Diff 
Intercept 0.12
A
 0.08
A
 0.08
A
 0.39
C
 0.25
A
 
Intercept & trend 0.07
A
 0.04
A
 0.06
A
 0.07
A
 0.10
A
 
LR               
ADF 
Level 
Intercept -0.17 -1.34 -1.88 -0.51 -2.79 
Intercept & trend -2.70 -2.07 -3.56
A
 -7.81
A
 -2.65 
1st Diff 
Intercept -6.59
A
 -8.72
A
 -9.56
A
 -8.12
A
 -9.34
A
 
Intercept & trend -6.70
A
 -8.73
A
 -9.62
A
 -7.93
A
 -9.44
A
 
KPSS 
Level 
Intercept 0.91 1.03 1.11 1.02 0.25
A
 
Intercept & trend 0.09
A
 0.14
B
 0.12
C
 0.20
B
 0.21
A
 
1st Diff 
Intercept 0.20
A
 0.09
A
 0.12
A
 0.35
C
 0.33
A
 
Intercept & trend 0.10
A
 0.04
A
 0.04
A
 0.29 0.43 
DR               
ADF 
Level 
Intercept -0.21 -2.40 -3.56
A
 -0.94 -0.32 
Intercept & trend -2.03 -1.85 -6.04
A
 0.20 0.94 
1st Diff 
Intercept -6.98
A
 -8.12
A
 -12.71
A
 -8.05
A
 -8.12
A
 
Intercept & trend -6.99
A
 -8.41
A
 -12.56
A
 -8.38
A
 -8.66
A
 
KPSS 
Level 
Intercept 0.88 0.87 1.09 0.58
B
 0.36
C
 
Intercept & trend 0.11
C
 0.18
B
 0.12
C
 0.22 0.27 
1st Diff 
Intercept 0.15
A
 0.31
A
 0.22
A
 0.35
C
 0.48
B
 
Intercept & trend 0.12
C
 0.08
A
 0.07
A
 0.13
C
 0.04
A
 
Note: 
A
=significant at 1%; 
B
=significant at 5% and 
C
=significant at 10% 
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Table C-1.2: Unit root results of rolling windows for Gambia 
      
1989-
1994 
1990-
1995 
1991-
1996 
1992-
1997 
1993-
1998 
1994-
1999 
1995-
2000 
1996-
2001 
1997-
2002 
1998-
2003 
1999-
2004 
2000-
2005 
2001-
2006 
2002-
2007 
2003-
2008 
2004-
2009 
DISR   Assumptions                                
ADF 
Level 
Intercept -1.24 -1.27 -1.45 -1.49 -4.10
A
 0.58 0.16 -1.28 -0.42 1.30 0.11 -1.00 -0.72 -0.57 -0.44 -1.85 
Intercept & trend -1.73 -2.30 -1.94 -1.75 -4.13
A
 -0.43 -1.77 -0.74 0.65 -0.23 -1.73 0.51 -0.29 -1.53 -2.24 -0.77 
1st Diff 
Intercept -7.56
A
 -7.49
A
 -7.46
A
 -7.38
A
 -7.95
A
 -6.81
A
 -8.47
A
 -8.26
A
 -4.81
A
 -8.53
A
 -8.58
A
 -7.81
A
 -7.84
A
 -2.14 -7.78
A
 -7.67
A
 
Intercept & trend -7.54
A
 -7.47
A
 -7.42
A
 -7.33
A
 -7.95
A
 -7.18
A
 -8.70
A
 -8.33
A
 -5.20
A
 -9.52
A
 -8.71
A
 -8.10
A
 -8.49
A
 -8.17
A
 -7.81
A
 -7.98
A
 
KPSS 
Level 
Intercept 0.41
C
 0.69
B
 0.84 0.61
B
 0.43
C
 0.50
B
 0.85 0.90 0.40
C
 0.55
B
 0.89 0.77 0.29
A
 0.44
C
 0.87 0.82 
Intercept & trend 0.20
B
 0.17
B
 0.13
C
 0.21
A
 0.17
B
 0.25 0.27 0.13
C
 0.25 0.25 0.24 0.15
B
 0.26 0.23 0.14
B
 0.26 
1st Diff 
Intercept 0.11
A
 0.13
A
 0.07
A
 0.08
A
 0.19
A
 0.44
C
 0.33
A
 0.24
A
 0.51
B
 0.65
B
 0.27
A
 0.34
C
 0.51
B
 0.38
C
 0.25
A
 0.39
C
 
Intercept & trend 0.05
A
 0.08
A
 0.06
A
 0.06
A
 0.15
B
 0.07
A
 0.04
A
 0.17
B
 0.13
C
 0.09
A
 0.12
B
 0.23 0.14
B
 0.17
B
 0.23 0.14
B
 
LR                                     
ADF 
Level 
Intercept -2.94
C
 -1.65 -1.79 -2.05 -2.24 -0.78 -0.77 -1.01 -1.46 -0.61 -0.89 -1.43 -1.55 -1.73 -1.54 -1.26 
Intercept & trend -3.43
C
 -2.60 -2.31 -2.13 -2.30 -1.27 -1.97 -1.97 -1.60 0.01 -2.12 -1.86 -1.55 -1.48 -2.84 -0.80 
1st Diff 
Intercept -8.39
A
 -8.10
A
 -8.26
A
 -8.26
A
 -6.94
A
 -8.29
A
 -8.29
A
 -8.37
A
 -8.37
A
 -4.66
A
 -3.50
B
 -3.52
A
 -3.75
A
 -3.76
A
 -8.26
A
 -8.86
A
 
Intercept & trend -8.37
A
 -8.03
A
 -8.21
A
 -8.23
A
 -6.86
A
 -8.43
A
 -8.33
A
 -8.31
A
 -8.36
A
 -5.13
A
 -3.56
B
 -3.51
B
 -3.88
B
 -4.00
B
 -8.68
A
 -8.96
A
 
KPSS 
Level 
Intercept 0.70
B
 0.84 0.78 0.54 0.16
A
 0.33 0.72
B
 0.95 0.84 0.32 0.73
A
 0.87 0.62
B
 0.28
A
 0.46
B
 1.00 
Intercept & trend 0.18
B
 0.17
B
 0.15
B
 0.23 0.15
B
 0.23 0.22 0.12
C
 0.20
B
 0.18
B
 0.22 0.14
B
 0.19
B
 0.25 0.17
B
 0.23 
1st Diff 
Intercept 0.08
A
 0.05
A
 0.06
A
 0.07
A
 0.09
A
 0.24
A
 0.18
A
 0.09
A
 0.12
A
 0.40
C
 0.20
A
 0.14
A
 0.25
A
 0.32
A
 0.35
C
 0.26
A
 
Intercept & trend 0.08
A
 0.05
A
 0.05
A
 0.04
A
 0.08
A
 0.06
A
 0.08
A
 0.09
A
 0.06
A
 0.11
C
 0.06
A
 0.14
B
 0.13
C
 0.08
A
 0.15
B
 0.13
C
 
DR                                     
ADF 
Level 
Intercept -3.03
B
 -2.19 -2.39 -3.63
B
 -2.06 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 0.33 -1.20 -0.82 -1.26 -1.42 -1.89 
Intercept & trend -3.34
C
 -2.23 -2.83 -2.13 -1.79 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A -1.41 -0.68 -0.32 -1.51 -2.03 -1.42 
1st Diff 
Intercept -8.28
A
 -8.25
A
 -8.25
A
 -8.26
A
 -8.37
A
  N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A -8.57
A
 -8.25
A
 -8.03
A
 -8.22
A
 -7.28
A
 -8.30
A
 
Intercept & trend -8.29
A
 -8.19
A
 -8.21
A
 -8.21
A
 -8.46
A
  N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A -8.79
A
 -8.31
A
 -8.35
A
 -8.31
A
 -7.18
A
 -8.44
A
 
KPSS 
Level 
Intercept 0.24
A
 0.28
A
 0.40
C
 0.67
B
 0.65
B
 0.39
C
 3.62 3.62 0.33
A
 0.63
B
 0.81 0.73
A
 0.31
A
 0.28
A
 0.64
B
 0.61
B
 
Intercept & trend 0.12
C
 0.22 0.13
C
 0.15
B
 0.21
A
 0.15
B
 2.90 2.90 0.13
C
 0.23 0.26 0.12
C
 0.23 0.23 0.12
C
 0.26 
1st Diff 
Intercept 0.15
A
 0.06
A
 0.14
A
 0.10
A
 0.18
A
 0.32
A
 N/A N/A 0.33
A
 0.65
B
 0.37
C
 0.26
A
 0.47
B
 0.27
A
 0.15
A
 0.29
A
 
Intercept & trend 0.11
C
 0.06
A
 0.10
A
 0.08
A
 0.05
A
 0.12
C
 N/A N/A 0.13
C
 0.20
B
 0.07
A
 0.19
B
 0.15
B
 0.12
C
 0.15
B
 0.09
A
 
Note: A=significant at 1%; B=significant at 5% and C=significant at 10% 
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Table C-1.3: Unit root results of rolling windows for Nigeria 
Table: Unit root results for rolling windows for Nigeria       1989-
1994 
1990-
1995 
1991-
1996 
1992-
1997 
1993-
1998 
1994-
1999 
1995-
2000 
1996-
2001 
1997-
2002 
1998-
2003 
1999-
2004 
2000-
2005 
2001-
2006 
2002-
2007 
2003-
2008 
2004-
2009 
DISR   Assumptions                                 
ADF 
Level 
Intercept -2.00 -1.71 -1.64 -1.59 -1.99 N/A -1.64 -0.45 -1.46 -1.65 -1.62 -0.83 -0.19 -1.35 -1.24 -0.56 
Intercept & trend -1.81 -1.85 -1.96 -2.12 -1.92 N/A -1.57 -3.87
B
 -1.16 -1.23 -2.60 -1.51 -2.78 -2.68 -2.41 -2.44 
1st Diff 
Intercept -8.25
A
 -8.26
A
 -8.25
A
 -8.26
A
 -8.31
A
 N/A -4.84
A
 -6.56
A
 -6.28
A
 -6.86
A
 -7.22
A
 -8.49
A
 -6.46
A
 -8.64
A
 -8.44
A
 -8.54
A
 
Intercept & trend -8.29
A
 -8.21
A
 -8.21
A
 -8.20
A
 -8.33
A
 N/A -4.86
A
 -6.56
A
 -6.30
A
 -7.00
A
 -7.24
A
 -8.47
A
 -6.68
A
 -8.60
A
 -8.39
A
 -8.51
A
 
KPSS 
Level 
Intercept 0.18
A
 0.21
A
 0.35
C
 0.57
B
 0.57
B
 0.54
B
 0.64
B
 0.72
B
 0.67
B
 0.23
A
 0.36
C
 0.62
B
 0.87 1.02 1.00 1.01 
Intercept & trend 0.10
A
 0.14
A
 0.15
A
 0.09
A
 0.19
B
 0.19
B
 0.11
C
 0.07
A
 0.08
A
 0.13
C
 0.12
C
 0.17
B
 0.09
A
 0.10
A
 0.06
A
 0.05
A
 
1st Diff 
Intercept 0.14
A
 0.08
A
 0.10
A
 0.07
A
 0.12
A
 0.13
A
 0.14
A
 0.09
A
 0.11
A
 0.19
A
 0.18
A
 0.13
A
 0.28
A
 0.07
A
 0.05
A
 0.07
A
 
Intercept & trend 0.06
A
 0.06
A
 0.07
A
 0.07
A
 0.04
A
 0.05
A
 0.12
C
 0.07
A
 0.07
A
 0.06
A
 0.08
A
 0.08
A
 0.11
C
 0.05
A
 0.05
A
 0.05
A
 
LR                                     
ADF 
Level 
Intercept -2.50 -2.27 -2.14 -1.97 -2.13 -1.84 -1.60 0.19 -1.36 -1.73 -1.47 -0.70 -0.72 -1.70 -1.87 -2.22 
Intercept & trend -2.32 -2.31 -2.33 -3.23
C
 -2.95 -1.48 -1.88 -1.73 -2.35 -0.92 -1.69 -1.77 -2.52 -1.79 -6.26 -1.87 
1st Diff 
Intercept -10.03
A
 -10.28
A
 -10.45
A
 -10.46
A
 -10.72
A
 -10.07
A
 -9.95
A
 -9.92
A
 -8.51
A
 -7.93
A
 -7.21
A
 -7.33
A
 -6.24
A
 -7.53
A
 -9.54
A
 -13.71
A
 
Intercept & trend -10.07
A
 -10.21
A
 -10.44
A
 -10.42
A
 -10.66
A
 -10.22
A
 -10.04
A
 -10.47
A
 -8.55
A
 -8.10
A
 -7.45
A
 -7.38
A
 -6.23
A
 -7.57
A
 -9.56
A
 -9.07
A
 
KPSS 
Level 
Intercept 0.23
A
 0.16
A
 0.27
A
 0.67
B
 0.73
A
 0.37
C
 0.32
A
 0.80 1.00 0.57
B
 0.26
A
 0.65
B
 0.96 0.97 1.03 0.40
C
 
Intercept & trend 0.09
A
 0.15
B
 0.18
B
 0.09
A
 0.16
B
 0.20
B
 0.25 0.22 0.09
A
 0.19
B
 0.25 0.20
B
 0.10
A
 0.23 0.15
B
 0.18
B
 
1st Diff 
Intercept 0.14
A
 0.07
A
 0.11
A
 0.10
A
 0.05
A
 0.31
A
 0.25
A
 0.49
B
 0.14
A
 0.32
A
 0.40
C
 0.21
A
 0.13
A
 0.21
A
 0.20
A
 0.24
A
 
Intercept & trend 0.06
A
 0.06
A
 0.05
A
 0.05
A
 0.04
A
 0.12
C
 0.08
A
 0.08
A
 0.12
C
 0.08
A
 0.07
A
 0.09
A
 0.11
C
 0.05
A
 0.08
A
 0.07
A
 
DR                                     
ADF 
Level 
Intercept -2.28 -2.10 -1.61 -1.24 -1.81 -1.86 -1.96 -1.95 -2.62
C
 -1.70 -2.04 -1.06 -1.89 -2.70
C
 -2.41 -3.01
B
 
Intercept & trend -2.18 -2.30 -2.87 -2.92 -2.55 -1.84 -1.91 -2.99 -4.00
B
 -1.67 -1.82 -1.32 -3.76
B
 -3.38
B
 -2.10 -3.16
C
 
1st Diff 
Intercept -10.72
A
 -4.17
A
 -3.86
A
 -3.81
A
 -10.13
A
 -5.50
A
 -6.31
A
 -4.07
A
 -2.17 -12.27
A
 -11.70
A
 -11.92
A
 -6.55
A
 -8.33
A
 -9.69
A
 -9.35
A
 
Intercept & trend -10.81
A
 -4.13
A
 -3.89
B
 -3.79
B
 -10.12
A
 -5.46
A
 -6.28
A
 -4.30
A
 -11.48
A
 -12.23
A
 -11.74
A
 -12.02
A
 -6.6A6 -8.70
A
 -9.73
A
 -9.88
A
 
KPSS 
Level 
Intercept 0.12
A
 0.27
A
 0.37
C
 0.80 0.80 0.32
A
 0.19
A
 0.41
C
 0.82 0.56
B
 0.23
A
 0.25
A
 0.73
A
 0.98 0.57
B
 0.27
A
 
Intercept & trend 0.10
A
 0.13
C
 0.16
B
 0.07
A
 0.12
C
 0.17
B
 0.18
B
 0.13
C
 0.06
A
 0.09
A
 0.13
C
 0.18
B
 0.10
A
 0.13
C
 0.23
A
 0.26
A
 
1st Diff 
Intercept 0.16
A
 0.07
A
 0.13
A
 0.11
A
 0.09
A
 0.12
A
 0.10
A
 0.22
A
 0.10
A
 0.10
A
 0.13
A
 0.16
A
 0.20
A
 0.25
A
 0.28
A
 0.50
B
 
Intercept & trend 0.06
A
 0.07
A
 0.07
A
 0.07
A
 0.05
A
 0.08
A
 0.09
A
 0.06
A
 0.09
A
 0.06
A
 0.05
A
 0.06
A
 0.11
C
 0.07
A
 0.07
A
 0.12
C
 
Note: A=significant at 1%; B=significant at 5% and C=significant at 10% 
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Table C-1.4: Unit root results of rolling windows for Sierra Leone 
      1989-1994 1990-1995 1991-1996 1992-1997 1993-1998 1994-1999 1995-2000 1996-2001 1997-2002 1998-2003 1999-2004 2000-2005 2001-2006 2002-2007 2003-2008 2004-2009 
TBR   Assumptions                                 
ADF 
Level 
Intercept -1.14 -1.31 -1.27 -2.40 -1.91 -1.81 -1.90 -1.95 -1.38 -1.79 -1.84 -2.61
C
 -1.47 -1.62 -0.90 -1.15 
Intercept & trend -1.15 -1.77 -1.69 -1.62 -1.76 -2.30 -1.60 -1.93 -1.40 -2.61
C
 -1.38 -3.04 -1.17 -1.58 -1.45 -2.48 
1st Diff 
Intercept -6.45
A
 -6.05
A
 -6.33
A
 -6.69
A
 -6.49
A
 -6.42
A
 -6.85
A
 -6.55
A
 -6.56
A
 -6.62
A
 -8.14
A
 -8.25
A
 -8.48
A
 -7.44
A
 -7.08
A
 -7.52 
Intercept & trend -6.70
A
 -5.99
A
 -6.28
A
 -6.95
A
 -6.70
A
 -6.41
A
 -6.93
A
 -6.50
A
 -6.52
A
 -6.62
A
 -8.32
A
 -8.33
A
 -8.75
A
 -7.40
A
 -7.33
A
 -7.45 
KPSS 
Level 
Intercept 0.27
A
 0.64
B
 0.62
B
 0.58
B
 0.09
A
 0.35
C
 0.25
A
 0.13
A
 0.21
A
 0.48
B
 0.41
C
 0.23
A
 0.49
B
 0.22
A
 0.28
A
 0.84 
Intercept & trend 0.24 0.15
B
 0.14
B
 0.22 0.09
A
 0.09
A
 0.08
A
 0.13
C
 0.19
B
 0.12
C
 0.25 0.19
B
 0.18
B
 0.19
B
 0.14
B
 0.07
A
 
1st Diff 
Intercept 0.27
A
 0.13
A
 0.09
A
 0.29
A
 0.28
A
 0.10
A
 0.13
A
 0.11
A
 0.13
A
 0.23
A
 0.32
A
 0.26
A
 0.19
A
 0.11
A
 0.28
A
 0.08
A
 
Intercept & trend 0.06
A
 0.12
C
 0.09
A
 0.11
C
 0.10
A
 0.07
A
 0.08
A
 0.11
A
 0.10
A
 0.15
A
 0.07
A
 0.12
C
 0.11
C
 0.09
A
 0.07
A
 0.08
A
 
LR                                     
ADF 
Level 
Intercept -1.27 -0.84 -1.56 -1.68 -1.57 -2.00 -1.29 -1.37 -1.62 -0.47 -0.98 -1.75 -1.79 -0.86 -1.78 -2.62 
Intercept & trend -1.33 -2.38 -2.76 -1.96 -1.91 -2.28 -1.31 -1.45 -1.66 -2.26 -1.93 -1.21 -2.22 -2.20 -1.08 -2.50 
1st Diff 
Intercept -11.86
A
 -12.22
A
 -12.42
A
 -8.73
A
 -6.97
A
 -9.80
A
 -7.18
A
 -7.26
A
 -8.41
A
 -10.15
A
 -9.05
A
 -8.37
A
 -9.39
A
 -9.25
A
 -8.41
A
 -8.28
A
 
Intercept & trend -12.27
A
 -12.24
A
 -12.33
A
 -8.74
A
 -7.11
A
 -9.74
A
 -7.13
A
 -7.21
A
 -8.36
A
 -10.41
A
 -9.00
A
 -8.65
A
 -9.55
A
 -9.29
A
 -8.61
A
 -9.16
A
 
KPSS 
Level 
Intercept 0.27
A
 0.76 0.87 0.84 0.62
B
 0.32
A
 0.34
C
 0.29
A
 0.26
A
 0.69
B
 0.89 0.41
C
 0.28
A
 0.74 0.81 0.23
A
 
Intercept & trend 0.27 0.21
A
 0.14
B
 0.22 0.14
B
 0.12
C
 0.14
B
 0.15
B
 0.23 0.24 0.15
B
 0.26 0.22 0.11
C
 0.22 0.23 
1st Diff 
Intercept 0.39
C
 0.21
C
 0.11
C
 0.16
C
 0.16
C
 0.10
C
 0.10
C
 0.09
C
 0.15
C
 0.32
C
 0.18
C
 0.36
C
 0.38
C
 0.17
A
 0.26
A
 0.57
B
 
Intercept & trend 0.06
A
 0.11
C
 0.11
C
 0.07
A
 0.07
A
 0.09
A
 0.09
A
 0.09
A
 0.14
B
 0.05
A
 0.18
B
 0.07
A
 0.14
B
 0.13
C
 0.06
A
 0.07
A
 
DR                                     
ADF 
Level 
Intercept -0.53 -0.37 -0.75 -2.59
C
 -2.77
C
 -2.67
C
 -2.17 -2.09 -3.58
A
 -2.77
C
 -1.37 -1.06 -1.42 -1.63 -1.78 -0.13 
Intercept & trend -1.02 -2.48 -1.10 -1.24 -1.98 -2.53 -2.24 -2.33 -3.44 -2.74 -1.37 -2.21 -1.76 -0.96 -1.08 -2.55 
1st Diff 
Intercept -4.57
A
 -4.46
A
 -9.31
A
 -3.27
B
 -7.28
A
 -5.68
A
 -5.64
A
 -5.97
A
 -6.13
A
 -5.81
A
 -4.83
A
 -4.97
A
 -6.01
A
 -4.97
A
 -8.41
A
 -7.14
A
 
Intercept & trend -9.86
A
 -4.56
A
 -9.25
A
 -7.79
A
 -7.63
A
 -5.73
A
 -5.64
A
 -5.92
A
 -6.17
A
 -5.88
A
 -5.22
A
 -5.03
A
 -5.93
A
 -5.16
A
 -8.61
A
 -7.51
A
 
KPSS 
Level 
Intercept 0.32
A
 0.83 0.89 0.78 0.57
B
 0.14
A
 0.12
A
 0.45
C
 0.12
A
 0.12
A
 0.25
A
 0.64
B
 0.95 0.71
B
 0.81 0.72
B
 
Intercept & trend 0.27 0.20
B
 0.16
B
 0.26 0.18
B
 0.08
A
 0.10
A
 0.14
A
 0.07
A
 0.13
A
 0.24 0.23 0.12
C
 0.22 0.22 0.22 
1st Diff 
Intercept 0.58
B
 0.31
A
 0.18
A
 0.44
C
 0.64
B
 0.19
A
 0.13
A
 0.12
A
 0.17
A
 0.19
A
 0.44
C
 0.23
A
 0.14
A
 0.29
A
 0.26
A
 0.43
C
 
Intercept & trend 0.07
A
 0.19
B
 0.18
B
 0.12
C
 0.18
B
 0.12
C
 0.10
A
 0.12
C
 0.09
A
 0.10
A
 0.05
A
 0.11
C
 0.14
B
 0.10
A
 0.06
A
 0.06
A
 
Note: A=significant at 1%; B=significant at 5% and C=significant at 10% 
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Appendix D: Summary of Interest Rate Pass-Through Analyses 
Table D-1.0: Summary of IRPT analysis for the entire period 
  Sample Cointegration Tests Intercept Long-run PT Short-run PT ECTt-1 ML 
Interest rates From To JJ EG CRDW ECM Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat   
Gambia 
Lending Rate 1989 2009 yes yes no yes 19.61 41.07 0.50 16.39 0.26 5.65 -0.06 -3.49 -12.84 
Deposit Rate 1989 2009 no yes no yes 7.77 25.11 0.40 20.00 0.29 5.62 -0.10 -3.44 -7.11 
Ghana 
Lending Rate 2000 2009 yes yes yes yes 17.81 21.34 0.66 19.33 -0.06 -0.36 -0.38 -5.25 -2.80 
Deposit Rate 2000 2009 no yes no yes 0.73 1.24 0.69 28.45 0.35 4.92 -0.12 -2.93 -5.66 
Nigeria 
Lending Rate 1989 2009 no yes yes yes 8.44 15.85 0.81 23.73 0.66 9.33 -0.16 -4.18 -2.10 
Deposit Rate 1989 2009 no yes no yes 3.63 5.27 0.67 15.14 0.47 6.84 -0.08 -2.80 -6.54 
Sierra Leone 
Lending Rate 1989 2009 yes yes no yes 15.13 18.83 0.62 23.72 0.30 6.34 -0.09 -3.51 -7.99 
Deposit Rate 1989 2009 yes yes no yes -1.99 -2.50 0.72 27.60 0.13 3.71 -0.05 -2.47 -18.61 
Note: JJ- is the Johansen method, EG- Engle-Granger method, CRDW- Cointegration Regression Durbin Watson test, ECM-Based - Error Correction Based test and PT- Pass-
through, ECTt-1 –Lagged Error Correction Term, and ML – Mean Lag 
 
  
138 
 
Table D-1.1: Summary of IRPT analysis for the rolling windows of Gambia 
  Rolling Sample Cointegration Tests Intercept Long-run PT Short-run PT ECTt-1 ML 
Interest rates From To JJ EG CRDW ECM Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat   
Lending Rate 1989 1994 no yes yes yes 19.48 23.91 0.44 8.38 0.20 2.23 -0.45 -4.70 -1.78 
Lending Rate 1990 1995 no yes yes yes 18.88 34.60 0.47 13.07 0.14 1.63 -0.26 -2.40 -3.26 
Lending Rate 1991 1996 no yes yes yes 19.09 40.20 0.45 14.23 0.16 1.75 -0.32 -2.75 -2.61 
Lending Rate 1992 1997 no yes yes yes 19.02 37.26 0.46 13.03 0.18 1.97 -0.37 -2.94 -2.23 
Lending Rate 1993 1998 yes yes yes yes 20.25 25.73 0.37 6.58 0.11 1.33 -0.40 -3.65 -2.21 
Lending Rate 1994 1999 no yes yes yes 17.29 33.12 0.58 14.93 0.00 0.02 -0.44 -6.26 -2.25 
Lending Rate 1995 2000 no yes yes yes 19.71 59.71 0.40 15.85 0.01 0.14 -0.23 -3.40 -4.25 
Lending Rate 1996 2001 no yes yes yes 19.73 58.77 0.40 15.01 0.01 0.18 -0.17 -2.77 -5.93 
Lending Rate 1997 2002 no no no yes 21.21 42.99 0.27 6.68 -0.01 -0.26 -0.10 -2.24 
-
10.39 
Lending Rate 1998 2003 yes yes no no 18.57 31.35 0.46 11.81 0.35 3.34 -0.14 -1.91 -4.72 
Lending Rate 1999 2004 yes yes no yes 16.47 27.02 0.63 18.93 0.31 3.10 -0.16 -2.88 -4.32 
Lending Rate 2000 2005 yes no no yes 17.01 18.52 0.65 13.92 0.26 2.93 -0.14 -3.09 -5.39 
Lending Rate 2001 2006 yes no no yes 20.10 17.89 0.53 9.30 0.27 2.88 -0.09 -2.37 -8.02 
Lending Rate 2002 2007 yes no no yes 22.66 21.47 0.43 8.01 0.29 2.99 -0.08 -2.12 -8.41 
Lending Rate 2003 2008 yes yes no yes 24.11 29.52 0.39 9.20 0.30 2.91 -0.14 -2.75 -5.03 
Lending Rate 2004 2009 yes yes no yes 23.13 64.62 0.49 23.04 0.13 2.23 -0.17 -4.15 -5.17 
Deposit Rate 1989 1994 no yes yes yes 9.00 6.24 0.24 2.60 0.03 0.25 -0.24 -3.36 -4.08 
Deposit Rate 1990 1995 no yes no no 9.66 8.44 0.20 2.63 0.03 0.28 -0.16 -2.39 -6.18 
Deposit Rate 1991 1996 yes yes yes yes 9.00 15.34 0.26 6.60 0.14 1.62 -0.30 -3.49 -2.89 
Deposit Rate 1992 1997 yes yes yes yes 7.14 15.67 0.39 12.52 0.24 2.99 -0.58 -5.02 -1.33 
Deposit Rate 1993 1998 yes yes no no 10.67 33.85 0.14 6.14 0.00 -0.06 -0.13 -3.07 -7.65 
Deposit Rate 1994 1999 N/A yes yes yes 12.49 78.07 0.00 0.14 0.00 -0.57 -1.00 -374.00 -1.00 
Deposit Rate 1995 2000 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Deposit Rate 1996 2001 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Deposit Rate 1997 2002 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Deposit Rate 1998 2003 yes no yes yes 9.16 38.67 0.29 18.20 0.24 3.58 -0.30 -1.73 -2.51 
Deposit Rate 1999 2004 yes yes no no 7.37 18.83 0.44 20.76 0.21 3.15 -0.15 -2.57 -5.44 
Deposit Rate 2000 2005 no yes no no 7.36 16.77 0.45 20.30 0.34 5.13 -0.18 -2.73 -3.58 
Deposit Rate 2001 2006 no yes yes yes 7.29 16.02 0.46 19.78 0.31 4.42 -0.21 -2.99 -3.21 
Deposit Rate 2002 2007 no yes yes yes 7.88 16.56 0.43 17.86 0.33 4.25 -0.20 -2.80 -3.33 
Deposit Rate 2003 2008 no yes yes yes 8.49 18.31 0.41 17.15 0.28 2.69 -0.28 -3.22 -2.58 
Deposit Rate 2004 2009 yes yes yes yes 8.69 24.17 0.45 21.28 0.51 4.17 -0.30 -3.12 -1.67 
Note: JJ- is the Johansen method, EG- Engle-Granger method, CRDW- Cointegration Regression Durbin Watson test, ECM-Based - Error Correction Based test and PT- Pass-
through, ECTt-1 –Lagged Error Correction Term, and ML – Mean Lag 
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Table D-1.2: Summary of IRPT analysis for the rolling windows of Ghana 
  Rolling Sample Cointegration Tests Intercept Long-run PT Short-run PT ECTt-1 ML 
Interest rates From To JJ EG CRDW ECM Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat   
Lending Rate 2000 2005 yes yes yes yes 19.36 24.55 0.64 23.22 0.16 2.08 -0.29 -4.69 -2.92 
Lending Rate 2001 2006 yes yes yes yes 19.52 33.10 0.63 26.64 0.09 1.13 -0.30 -5.17 -3.05 
Lending Rate 2002 2007 yes yes yes yes 19.36 35.99 0.62 21.35 0.20 2.07 -0.33 -5.01 -2.46 
Lending Rate 2003 2008 yes yes yes yes 20.90 16.01 0.43 5.67 -0.38 -1.20 -0.44 -3.83 -1.41 
Lending Rate 2004 2009 yes yes yes yes 22.22 15.19 0.33 3.63 -1.29 -2.55 -0.52 -4.37 -4.42 
Deposit Rate 2000 2005 no yes no yes -1.36 -1.25 0.76 19.94 0.34 3.94 -0.11 -2.20 -6.12 
Deposit Rate 2001 2006 no yes no yes 1.12 1.36 0.65 19.66 0.27 2.94 -0.15 -3.10 -4.83 
Deposit Rate 2002 2007 no yes yes yes 5.77 11.14 0.36 13.02 0.02 0.21 -0.20 -3.02 -4.95 
Deposit Rate 2003 2008 no yes yes yes 5.98 12.26 0.33 11.55 0.13 1.65 -0.20 -2.87 -4.41 
Deposit Rate 2004 2009 no yes yes yes 2.99 5.79 0.57 17.78 0.20 1.37 -0.29 -3.28 -2.79 
Note: JJ- is the Johansen method, EG- Engle-Granger method, CRDW- Cointegration Regression Durbin Watson test, ECM-Based - Error Correction Based test and PT- Pass-
through, ECTt-1 –Lagged Error Correction Term, and ML – Mean Lag 
 
Table D-1.3: Summary of IRPT analysis for the rolling windows of Nigeria 
  Rolling Sample Cointegration Tests Intercept Long-run PT Short-run PT ECTt-1 ML 
Interest rates From To JJ EG CRDW ECM Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat   
Lending Rate 1989 1994 yes yes yes yes 5.06 4.89 1.07 18.53 0.88 7.94 -0.51 -4.60 -0.24 
Lending Rate 1990 1995 yes yes yes yes 5.86 6.13 1.04 19.18 0.92 8.20 -0.48 -4.37 -0.17 
Lending Rate 1991 1996 yes yes yes yes 5.89 6.75 1.03 20.01 0.88 7.94 -0.48 -4.47 -0.25 
Lending Rate 1992 1997 yes yes yes yes 5.26 6.14 1.07 20.79 0.91 7.96 -0.49 -4.47 -0.18 
Lending Rate 1993 1998 yes yes yes yes 4.70 6.92 1.08 25.50 1.08 10.58 -0.43 -4.07 0.18 
Lending Rate 1994 1999 no yes no yes 16.39 16.97 0.21 3.22 0.13 0.94 -0.12 -1.99 -7.31 
Lending Rate 1995 2000 no yes no yes 14.62 15.79 0.33 5.43 0.07 0.53 -0.15 -2.36 -6.27 
Lending Rate 1996 2001 no yes no no 10.90 10.15 0.59 8.72 0.16 1.41 -0.08 -1.40 -10.76 
Lending Rate 1997 2002 no yes yes yes 7.34 5.79 0.82 10.87 0.12 0.92 -0.15 -2.71 -5.71 
Lending Rate 1998 2003 no yes no yes 8.75 6.17 0.75 9.03 0.12 1.09 -0.14 -2.64 -6.33 
Lending Rate 1999 2004 no yes no yes 9.19 5.52 0.72 7.51 0.11 0.97 -0.13 -2.61 -6.87 
Lending Rate 2000 2005 yes yes yes yes 4.87 5.33 1.00 18.08 0.17 1.32 -0.24 -2.87 -3.49 
Lending Rate 2001 2006 yes yes yes yes 3.22 3.85 1.10 20.94 0.10 0.89 -0.26 -3.20 -3.51 
Lending Rate 2002 2007 no yes yes yes 8.29 10.68 0.78 14.68 -0.04 -0.33 -0.13 -2.45 -8.10 
Lending Rate 2003 2008 no yes yes yes 10.66 14.82 0.57 10.22 0.06 0.39 -0.31 -3.21 -3.07 
Lending Rate 2004 2009 no yes yes yes 15.98 23.11 0.13 2.22 -0.03 -0.17 -0.20 -2.16 -5.24 
Deposit Rate 1989 1994 yes yes yes yes 2.17 2.64 0.87 18.83 0.72 7.38 -0.54 -4.23 -0.52 
Deposit Rate 1990 1995 yes yes yes yes 1.78 2.32 0.89 20.44 0.78 8.10 -0.52 -4.20 -0.42 
Deposit Rate 1991 1996 yes yes yes yes 1.59 2.58 0.88 23.99 0.76 8.32 -0.60 -4.53 -0.40 
Deposit Rate 1992 1997 no yes yes yes -1.74 -1.42 1.02 13.91 0.67 6.24 -0.12 -1.76 -2.66 
Deposit Rate 1993 1998 no yes no yes -2.35 -2.13 1.02 14.81 0.78 7.24 -0.14 -2.19 -1.54 
Deposit Rate 1994 1999 no yes no no 7.19 3.68 0.31 2.29 0.27 1.66 -0.06 -1.80 -12.22 
Deposit Rate 1995 2000 no yes no no 5.91 3.30 0.37 3.10 0.20 1.23 -0.17 -1.51 -4.64 
Deposit Rate 1996 2001 no yes yes yes -0.93 -0.53 0.81 7.36 0.09 0.42 -0.14 -2.11 -6.59 
Deposit Rate 1997 2002 no yes yes yes -7.27 -5.00 1.18 13.62 0.24 1.25 -0.18 -2.39 -4.16 
Deposit Rate 1998 2003 no yes yes yes -1.82 -1.03 0.90 8.74 0.10 0.51 -0.20 -2.46 -4.60 
Deposit Rate 1999 2004 no yes yes yes 2.25 1.01 0.68 5.34 0.10 0.43 -0.20 -2.63 -4.45 
Deposit Rate 2000 2005 no yes yes yes -1.70 -1.03 0.94 9.45 0.09 0.34 -0.22 -2.37 -4.14 
Deposit Rate 2001 2006 no yes yes yes -3.10 -2.38 1.04 12.81 0.10 0.47 -0.34 -3.46 -2.62 
Deposit Rate 2002 2007 yes yes yes yes 2.57 2.67 0.70 10.58 0.01 0.04 -0.18 -2.69 -5.40 
Deposit Rate 2003 2008 no yes no no 6.90 6.54 0.38 4.69 -0.08 -0.47 -0.11 -1.72 -9.96 
Deposit Rate 2004 2009 no yes no yes 11.90 13.47 -0.03 -0.36 0.05 0.44 -0.15 -3.10 -6.51 
Note: JJ- is the Johansen method, EG- Engle-Granger method, CRDW- Cointegration Regression Durbin Watson test, ECM-Based - Error Correction Based test and PT- Pass-
through, ECTt-1 –Lagged Error Correction Term, and ML – Mean Lag 
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Table D-1.4: Summary of IRPT analysis for the rolling windows of Sierra Leone 
  Rolling Sample Cointegration Tests Intercept Long-run PT Short-run PT ECTt-1 ML 
Interest rates From To JJ EG CRDW ECM Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat   
Lending Rate 1989 1994 no yes yes yes 25.80 14.29 0.52 13.34 0.41 3.95 -0.21 -2.64 -2.81 
Lending Rate 1990 1995 no yes yes yes 26.77 16.33 0.51 14.20 0.34 3.26 -0.19 -2.22 -3.45 
Lending Rate 1991 1996 no yes yes yes 24.69 14.48 0.51 13.03 0.32 3.08 -0.17 -2.34 -3.94 
Lending Rate 1992 1997 no yes no yes 22.62 15.66 0.51 13.60 0.23 2.35 -0.14 -2.51 -5.31 
Lending Rate 1993 1998 no yes no yes 19.95 9.02 0.56 5.66 0.27 2.01 -0.13 -2.42 -5.48 
Lending Rate 1994 1999 no yes no yes 24.58 30.55 0.12 3.58 0.04 0.76 -0.12 -2.02 -7.90 
Lending Rate 1995 2000 no yes no no 23.88 28.01 0.13 3.96 0.05 1.67 -0.07 -1.88 -12.77 
Lending Rate 1996 2001 no yes no yes 21.67 28.50 0.20 6.50 0.06 1.78 -0.11 -2.58 -8.22 
Lending Rate 1997 2002 no yes yes yes 21.47 52.84 0.15 8.33 0.05 1.61 -0.25 -3.38 -3.74 
Lending Rate 1998 2003 no no no yes 19.89 35.36 0.19 7.76 0.06 2.29 -0.10 -2.16 -9.30 
Lending Rate 1999 2004 no no no yes 19.52 26.43 0.19 5.89 0.04 1.59 -0.07 -2.27 -13.55 
Lending Rate 2000 2005 yes no no yes 20.54 26.38 0.13 3.63 0.02 0.99 -0.09 -2.55 -11.18 
Lending Rate 2001 2006 yes yes no yes 22.15 27.39 0.04 0.90 -0.06 -1.72 -0.07 -1.94 -15.88 
Lending Rate 2002 2007 no no no no 21.24 23.01 0.09 1.94 -0.05 -1.32 -0.05 -1.55 -20.42 
Lending Rate 2003 2008 no yes no yes 22.79 25.15 0.03 0.65 -0.05 -1.67 -0.06 -2.42 -16.18 
Lending Rate 2004 2009 yes yes no yes 23.35 44.72 0.02 0.74 -0.05 -1.76 -0.14 -3.46 -7.41 
Deposit Rate 1989 1994 yes yes yes no 8.14 5.70 0.64 20.73 0.20 -0.95 -0.12 -1.39 -6.81 
Deposit Rate 1990 1995 no yes yes no 4.76 2.92 0.69 19.49 0.13 1.61 -0.06 -0.89 -14.68 
Deposit Rate 1991 1996 no yes yes no 2.33 1.33 0.69 17.15 0.10 1.26 -0.08 -1.59 -11.11 
Deposit Rate 1992 1997 yes yes no yes 2.15 1.91 0.63 21.62 0.17 4.09 -0.19 -5.56 -4.32 
Deposit Rate 1993 1998 yes yes no yes 4.49 2.75 0.42 5.71 0.07 1.38 -0.12 -4.03 -7.76 
Deposit Rate 1994 1999 yes yes no yes 7.62 9.19 0.11 3.03 0.03 0.75 -0.13 -3.00 -7.73 
Deposit Rate 1995 2000 yes yes no yes 6.75 9.39 0.12 4.14 0.02 0.57 -0.11 -2.81 -8.60 
Deposit Rate 1996 2001 no yes no yes 7.01 9.79 0.11 3.90 0.01 0.37 -0.11 -2.77 -9.07 
Deposit Rate 1997 2002 yes yes no yes 7.28 16.89 0.07 3.42 -0.01 -0.58 -0.26 -4.61 -3.96 
Deposit Rate 1998 2003 yes yes no yes 6.64 27.07 0.08 7.65 0.02 1.39 -0.21 -4.23 -4.66 
Deposit Rate 1999 2004 no no no no 6.95 32.92 0.09 9.67 0.02 2.28 -0.09 -2.37 -11.32 
Deposit Rate 2000 2005 yes yes no yes 6.63 18.58 0.12 7.37 0.01 1.55 -0.07 -2.81 -13.72 
Deposit Rate 2001 2006 yes no no yes 5.86 13.95 0.19 8.54 0.00 -0.02 -0.08 -3.82 -12.12 
Deposit Rate 2002 2007 no no no yes 7.04 15.86 0.14 6.22 0.00 -0.18 -0.08 -3.77 -12.71 
Deposit Rate 2003 2008 no no no yes 8.32 22.06 0.08 4.49 0.00 -0.25 -0.08 -3.49 -12.20 
Deposit Rate 2004 2009 no no no yes 6.31 13.84 0.18 7.61 -0.02 -0.60 -0.12 -2.91 -8.41 
Note: JJ- is the Johansen method, EG- Engle-Granger method, CRDW- Cointegration Regression Durbin Watson test, ECM-Based - Error Correction Based test and PT- Pass-
through, ECTt-1 –Lagged Error Correction Term, and ML – Mean Lag 
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Appendix E: Summary of Asymmetric Error Correction Terms and Mean Adjustment 
Lags 
 
Table E-1.0:  Asymmetric Error Correction Terms and Mean Adjustment Lags for the entire 
sample period for all countries  
        Asymmetric error correction terms       Summary 
Interest Sample ECT
+
t-1 ECT
-
t-1 Wald Test Mean Lag PT Adjustment Hypothesis 
Rates From To Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat F-stat PV ML
+
 ML
-
 Mechanism Rigidity   
Gambia 
Lending Rate 1989 2009 0.02 0.57 -0.19 -4.50 11.50 0.00 49.10 -4.01 Asymmetry Upward Customer reaction 
Deposit Rate 1989 2009 -0.03 -0.67 -0.19 -3.07 2.84 0.09 -21.32 -3.62 Asymmetry Upward Collusive pricing arrangement 
Ghana 
Lending Rate 2000 2009 -0.23 -1.33 -0.43 -4.71 0.89 0.35 -4.48 -2.39 Symmetric Upward Customer reaction 
Deposit Rate 2000 2009 -0.18 -1.98 -0.08 -1.27 0.62 0.43 -3.63 -8.34 Symmetric Downward Customer reaction 
Nigeria 
Lending Rate 1989 2009 -0.21 -3.33 -0.10 -1.23 0.86 0.35 -1.65 -3.50 Symmetric Downward Collusive pricing arrangement 
Deposit Rate 1989 2009 -0.17 -2.81 -0.01 -0.15 2.78 0.10 -3.09 -66.27 Asymmetry Downward Customer reaction 
Sierra Leone 
Lending Rate 1989 2009 -0.15 -3.84 0.01 0.26 4.33 0.04 -4.70 50.31 Asymmetry Downward Collusive pricing arrangement 
Deposit Rate 1989 2009 -0.07 -2.13 -0.02 -0.57 0.81 0.37 -12.04 -43.12 Symmetric Downward Customer reaction 
Note: ML - mean lag, ECT- error correction term, PV-Probability Value 
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Table E-1.1:  Asymmetric error correction terms and mean adjustment lags of rolling windows for 
Gambia    
        
Asymmetric error correction 
terms       Summary 
Interest  
Rolling 
Sample ECT
+
t-1 ECT
-
t-1 Wald Test Mean Lag PT Adjustment Hypothesis 
Rates From To Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat F-stat PV ML
+
 ML
-
 Mechanism Rigidity   
Lending Rate 1989 1994 -0.73 -5.66 0.03 0.18 9.33 0.00 -1.25 27.48 Asymmetric Downward Collusive pricing arrangement 
Lending Rate 1990 1995 -0.24 -1.57 -0.31 -1.19 0.05 0.83 -3.53 -2.69 Symmetric Upward Customer reaction 
Lending Rate 1991 1996 -0.29 -2.00 -0.41 -1.49 0.11 0.74 -2.81 -2.04 Symmetric Upward Customer reaction 
Lending Rate 1992 1997 -0.33 -2.20 -0.45 -1.73 0.14 0.71 -2.38 -1.76 Symmetric Upward Customer reaction 
Lending Rate 1993 1998 -0.48 -3.53 -0.16 -0.61 1.02 0.31 -1.90 -5.72 Symmetric Downward Collusive pricing arrangement 
Lending Rate 1994 1999 -0.61 -6.76 0.00 0.01 7.58 0.01 -1.65 476.71 Asymmetric Downward Collusive pricing arrangement 
Lending Rate 1995 2000 -0.81 -6.44 0.18 1.84 26.78 0.00 -1.23 5.47 Asymmetric Downward Collusive pricing arrangement 
Lending Rate 1996 2001 -0.79 -6.76 0.16 2.16 34.49 0.00 -1.28 6.26 Asymmetric Downward Collusive pricing arrangement 
Lending Rate 1997 2002 0.10 1.16 -0.28 -3.35 6.36 0.01 9.63 -3.60 Asymmetric Upward Customer reaction 
Lending Rate 1998 2003 -0.01 -0.09 -0.23 -2.12 1.27 0.26 
-
58.38 -3.00 Symmetric Upward Customer reaction 
Lending Rate 1999 2004 0.10 0.63 -0.25 -3.31 3.04 0.08 7.15 -2.81 Asymmetric Upward Customer reaction 
Lending Rate 2000 2005 -0.07 -0.88 -0.19 -2.99 1.37 0.24 
-
11.15 -3.86 Symmetric Upward Customer reaction 
Lending Rate 2001 2006 -0.05 -0.57 -0.13 -1.68 0.29 0.59 
-
14.93 -5.87 Symmetric Upward Customer reaction 
Lending Rate 2002 2007 -0.15 -1.09 -0.06 -0.80 0.26 0.61 -4.67 -12.86 Symmetric Downward Collusive pricing arrangement 
Lending Rate 2003 2008 -0.12 -0.97 -0.14 -2.26 0.02 0.88 -5.74 -4.82 Symmetric Upward Customer reaction 
Lending Rate 2004 2009 -0.32 -4.61 0.08 0.77 6.85 0.01 -2.79 11.28 Asymmetric Downward Collusive pricing arrangement 
Deposit Rate 1989 1994 -0.48 -3.25 -0.09 -0.86 3.45 0.06 -1.98 -10.51 Asymmetric Downward Customer reaction 
Deposit Rate 1990 1995 -0.21 -1.40 -0.13 -1.44 0.14 0.71 -4.67 -7.22 Symmetric Downward Customer reaction 
Deposit Rate 1991 1996 -0.31 -2.37 -0.28 -1.87 0.03 0.87 -2.74 -3.09 Symmetric Downward Customer reaction 
Deposit Rate 1992 1997 -0.44 -2.27 -0.69 -4.03 0.76 0.38 -1.72 -1.10 Symmetric Upward Collusive pricing arrangement 
Deposit Rate 1993 1998 -0.23 -3.16 0.23 1.03 2.73 0.10 -4.42 4.45 Asymmetric Downward Customer reaction 
Deposit Rate 1994 1999             
Deposit Rate 1995 2000             
Deposit Rate 1996 2001             
Deposit Rate 1997 2002             
Deposit Rate 1998 2003 -0.36 -0.78 -0.25 -0.60 0.02 0.90 -2.13 -2.99 Symmetric Downward Customer reaction 
Deposit Rate 1999 2004 0.08 0.63 -0.28 -3.21 4.03 0.04 10.18 -2.80 Asymmetric Upward Collusive pricing arrangement 
Deposit Rate 2000 2005 -0.14 -0.87 -0.20 -1.89 0.06 0.80 -4.53 -3.20 Symmetric Upward Collusive pricing arrangement 
Deposit Rate 2001 2006 -0.23 -1.37 -0.20 -1.75 0.01 0.91 -2.97 -3.38 Symmetric Downward Customer reaction 
Deposit Rate 2002 2007 -0.15 -0.85 -0.23 -1.78 0.10 0.76 -4.45 -2.84 Symmetric Upward Collusive pricing arrangement 
Deposit Rate 2003 2008 -0.20 -0.78 -0.32 -2.11 0.11 0.73 -3.64 -2.25 Symmetric Upward Collusive pricing arrangement 
Deposit Rate 2004 2009 0.14 0.74 -0.59 -4.05 6.70 0.01 3.64 -0.87 Asymmetric Upward Collusive pricing arrangement 
Note: ML - mean lag, ECT- error correction term 
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Table E-1.2:  Asymmetric error correction terms and mean adjustment lags of rolling windows for 
Ghana   
        Asymmetric error correction terms       Summary 
Interest  
Rolling 
sample ECT
+
t-1 ECT
-
t-1 Wald Test Mean Lag PT Adjustment Hypothesis 
 Rates From To Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat F-stat PV ML
+
 ML
-
 Mechanism Rigidity   
Lending Rate 2000 2005 -0.28 -2.65 -0.30 -2.12 0.00 0.95 -2.97 -2.83 Symmetric Upward Customer reaction 
Lending Rate 2001 2006 -0.46 -4.84 -0.10 -0.81 3.93 0.05 -2.06 -9.84 Asymmetry Downward Collusive pricing arrangement 
Lending Rate 2002 2007 -0.54 -5.04 0.01 0.05 6.09 0.01 -1.53 -5.83 Asymmetry Downward Collusive pricing arrangement 
Lending Rate 2003 2008 0.02 0.06 -0.56 -4.07 2.37 0.12 66.46 -2.33 Symmetric Upward Customer reaction 
Lending Rate 2004 2009 0.10 0.29 -0.69 -4.81 4.12 0.04 23.03 -3.18 Asymmetry Upward Customer reaction 
Deposit Rate 2000 2005 -0.21 -1.73 -0.05 -0.63 0.88 0.35 -3.07 -13.15 Symmetric Downward Customer reaction 
Deposit Rate 2001 2006 -0.32 -2.62 -0.06 -0.73 2.27 0.13 -2.32 -12.86 Symmetric Downward Customer reaction 
Deposit Rate 2002 2007 -0.34 -2.51 -0.08 -0.67 1.42 0.23 -2.88 -12.29 Symmetric Downward Customer reaction 
Deposit Rate 2003 2008 -0.02 -0.14 -0.46 -3.18 4.07 0.04 
-
55.12 -1.97 Asymmetry Upward Collusive pricing arrangement 
Deposit Rate 2004 2009 0.14 0.66 -0.52 -3.78 4.66 0.03 6.14 -1.68 Asymmetry Upward Collusive pricing arrangement 
Note: ML - mean lag, ECT- error correction term 
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Table E-1.3:  Asymmetric error correction terms and mean adjustment lags of rolling windows of 
Nigeria.   
        Asymmetric error correction terms       Summary 
Interest rates Rolling sample ECT
+
t-1 ECT
-
t-1 Wald Test Mean Lag PT Adjustment Hypothesis 
  From To Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat F-stat PV ML
+
 ML
-
 Mechanism Rigidity   
Lending Rate 1989 1994 -0.51 -2.68 -0.50 -2.17 0.00 0.99 -0.24 -0.24 Symmetric   
Lending Rate 1990 1995 -0.52 -2.81 -0.45 -2.19 0.05 0.82 -0.16 -0.18 Symmetric Downward Collusive pricing arrangement 
Lending Rate 1991 1996 -0.49 -2.81 -0.47 -2.33 0.00 0.95 -2.44 -0.25 Symmetric Upward Customer reaction 
Lending Rate 1992 1997 -0.49 -2.65 -0.49 -2.53 0.00 0.99 -0.18 -0.18 Symmetric   
Lending Rate 1993 1998 0.02 0.07 -0.78 -4.06 4.70 0.03 -9.24 0.19 Asymmetric Upward Customer reaction 
Lending Rate 1994 1999 0.31 1.53 -0.39 -2.88 4.91 0.03 2.83 -2.23 Asymmetric Upward Customer reaction 
Lending Rate 1995 2000 0.21 1.20 -0.39 -3.12 4.92 0.03 4.64 -2.43 Asymmetric Upward Customer reaction 
Lending Rate 1996 2001 0.19 1.56 -0.32 -2.82 5.85 0.02 4.83 -2.96 Asymmetric Upward Customer reaction 
Lending Rate 1997 2002 -0.24 -2.17 -0.07 -0.69 0.79 0.37 -3.66 -11.79 Symmetric Downward Collusive pricing arrangement 
Lending Rate 1998 2003 -0.23 -2.23 -0.06 -0.59 1.04 0.31 -3.78 -15.20 Symmetric Downward Collusive pricing arrangement 
Lending Rate 1999 2004 -0.23 -2.38 -0.04 -0.39 1.41 0.24 -3.87 -23.84 Symmetric Downward Collusive pricing arrangement 
Lending Rate 2000 2005 0.06 0.40 -0.39 -2.80 2.72 0.10 14.05 -2.25 Asymmetric Upward Customer reaction 
Lending Rate 2001 2006 -0.20 -1.65 -0.35 -2.11 0.40 0.53 -4.47 -2.57 Symmetric Upward Customer reaction 
Lending Rate 2002 2007 -0.21 -2.31 -0.01 -0.11 1.17 0.28 -0.05 -78.06 Symmetric Downward Collusive pricing arrangement 
Lending Rate 2003 2008 0.24 1.17 -0.63 -4.41 8.58 0.00 3.94 -1.52 Asymmetric Upward Customer reaction 
Lending Rate 2004 2009 0.24 1.33 -0.51 -3.57 7.63 0.01 4.44 -2.07 Asymmetric Upward Customer reaction 
Deposit Rate 1989 1994 -0.82 -3.83 -0.22 -0.94 2.59 0.11 -0.32 -1.17 Symmetric Downward Customer reaction 
Deposit Rate 1990 1995 -0.70 -3.52 -0.32 -1.52 1.32 0.25 -0.30 -0.66 Symmetric Downward Customer reaction 
Deposit Rate 1991 1996 -0.74 -3.93 -0.43 -2.02 1.12 0.29 -0.31 -0.53 Symmetric Downward Customer reaction 
Deposit Rate 1992 1997 -0.53 -2.37 0.03 0.29 3.65 0.06 -0.48 8.50 Asymmetric Downward Customer reaction 
Deposit Rate 1993 1998 -0.64 -2.82 0.12 0.89 5.23 0.02 -0.24 1.36 Asymmetric Downward Customer reaction 
Deposit Rate 1994 1999 0.00 -0.02 -0.09 -1.36 0.28 0.60 -273.12 -7.93 Symmetric Upward Collusive pricing arrangement 
Deposit Rate 1995 2000 -0.14 -1.20 -0.30 -1.73 0.94 0.33 -5.51 -2.63 Symmetric Upward Collusive pricing arrangement 
Deposit Rate 1996 2001 -0.20 -1.74 -0.06 -0.47 0.44 0.51 -4.41 -14.31 Symmetric Downward Customer reaction 
Deposit Rate 1997 2002 -0.25 -1.53 -0.12 -0.84 0.23 0.63 -2.92 -5.98 Symmetric Downward Customer reaction 
Deposit Rate 1998 2003 -0.22 -1.48 -0.17 -1.02 0.04 0.85 -4.07 -5.29 Symmetric Downward Customer reaction 
Deposit Rate 1999 2004 -0.26 -1.57 -0.13 -0.72 0.19 0.66 -3.33 -6.82 Symmetric Downward Customer reaction 
Deposit Rate 2000 2005 -0.26 -1.35 -0.18 -0.89 0.06 0.80 -3.41 -5.12 Symmetric Downward Customer reaction 
Deposit Rate 2001 2006 -0.13 -0.67 -0.60 -2.62 1.53 0.22 -7.18 -1.59 Symmetric Upward Collusive pricing arrangement 
Deposit Rate 2002 2007 -0.27 -1.86 -0.10 -0.78 0.48 0.49 -3.59 -9.27 Symmetric Downward Customer reaction 
Deposit Rate 2003 2008 -0.39 -3.13 0.12 1.12 6.69 0.01 -2.72 8.81 Asymmetric Downward Customer reaction 
Deposit Rate 2004 2009 -0.48 -4.61 0.21 1.90 12.49 0.00 -1.96 -0.28 Asymmetric Upward Collusive pricing arrangement 
Note: ML - mean lag, ECT- error correction term 
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Table E-1.4:  Asymmetric error correction terms and mean adjustment lags for rolling windows of 
Sierra Leone 
        
Asymmetric Error Correction 
Terms       Summary 
Interest  Rolling sample ECT
+
t-1 ECT
-
t-1 Wald Test Mean Lag PT Adjustment Hypothesis 
Rates From To Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat F-stat PV ML
+
 ML
-
 Mechanism Rigidity   
Lending Rate 1989 1994 -0.32 -2.32 -0.05 -0.25 0.93 0.33 -3.00 -20.50 Symmetric Downward Collusive pricing arrangement 
Lending Rate 1990 1995 -0.29 -2.05 -0.04 -0.18 0.75 0.39 -2.32 -18.45 Symmetric Downward Collusive pricing arrangement 
Lending Rate 1991 1996 -0.22 -1.79 -0.09 -0.45 0.25 0.62 -3.09 -7.98 Symmetric Downward Collusive pricing arrangement 
Lending Rate 1992 1997 -0.16 -1.89 -0.10 -0.58 0.07 0.79 -4.78 -7.69 Symmetric Downward Collusive pricing arrangement 
Lending Rate 1993 1998 -0.18 -2.25 -0.04 -0.37 0.66 0.42 -4.08 -16.51 Symmetric Downward Collusive pricing arrangement 
Lending Rate 1994 1999 -0.16 -1.20 -0.08 -0.54 0.10 0.75 -6.03 -12.20 Symmetric Downward Collusive pricing arrangement 
Lending Rate 1995 2000 0.04 0.58 -0.26 -2.37 3.27 0.07 21.35 -3.66 Asymmetric Upward Customer reaction 
Lending Rate 1996 2001 -0.02 -0.33 -0.29 -2.88 3.77 0.05 -43.54 -3.22 Asymmetric Upward Customer reaction 
Lending Rate 1997 2002 -0.26 -1.66 -0.25 -1.84 0.00 0.99 -3.71 -3.76 Symmetric Downward Collusive pricing arrangement 
Lending Rate 1998 2003 -0.11 -1.02 -0.09 -1.03 0.01 0.93 -8.58 -9.98 Symmetric Downward Collusive pricing arrangement 
Lending Rate 1999 2004 -0.04 -0.52 -0.10 -1.40 0.18 0.67 -23.85 -9.87 Symmetric Upward Customer reaction 
Lending Rate 2000 2005 -0.08 -0.86 -0.10 -1.29 0.02 0.89 -12.84 -10.10 Symmetric Upward Customer reaction 
Lending Rate 2001 2006 -0.06 -0.64 -0.07 -1.09 0.00 0.95 -17.27 -15.13 Symmetric Upward Customer reaction 
Lending Rate 2002 2007 0.05 0.55 -0.12 -1.73 1.31 0.25 19.74 -8.47 Symmetric Upward Customer reaction 
Lending Rate 2003 2008 -0.20 -2.10 0.00 0.00 2.18 0.14 -5.24 5219.00 Symmetric Downward Collusive pricing arrangement 
Lending Rate 2004 2009 0.00 -0.04 -0.22 -2.97 1.66 0.20 
-
219.96 -4.73 Symmetric Upward Customer reaction 
Deposit Rate 1989 1994 -0.25 -1.90 0.06 0.40 1.73 0.19 -3.10 -12.07 Symmetric Downward Customer reaction 
Deposit Rate 1990 1995 -0.17 -1.27 0.04 0.34 0.91 0.34 -5.04 19.77 Symmetric Downward Customer reaction 
Deposit Rate 1991 1996 -0.06 -0.54 -0.10 -0.88 0.04 0.84 -14.87 -8.85 Asymmetric Upward Collusive pricing arrangement 
Deposit Rate 1992 1997 -0.26 -4.45 -0.12 -1.84 2.04 0.15 -3.20 -7.15 Symmetric Downward Customer reaction 
Deposit Rate 1993 1998 -0.10 -2.26 -0.15 -2.35 0.22 0.64 -8.99 -6.42 Symmetric Upward Collusive pricing arrangement 
Deposit Rate 1994 1999 -0.19 -2.47 0.01 0.09 0.99 0.32 -5.07 72.77 Symmetric Downward Customer reaction 
Deposit Rate 1995 2000 -0.12 -1.74 -0.10 -0.65 0.02 0.89 -8.04 -10.34 Symmetric Downward Customer reaction 
Deposit Rate 1996 2001 -0.10 -1.46 -0.14 -1.07 0.06 0.81 -10.29 -7.14 Symmetric Upward Collusive pricing arrangement 
Deposit Rate 1997 2002 -0.30 -4.00 -0.17 -1.48 0.83 0.36 -3.27 -5.94 Symmetric Downward Customer reaction 
Deposit Rate 1998 2003 -0.16 -1.28 -0.23 -3.22 0.16 0.69 -6.02 -4.25 Symmetric Upward Collusive pricing arrangement 
Deposit Rate 1999 2004 -0.06 -1.01 -0.13 -1.63 0.36 0.55 -16.53 -7.65 Symmetric Upward Collusive pricing arrangement 
Deposit Rate 2000 2005 -0.06 -1.37 -0.09 -1.62 0.16 0.68 -16.96 -10.64 Symmetric Upward Collusive pricing arrangement 
Deposit Rate 2001 2006 -0.06 -1.69 -0.11 -2.26 0.46 0.50 -16.09 -8.83 Symmetric Upward Collusive pricing arrangement 
Deposit Rate 2002 2007 -0.08 -1.79 -0.08 -1.56 0.00 0.99 -12.76 -12.65 Symmetric Upward Collusive pricing arrangement 
Deposit Rate 2003 2008 -0.15 -2.76 -0.04 -0.93 1.80 0.18 -6.85 -26.55 Symmetric Downward Customer reaction 
Deposit Rate 2004 2009 -0.27 -2.92 0.01 0.07 3.19 0.07 -3.77 167.77 Asymmetric Downward Customer reaction 
Note: ML - mean lag, ECT- error correction term 
 
 
